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Abstract 
 
 
Psychiatrist Medard Boss organised the Zollikon seminars with Martin Heidegger in 
1959. Among other things, these seminars focused on criticizing the psychoanalytic 
theory of Sigmund Freud with Heidegger’s philosophy; however, a Heideggerian 
critique of Carl Jung’s theory did not occur. Although Jung was superficially critical of 
Heidegger’s philosophy, my thesis aims to inspire psychotherapy by opening up a new 
view of Jungian psychology. Medard Boss and Ludwig Binswanger have provided only 
brief criticisms of Jung’s psychology with Heidegger’s ontology therefore I provide a 
Heideggerian description of three aspects of Jung’s analytical psychology: the 
transcendent function, complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum. My thesis 
highlights a “unifying element” which is “unthought” by Jung to provide Jung’s work 
with a consistent concept, which shows the interrelation of the transcendent function, 
complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum. My work explains the interrelationship 
between these areas of Jungian psychology with Heidegger’s philosophy to provide 
consistency, interconnectedness and an enhanced explanation of Jung's ideas as 
exemplifying Nietzsche's Will to Power as interpreted by Heidegger. My work 
contributes to the small amount of research that has investigated the relationship 
between Heidegger and Jung and the relationship between Jung and Nietzsche. 
Finally, my research also develops the theoretical and practical understanding of 
primary and secondary research on the Jung’s transcendent function. In summary, my 
thesis retrieves a variety of Jung’s and Heidegger’s writing as well as secondary 
research in these areas. This leads me to articulate a new understanding of the 
relationship between Jung and Heidegger as well as philosophy, psychology and 
psychoanalysis. This new understanding provides a variety of new possibilities to be 
investigated in future research in philosophy, psychoanalysis, psychology and 
Daseinsanalysis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In the foreword to the book Heidegger and the Question of Psychology (Letteri, 2009), 
Emmy van Deurzen states that Heidegger’s work has significantly influenced 
existential therapy’s goal of searching for a patient’s truth. Van Deurzen claims 
Heidegger’s philosophy helps existential therapy “elucidate and reveal life in as many 
guises as possible” (Letteri, 2009, p.ix). Furthermore, van Deurzen recognises that 
Heidegger’s work is a much-underrated resource by psychotherapists and that his 
writing can inspire psychotherapy by “opening up our view of the world, which is 
normally so closed and confined” (Letteri, 2009, p.ix). This thesis works to use 
Heidegger’s philosophy to inspire psychotherapy research and practice by opening up 
a new view of Jungian psychology. 
 
Paul Stenner (1998, p.1) recognises that the application of Martin Heidegger’s 
philosophy to the science of psychology would have “profound implications for the 
discipline”. He was aware that some psychologists had used Heidegger to develop 
their work when he wrote this; however, he explains that Heidegger’s influence “has 
been almost entirely covert” (Stenner, 1998, p.1). Stenner claims that psychologists 
are unacquainted with the possibility of using Heidegger’s work to explain human 
behaviour and that “The time is ripe, therefore, to explicitly examine some of the 
implications and applications Heideggerian thought has for modern psychology” 
(Stenner, 1998, p.1). Van Deuzen also adds, “Few psychologists and psychotherapists 
have gone through the trouble of studying Heidegger in any detail” (Letteri, 2009, p.ix). 
More research is required to help elaborate his work into psychology and my thesis 
aims to contribute to filling this gap. My thesis focuses specifically on elaborating and 
extending Heidegger’s thinking, to show its importance for understanding and 
explaining many of the concepts presented in Carl Jung’s Analytical Psychology. 
 
I begin my thesis by introducing previous work that has endeavoured to demonstrate 
Heidegger’s positive influence on psychology and psychotherapy, as well as research 
that discusses his critique of the underlying philosophy of psychoanalysis. Secondly, 
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my introduction highlights research that uses Heidegger's philosophy to better 
understand and explain psychotherapeutic theory, including the development of the 
work achieved by psychologists such as Freud and Lacan. A number of researchers 
in this area have recognised Heidegger's explicit engagement with psychoanalysis 
(Heidegger, 2001) through the Zollikon seminars that were organised by psychiatrist 
Medard Boss. As a result of this engagement, Boss developed psychoanalytic theory 
and practice with Heidegger's phenomenology and ontology to establish a new 
psychotherapeutic method named Daseinsanalysis (Boss, 1963). Consequently, a 
major focus of my introduction is to describe Daseinsanalytic principles and its impact 
on psychotherapy and this forms a foundation for my Daseinsanalytic critique of 
Jungian psychology in this thesis1. The introduction also highlights the limited previous 
research that has endeavoured to develop Jung's psychology with Heidegger’s 
philosophy and this displays the areas of Jung's work that are not interpreted in the 
light of Heidegger. These areas, which form the focus of chapters 2-6 of my thesis, are 
the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum. By the end 
of my thesis, I unify these areas of Jungian psychology to provide an enhanced 
explanation of the transcendent function as exemplifying Nietzsche's Will to Power, as 
interpreted by Heidegger (Heidegger, 1991). Finally, the conclusion of my dissertation 
demonstrates that this new understanding of the transcendent function, complexes 
and the Rosarium Philosophorum are also consistent with the principles of 
Daseinsanalysis. Consequently, my research is a valuable addition to this developing 
area of psychotherapy as well as a contribution to writing that has explained Jung’s 
work with Heidegger, as well as developing the theory and practice of the transcendent 
function. 
 
1.2 Heidegger and Psychoanalysis 
 
 
Askay & Farquhar (Askay & Farquhar, 2013a) have demonstrated how psychology can 
benefit from using Heidegger’s philosophy by highlighting similarities and fundamental 
differences between Freud and Heidegger such as the development of a 
comprehensive and unified explanation of the human being. Consequently, Askay & 
Farquhar argue that there is an “intimate belonging together” (Askay & Farquhar, 
                                               
1 Boss and Binswanger have carried out minor Daseinsanalytic critiques of Jung. For example see 
Binswanger (1963, p.246) for his brief criticism of Jung’s speculation of the ‘collective unconscious’. See 
also Boss (1963, p.54) for his brief condemnation of Jungian archetypes.   
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2013a, p.1228) of Being and the unconscious and these authors highlight that this has 
been supported by a number of philosophers and psychologists including Needleman, 
Richardson, Binswanger, Boss, Loewald, Chessick, Frie, Mills, and Thompson. 
Subsequently, Askay & Farquhar argue that a merger of Heidegger’s work with Freud’s 
will provide an enhanced and more comprehensive explanation of the human being 
(Askay & Farquhar, 2006). This is possible because both provide mutual insights and 
because of this development, in theory, Askay & Farquhar argue this will help reduce 
the prevalence of mental illness. Askay & Farquhar also point out that both Freud and 
Heidegger agree that mental health involves liberating “clients from their pathologically 
constricted ways of relating by restoring to them the fullness of their potentialities of 
existence” (Askay & Farquhar, 2013a, p.1228). 
 
Heidegger explicitly critisizes psychoanalysis in the Zollikon seminars (Heidegger, 
2001) which he delivered to scientifically educated psychiatrists, in the home of his 
psychiatrist advocate and promoter, Medard Boss. These seminars allowed Heidegger 
to interrupt “the dictatorship of scientific thinking” (Heidegger, 2001, p.274). Heidegger 
justifies this by arguing, “The more the current effect and usefulness of science spread, 
the more the capacity and readiness for a reflection upon what occurs in science 
disappears. This is especially true insofar as science carries through its claim to offer, 
and to administer, the truth about genuine reality " (Heidegger, 2001, p.94). Heidegger 
aimed to highlight the danger of an uncritical scientific worldview for psychoanalysis 
by explaining his philosophy to the psychiatrists, in the hope that psychiatry could 
develop from a more appropriate philosophical foundation. 
 
Dallmayr (1995) says Heidegger aimed to show the problems of natural science to the 
Zollikon seminar participants by highlighting the "ontological difference", which is the 
distinction between empirical characteristics (ontic) of a being and the meaning of a 
being (ontological) i.e., ‘what it means to be as Dasein’. The natural scientific method 
of inquiry focuses exclusively on ontic characteristics. Therefore, when psychoanalysis 
uses only natural science to describe behaviour, it fails to include ontological aspects 
of reality in its description. These seminars organised by Boss focused primarily on 
criticizing the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and, consequently, a Heideggerian 
critique of Jung’s theory did not occur2. Therefore, my thesis aims to continue a 
                                               
2 Boss has briefly criticized Jung in his book The analysis of dreams, where he claims Jung’s notions of 
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Heideggerian critique of psychoanalysis by filling a gap in this area of investigation by 
focusing on Carl Jung’s writing. 
 
1.3 Dasein and Psychoanalysis 
 
In the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger argues that an understanding of the human being 
as Dasein can provide a philosophical foundation for psychoanalysis. Heidegger 
explains that the meaning of the human being as Dasein is an openness to existence. 
In other words, “Dasein is always already a situatedness in any situation (literally 
meaning, “to-be-there”). It is an openness in the sense of, “Here I am in my situation, 
open to possibilities, beings, and so on.” Next, Dasein is always—in each case— a 
“mineness” in the sense of “I am my experience of meaning.” Dasein exists as Being-
in-the-world; that is, Dasein exists within a unified, concrete, experiential field of 
meaning. As such, its ways of Being-in-the-world include relating to objects, other 
Daseins, and itself. As clearedness, Dasein is always already engaged as existing in 
the clearing” (Askay & Farquhar, 2006, p.205). Heidegger applies this philosophical 
insight of Dasein to help psychotherapists understand that psychoanalysis aims to 
help a psychologically ill person to sustain this openness to existence by being 
authentic to who they are. To achieve this openness, a psychotherapist helps a person 
uncover hidden (or unconscious) possibilities from their client’s being-in-the-world. As 
a result, Heidegger says, “each illness is a loss of freedom, a constriction of the 
possibility for living” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 157). 
 
The seminars also see Heidegger advocating a “regional ontology of psychiatry” 
(Askay & Farquhar, 2013a, p.1240) (as grounded in Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology), which allows diverse psychopathology to be explained by their 
characteristic ways of losing this openness to existence. This is important as 
Heidegger says psychotherapists need an ontological grounding to their work, 
otherwise it would be “arbitrary, ‘free-floating,’ and insufficiently grounded” (Boss, 
1979, p.280). Heidegger recognises that Freud’s writing is oblivious to the ontological 
characteristics of what it means to be human. Instead of building his explanation of 
human behaviour on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, Freud uncritically adopts the 
                                               
symbol, archetype and the collective unconscious are abstract and that he objectifies the ‘subject’ with 
phrases such as “The psyche is a self-regulating system” and “the human personality is built up of layers 
which can be compared with geological layers” (Boss, 1957, p.51).  
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assumptions of the metaphysical tradition of Cartesianism, which involves 
conceptualising the mind as a mechanical object. This results in concealing the 
ontological meaning of a human. 
 
Since Freud adhered to the Cartesian tradition he assumed that the human being can 
be completely explained through “the continuity of causal connections” (Askay & 
Farquhar, 2006, p.216). However, Freud was unable to find many causes in the gaps 
of human consciousness to explain human behaviour by adopting the natural scientific 
approach of measurement. Thus, he found it necessary “to invent the unconscious” 
(Heidegger, 2001, p.207-208) to maintain the natural scientific worldview of explaining 
the mind through the mechanics of casual connections. Heidegger claims that the 
creation of the unconscious had disastrous consequences as it postulated a hidden 
entity to explain the mind. This is disastrous because the unconscious should be 
explained using experience to verify its existence. Heidegger argues that Freud 
constructed hypothetical explanations for human behaviour because he followed the 
common mode of scientific thinking where “human beings reject the importance of 
things experienced directly. They do not count. Meanwhile, most proofs rest on mere 
hypotheses” (Heidegger, 2001, p.215)3. In contrast, Heidegger’s philosophy explains 
human behaviour using direct and verifiable evidence found in the phenomena of lived 
experience. Boss highlights this by claiming, “what Heidegger’s teaching has taught 
me” is “only to open my eyes” (Boss, 1988, p.41). 
 
Heidegger (2001, p.307) praises Medard Boss’s subsequent writing following the 
Zollikon seminars that adhered to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Dasein and 
articulated an appropriate response to the scientific method of psychoanalysis 
(Heidegger 2001, p.269). In his books, which aimed to develop an ontologically 
suitable psychoanalysis, Boss acknowledges the importance of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic techniques to help a person achieve mental health, but he rejects 
Freud’s theory to explain human behaviour4. Therefore, Boss’s writing following the 
Zollikon seminars aims to describe and reinterpret Freud’s theoretical writing through 
the light of Heidegger’s phenomenology and ontology. Boss believes he can 
accomplish this objective because he argues that Freud had an implicit understanding 
                                               
3 This is a similar criticism Boss makes about Freud and Jung when he says their use of natural science 
methods obstructs them from the “discovery of the actual essence of dreams” (Boss, 1957, p.59). 
4 This is what Medard Boss identified as Freud’s ‘split personality’ (See Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.63). 
18  
of Dasein. Boss recognises that he can achieve a phenomenological interpretation of 
Freud as Freud converged with Heidegger in acknowledging that mental health is 
achieved when a person can “unveil himself and to unfold into his utmost openness” 
(Boss, 1963, p. 62), although Freud explains his ideas using the perspective of natural 
science. 
 
Boss grounds his phenomenological interpretation of psychoanalysis in Heidegger’s 
philosophy and names it Daseinsanalysis. He argues that the treatment of 
psychopathology involves helping a person to be open to all of the possibilities 
available to them for existing (Boss, 1963, p.47). Boss claims that if a person 
inauthentically fails to fulfil their possibilities they experience “guilt”5 (Boss, 1963, 
p.270). Thus, the objective of Daseinsanalysis is for a therapist to assist the analysand 
to become aware of and acknowledge all of their life possibilities in order to enable 
them to discover their unique self (Dasein) through an authentic relationship to 
existence (Boss, 1963). 
 
Boss avoids applying the natural scientific method to human behaviour which distorts 
the knowledge built in this area because, as Heidegger claims “psychology, 
anthropology, and psychopathology have considered the human being as an object in 
a broad sense, as something present-at-hand, as a domain of beings” (Heidegger, 
2001, p.153). By conceiving of a human as an object, the lived experience and 
ontological dimension of the human being is not included in knowledge construction. 
Psychoanalysis’s natural scientific method distorts the meaning of a human being 
because it assumes that humans are objects that are reducible to quantification. As a 
result, “all conventional, objectifying representations of a capsule-like psyche, subject, 
person, ego, or consciousness in psychology and psychopathology must be 
abandoned” to be replaced by “Da-sein, or being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 2001, p.4). 
 
Heidegger’s ontology assists in understanding human behaviour by removing arbitrary 
and abstract concepts that could obstruct this task. His ontology describes and outlines 
a horizon of possible ways the human being can exist. Both his ontology and 
phenomenology avoid the obstructions constructed by psychoanalysis’s assumptions 
from the natural scientific method. For example, Askay & Farquhar point out that Freud 
                                               
5 Note this interpretation of guilt by Boss is different to Heidegger’s in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1996) 
19  
assumes that physical and psychological aspects of life function in the same 
mechanical fashion and with this assumption, psychoanalysis constructs obstructions 
to understanding the human being. Freud’s assumption appears to arise because of a 
dogmatic insistence to measure and quantify human behaviour in order to understand 
and explain it. However, by doing this, a natural scientific method disregards those 
aspects of human behaviour that are not suitable for mechanical measurement or 
quantification6. This erroneous view held by psychoanalysis is evident when Freud 
says, “the intellect and the mind are objects for scientific research in exactly the same 
way as non-human things” (Askay & Farquhar, 2006, p.191). 
 
Richardson (2003) reminds us that Heidegger claims that psychoanalysis has built a 
description of the unconscious on the assumption that human behaviour is only 
describable by investigating empirical causes. However when a cause cannot be found 
empirically, a hidden unconscious is invented to maintain the mechanical worldview of 
science and causality. Heidegger argues that Freud invents and infers the existence 
of the unconscious (which cannot be measured or quantified and therefore contradicts 
the scientific method) in order to adhere to the mechanical assumptions of natural 
science. Dallmayr (1995) explains that Freud does this by removing Descartes’s 
difference between the mental and physical, by hypothesising those mental aspects 
of life function in the same way as the physical. This explains why Heidegger criticises 
psychoanalysis for constructing its theory on the objectification of humans so it can be 
“measured, calculated, controlled” (Richardson, 2003, p.14). Richardson adds to this 
by recognising that psychoanalytic theories that adhere to the objectifying perspective 
of natural science are unnecessary since phenomenology can describe and support 
the explanation of behaviour through the evidence of direct lived experience. With the 
construction of the concept of an unverifiable unconscious, psychoanalysis obstructs 
a correct description of human behaviour because the arguments are unsupported by 
the evidence of lived experience. Heidegger’s ontology can avoid the construction of 
unverifiable concepts to explain human behaviour by building explanations on direct 
lived experience through the method of phenomenology. For example, Heidegger 
(2001) provides a phenomenological explanation of repression. He simply claims that 
repression occurs when a person regularly directs their being-in-the-world to 
                                               
6 Boss applies this to both Freud and Jung when he says “For Jung as for Freud it is always that which 
is calculable or useful which is the primary measure of reality” (Boss, 1957, p.96).  
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something unrelated to the ‘repressed’ experience7. In other words, Askay and 
Farquhar (2006, p.222) say, “Heidegger believed that he could phenomenologically 
account for everything involved here without having to resort to a notion of the 
unconscious. Heidegger claimed that when someone forgets some painful event, 
she/he simply did not want to think about it”. 
 
1.4 Heidegger and Psychology 
 
As well as Binswanger (see Binswanger, 1963), Askay & Farquhar (Askay & Farquhar, 
2013a) also list William Richardson as another important figure to try to develop 
Freud’s work with Heidegger’s philosophy. Prior to the publication of the Zollikon 
seminars, Richardson (1965) notes that Freud and Heidegger both interpret Sophocles 
play, Oedipus Rex, as a metaphor for the process of revelation and “the need to 
uncover what is hidden in our existence so that we can fulfill our possibilities as whole 
beings” (Askay & Farquhar, 2013a, p.1234). They explain that Richardson builds on 
this insight by saying that it is important to understand Freud’s notion of the 
unconscious as an ontological dimension of existence, which is not always conscious 
and is therefore ‘unconscious.’ 
 
Other authors who have applied Heidegger’s philosophy to psychology include, Kemp 
(2013), who investigates the meaning of truth in psychoanalysis with the help of 
Heidegger. Kemp explains that it is important to understand truth in psychoanalysis as 
discovered and originating from “concealment or unconsciousness” (Kemp, 2013, 
p.7). Truth emerges out of a negativity of concealment. As a consequence, 
“consciousness is thus an ‘island’ that floats on unconsciousness” (Kemp, 2013, p.7), 
revealing that truth occurs from a progression of developing further consciousness of 
what is concealed. Kemp claims that the process of psychoanalysis does not involve 
starting from truth, and that untuth comes later. In contrast, Kemp says, “we start from 
untruth, ignorance and mystery and inch our way towards truth” (Kemp, 2013, p.9). 
Kemp cites Heidegger: “this struggle for unconcealment, which even in itself is 
continuous conflict, is at the same time a combat against concealment, disguise, false 
appearance” (Heidegger, 1961, p. 160) to explain that the negativity of concealment 
                                               
7 Note Heidegger would reject the psychoanalytic language here (see Askay and Farquhar, 2006, p.221-
222. It is also interesting to note how Jung and Freud may respond to this Heideggerian criticism (see 
Askay and Farquhar, 2006, p.223-229). 
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is a force which psychotherapy aims to surpass. 
 
Storolow (2003) borrows from Heidegger’s work to argue that psychological trauma 
results in the breaking up of the unifying thread of temporality. He claims that the 
stretching along between past and future receives a devastating disturbance from 
psychological trauma, where the traumatic past becomes present, and future loses all 
meaning other than endless repetition of the trauma. Storolow claims this disruption of 
temporality alienates a person from other human beings. In “Anxiety, authenticity, and 
trauma: The relevance of Heidegger's existential analytic for psychoanalysis”, 
Storolow (2007) continues to examine trauma in the light of Heidegger’s philosophy 
and he concludes that psychological trauma plunges a traumatized person into an 
authentic “Being-toward-death”. This opens up enhanced “resoluteness,” which, forms 
authentic selfhood. For Storolow, trauma shatters the illusions of the “they,” who cover 
up the finitude of Dasein and this shattering exposes the truth of what ‘the they’ hide, 
bringing about an enhanced “resoluteness” when the truth of Dasein's finitude has 
been unconcealed8. 
 
Chessick (1995) applies Heidegger’s notion of ‘authenticity’ to psychotherapy with 
adolescents. In this paper, Chessick is interested in highlighting Heidegger’s idea of 
inauthenticity which he says results in self-forgetfulness and a loss of meaning to life. 
Chessick claims that adolescents in psychotherapy typically present this type of 
inauthenticity. He argues that Heidegger has a solution to overcome this inauthenticity 
that “is a kind of self-focussing. In this procedure, one stands back and reviews options 
and possibilities in the attempt to shape one's life in accordance with ideals and values 
that are determined by actual focus on them rather than by a mindless immersion in 
everyday practices” (Chessick, 1995, p.215). Chessick argues this self-focusing 
results in both an increasingly meaningful life and a cohesiveness of the self. He also 
claims that when adolescents live inauthentically their life is disjointed and they fail to 
consolidate an identity. Chessick argues this leads to non-adaptive behaviours such 
as using drugs or "‘thrills’ to ‘make it all worthwhile’" (Chessick, 1995, p.215). Thus, 
Chessick recommends that to overcome inauthentic and non-adaptive behaviour, a 
conscious self-focusing allows options and possibilities to open. This provides a 
person the opportunity to shape their life in accordance with their individual values 
                                               
8 See Askay, & Farquhar (2013b, p.605) for a more extensive discussion of Storolow’s contributions to 
phenomenology and psychoanalysis. 
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instead of the values inauthentically prescribed by others. 
 
Carel (2006) investigates Freud’s and Heidegger’s work on death to show that 
mortality is an essential configuring metaphysical force in human life. By bringing 
Freud and Heidegger together, she presents an explanation of death that creates an 
assembly point for philosophy and psychoanalysis, which allows a critical analysis of 
the problems and strengths of both. Carel constructs a unified view of death, based 
on the strengths of each standpoint to overcome the problems found in each discipline. 
 
Carel points out that both Heidegger and Freud claim that death actively influences life 
and that both attribute more significance than “a physicalist account, in which it would 
simply be the endpoint of life and have no influence within life” (Carel, 2006, p.116). 
She recognises that both thinkers focus on death as a metaphysical force, rather than 
a physical incident. She also claims that the covering up of death (in Heidegger’s 
words) is equivalent to saying death is repressed in the words of psychoanalysis. Both 
of these actions act as defence mechanisms, both transport unpleasant or threatening 
ideas elsewhere and both retain their contents while covering them up. As a result, 
both phenomenology and psychoanalysis are methods for exploring the hidden 
aspects of human behaviour as both explain how this is possible and how to uncover 
what remains hidden. Carel integrates these perspectives, claiming that an authentic 
encounter with death occurs when death is not repressed and authenticity is the goal 
of successful psychoanalysis that provides “an uncovered – or better, discovered – 
life” (Carel, 2006, p.182). Carel concludes by advocating further dialogue between 
philosophy and psychoanalysis as this “can enhance and enrich philosophical styles 
of argumentation and conceptualisation, as well as apply philosophical critical 
strategies to examine psychoanalytic assumptions” (Carel, 2006, p.188). 
 
Loparic (1999) claims that when Heidegger criticizes psychoanalysis he accepts 
Freud's observations but that these observations need translation into a "language of 
description of phenomena" (Heidegger, 2001, p.345). Heidegger recognizes that 
Freud has discovered many ‘ontic’ experiences such as projection, identification, 
regression and repression. However, to explain these behaviours adequately, these 
discoveries need an interpretation in the light of Heidegger’s phenomenological 
ontology of Dasein. Thus, Loparic points out that it is important to understand all 
behaviour encountered in psychoanalysis as “particular modes of being-in-the-world, 
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which make them possible” (Loparic, 1999, p.14). When these behaviours are 
explained, they form a regional ontology of psychiatry. Loparic recognises that this 
regional ontology of psychiatry is still lacking and “remains a long overdue desideratum 
for the disciplinary framework of daseinsanalysis” (Loparic, 1999, p.14). My thesis 
continues this work suggested by Loparic by translating Carl Jung’s psychoanalytical 
findings into the "language of description of phenomena" and as “particular modes of 
being-in-the-world, which make them possible”. Although Boss has outlined a regional 
ontology of psychiatry for Freud’s concepts including projection, identification, 
regression and repression, Jung’s work has yet to receive the same attention, and my 
thesis focuses on a phenomenological explanation of three aspects of Jung’s writing: 
the transcendent function, complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum. 
 
1.5 Heidegger and Lacan 
Capobianco (1995) extends Heidegger’s work to psychoanalysis by demonstrating an 
equivalence between Lacan's "ordinary" man and the "hero" and Heidegger's 
inauthentic "Self of everyday Dasein" and "the authentic Self". He claims that Lacan's 
"ordinary" man conforms to the desire advocated by society, but not with his own 
desire, which resembles the "they-self" of Dasein who projects the common 
possibilities of "Others" rather than its own possibilities. Capobianco also shows that 
Lacan's "hero" rejects compromising their own desire, and that this is reminiscent of 
Dasein's "authentic self" who is resolute to project its own possibilities. He 
demonstrates this equivalence further in Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics. 
When Heidegger interprets Sophocles' Antigone, he describes Dasein's authentic 
resoluteness as "heroic". Thus, Capobianco’s work highlights the possibility of a 
phenomenological explanation of Lacan’s work. This adds to Boss’s interpretation of 
Freud, and to my interpretation of Jung, in order to form a more comprehensive 
“regional ontology of psychiatry” (see Gildersleeve, 2016a and Gildersleeve 2017). 
 
In “Psychoanalysis and the Being-question” Richardson (1983) highlights Heidegger’s 
influence on Lacan by quoting a passage from Lacan’s Ecrits. Lacan writes: "Of all the 
undertakings that have been proposed in this century, that of the psychoanalyst is 
perhaps the loftiest, because his task is to act in our time as a mediator between the 
man of care [i.e., human being according to Heidegger] and the subject of absolute 
knowledge [i.e., human being according to Hegel]" (Lacan, 2002, p.78). Richardson 
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(2003) also recognises that, similar to Heidegger and Boss, Lacan proposes to 
dispense with the mechanics of natural science by explaining the human mind as a 
structure of language. Richardson highlights how Heidegger’s concepts of truth and 
freedom also assist in explaining Lacan’s work. He claims Lacan is “certainly 
interested in Heidegger” (Richardson, 2003, p.16) since Lacan translated Heidegger's 
work on the Logos of Heraclitus. Richardson suggests that their mutual interest in 
Heraclitus demonstrates the compatibility of their work. 
 
In order to bring their work together, Richardson explains that Lacan reduces 
understanding the human mind to language and this provides some insight into how 
psychoanalysis is successful as a "talking cure" (Richardson, 2003, p.19). 
Furthermore, Richardson explains that Lacan argues psychoanalysis aims to discover 
the truth of the subject (or their desire) through a revelation of the meaning of the 
subject’s historicity. Richardson claims psychoanalysis reveals this truth of the 
subject’s desire and provides a “freedom from darkness” (Richardson, 2003, p.32). He 
argues that Heidegger’s work on Aletheia (Αληθεια) provides an explanation for how 
this process is possible, adding that Heidegger’s work can explain how psychoanalysis 
achieves the subject’s ‘full speech’, which occurs when the analysand achieves the 
freedom to fulfil the truth of their being. 
 
Richardson elaborates this idea by explaining that Lacan argues that truth and 
language are intimately related. He points out that Heidegger says the meaning of 
logos (λόγος) in the work of Heraclitus explains the relationship between truth and 
language. The meaning of logos, according to Heidegger, is "to gather" (Richardson, 
2003, p.35) beings into a unity which unconceals the truth of Being (Aletheia). Thus, 
Richardson argues that psychoanalysis involves the task of unconcealing this truth 
through the articulation of the language of logos. Consequently, Richardson explains 
that Aletheia takes place through the articulation of logos when ‘full speech’ is 
achieved by the analysand, and that this demonstrates that "truth is grounded in the 
fact that it speaks and it has no other means of [being grounded]" (Richardson, 2003, 
p.36). Lacan’s writing reflects this explanation when he suggests “it is with the 
appearance of language that the dimension of truth emerges" (Lacan, 2002, p.130). 
Thus, Richardson concludes that psychoanalysis is successful because it can achieve 
a revelation of Aletheia that liberates the analysand from darkness, resulting in a 
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newfound freedom through the function of language. 
 
In “Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis” Richardson (1980) also argues that Lacan’s 
concepts of "empty" speech and "full" speech are equivalent to Heidegger’s 
explanation of Dasein’s "inauthenticity" and "authenticity"9. Richardson explains that 
empty speech is speech from an inauthentic self, whereas full speech comes from an 
authentic self. Psychoanalysis aims to help the analysand attain full speech. 
Richardson elaborates by arguing that Heidegger also influences the temporal aspects 
of Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Lacan explains that the fundamental method of 
psychoanalysis is to examine the history of the subject through the analysand’s speech 
to the analyst. Richardson argues that Lacan understands this in the light of 
Heidegger’s work on temporality where psychoanalysis allows the analysand to 
appropriate their past in the present through the effect of full speech that rearranges 
“past contingencies by conferring on them the sense of necessities to come” (Lacan, 
2002, p.36). Another Heideggerian influence is evident when Lacan claims that, 
"analysis can have for its goal only the advent of true speech and the realization of the 
subject of his history in relation to a future" (Lacan, 2002, p.65). Thus, temporality 
(past, present and future), is involved in the "advent of true speech". Accordingly, 
Richardson points out that what psychoanalysis aims to achieve is what Heidegger 
calls authentic existence that involves retrieving the past to make the future present. 
This allows Dasein to anticipate possibilities to care for its being. By retrieving the past 
to anticipate the future, psychoanalysis achieves full speech that liberates and heals 
Dasein from its darkness, where a revelation of truth allows Dasein to be authentic. 
 
Finally, Moran (1993) offers another piece of work that examines the relationship 
between Heidegger and Lacan. He argues that Heidegger’s ontology is unspoken in 
the work of Lacan. Moran claims that, “Lacan's work is nourished by his attention to 
the concept of being” (Moran, 1993a, p.170) and that the desire of the subject is a 
desire of “the lack of being”. He argues this is clear in Lacan’s Freudian statement 
concerning desire and lack: "There where it was it is my duty that I should come to 
being" (Lacan, 2002, p.98). Examining this statement in the light of Heidegger's writing 
discloses, for Moran, “a fertile territory” (Moran, 1993b, p.78) which can inspire further 
research into the ontological aspects of psychoanalysis. Finally, Moran uses 
                                               
9 Empty speech may be comparable to ‘idle talk’ in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1996, p.157).  
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Heidegger’s writing to claim that truth in psychoanalysis should be understood as 
Aletheia, where the unconscious comes to “presence through non-concealment of 
Being” (Moran, 1993b, p.85). 
 
1.6 Daseinsanalysis 
 
Earlier in this introduction, I briefly outlined Medard Boss’s writing on Daseinsanalysis. 
This section focuses on elucidating Boss’s work, as well as outlining the achievements 
of other projects by those working in Daseinsanalysis. Marshall (1989) describes a 
fundamental difference that separates Daseinsanalysis from psychoanalysis. He 
suggests that the phenomenological loyalty to lived experience principally 
distinguishes Daseinsanalysis from psychoanalysis, where psychoanalysis explains 
human behaviour through “forces” or “dynamics” behind the experience. The 
distinction between the natural scientific view of human behavior in psychoanalysis 
and the phenomenological view in Daseinsanalysis is evident when Freud writes: “We 
do not seek merely to describe and classify phenomena but to comprehend them as 
indications of a play of forces in the mind, as expressions of tendencies striving 
towards a goal, which work together or against one another. In this conception, the 
trends we merely infer are more prominent than the phenomena we perceive” (Freud, 
1920, p. 60)10. 
 
Marshall explains that Daseinsanalysis understands that mental illness occurs when 
there is a disruption or impasse in a person’s openness to existence where a person 
is unable to remain open to the challenges of Being-in-the-world. Boss supports this 
explanation by providing an example of a Daseinanalytic understanding of 
schizophrenia. Boss writes: 
 
A Daseinsanalytic view of the existence of the schizophrenic reveals it to be 
unable to sustain or maintain that open worldly realm of the ability to perceive in 
the way that healthy human beings do…what he encounters engulfs the 
schizophrenic; it destroys his selfhood. No wonder, then, that he strives to 
                                               
10 This quote from Freud is characteristic of him as a natural scientist but Binswanger and Boss both 
recognise his ‘split personality’ where “ Freud had been a practicing existentialist while theorizing like a 
natural scientist” (Boss, 1977, p.xii). (For more about Freud’s ‘split personality’ see (Askay & Farquhar, 
2006, p.315, p.408) and (Askay & Farquhar, 2011, p.63, p.126). 
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escape this destruction by maintaining a rigid distance from encountering beings, 
especially human beings. (Boss, 1977, p. 225) 
 
Spinelli (1996) provides an explanation of the essential features of Daseinsanalysis 
that include rejecting the idea of a human being as "a psychic apparatus” which is 
determined by “unseen psychic structures and forces" (Spinelli, 1996, p.32). In 
addition, Spinelli claims that Daseinsanalysis recognises human behaviour is only 
understandable by examining it as an “interplay between, human beings and their 
world” (Spinelli, 1996, p.32). Spinelli also says Daseinsanalysis emphasises "letting 
be" so a person can unconceal truth when encountering beings in the world11. 
 
Cooper (2003, p.37) suggests that Boss argues that psychoanalysis “was a 
‘conceptual monstrosity’ of inhuman mechanisms” which was built on a theory that 
was unverifiable and arbitrary. In his book, Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, Boss 
points out that psychoanalysis rests on the prescientific assumption that “all things are 
of the nature of calculable objects” (Boss, 1963, p.29). Consequently, Daseinsanalysis 
attempts to acquire a more accurate understanding of human behavior by borrowing 
Heidegger's "analysis of Dasein" (Boss, 1963, p.4), which Boss claims is more 
appropriate than the objectifying view of natural science12. 
 
Boss emphasizes that Daseinsanalysis urges theories in psychology to be constructed 
by remaining with what is immediately perceived; to “not get lost in "scientific" 
abstractions, derivations, explanations, and calculations estranged from the 
immediate reality of the given phenomena” (Boss, 1963, p.30). Daseinsanalysis avoids 
the “dangerous scientific tendency to flee from the immediately given phenomena” 
(Boss, 1963, p.59) and unverified assumptions which construct abstractions “behind” 
direct experience. Daseinsanalysis describes human behavior through phenomena, 
which are directly encountered and seen through immediate reflective experience. 
Consequently, Boss states that Daseinsanalysis’s criticism towards psychoanalysis “is 
positive” (Boss, 1963, p.59) because it is capable of explaining human behaviour and 
providing evidence through lived experience rather than from “distant and abstract 
                                               
11 See also Binswanger (1963, p.252) 
12 Note Heidegger’s distinction between ‘Daseinsanalysis’ and the ‘Analytic of Dasein’ (Heidegger, 2001, 
p.305-306).  
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positions” (Boss, 1963, p.59)13. Daseinsanalysis can develop psychoanalysis because 
both have the same aim; to free and open the human being to all the possibilities 
available to them14. This is in accordance with Freud’s formula for psychotherapy to 
allow a person the “full capacity for work and enjoyment” (Boss, 1963, p.68). 
Daseinsanalysis highlights the truth of Freud’s words when he says psychoanalysis is 
a: 
 
‘speculative superstructure,’ a ‘rational foundation for . . . medical efforts, 
gradually developed,’ any part of which ‘can be abandoned or changed without 
loss or regret the moment its inadequacies have been proved’; it is an ‘artificial 
structure of hypotheses’ which would probably be ‘blown away’ in globo by the 
progress of science (Freud cited in Boss, 1963, p.75). 
 
Daseinsanalysis demonstrates the truth of this statement by Freud by highlighting the 
inadequacy of the secondary, "speculative superstructure" of psychoanalytic theory, 
because Daseinsanalysis can elucidate “on the basis of immediate experience, all 
those psychic phenomena that forced Freud to invent the unconscious” (Boss, 1963, 
p.94). 
 
In Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology, Boss (1977) highlights the 
significant impact prescientific premises have on scientific investigation as it “sets forth 
in advance which inquiries are possible and which are not” (Boss, 1977, p.xvii). These 
premises determine the results of scientific enquiry and therefore demonstrate the 
significance of Heidegger’s investigation of prescientific premises for the accuracy of 
psychological conclusions. Until the work of Heidegger and Boss in the Zollikon 
seminars, psychoanalysis appeared oblivious to the importance that “Any science 
must undertake again and again to rethink and rearticulate the premises on which it is 
based” and that “Only this can assure reliable functioning and productivity for the 
science” (Boss, 1977, p.xviii). The reason for this is due to the success of applying 
natural scientific premises to human behaviour; “these achievements leave no room 
to doubt that this kind of application of the natural scientific research method is 
justifiable and necessary” (Boss, 1977, p.xviii). However, with all the success and 
                                               
13 This can be connected to Boss’s criticism of Jungian archetypes (Boss, 1957, p.53). 
14 This highlights the other (‘existentialist’) part of Freud’s ‘split personality’ as mentioned in the footnote 
two pages previously.  
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achievements of this method, “the natural scientific approach repeatedly finds itself 
confronting a realm to which it cannot gain access” (Boss, 1977). Thus, the role of 
Daseinsanalysis is to gain access to the lived first person experience and explain 
behaviour from the areas of life which natural science cannot reach. Boss claims that 
Freud uncritically thought that the natural scientific path was the only way to truth. 
Unfortunately, by adhering to this method, psychoanalysis constructs “conclusions that 
are alien to the actual appearance of our objects of study, with abstractions that depart 
from what can actually be seen” (Boss, 1977, p.84). 
 
In “Daseinsanalysis: A Quest for Essentials”, Craig (1988) calls for all psychoanalytic 
theories to be re-interpreted with Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. He explains that 
Boss has lead the way in this task by explaining a variety of psychoanalytic concepts 
such as “‘transference,’ ‘countertransference,’ ‘resistance,’ ‘repetition compulsion’ and 
‘acting out’” “in the philosophically ‘purified’ light of phenomenological reflection” 
(Craig, 1988, p.15). Although Boss does not re-interpret Jung’s psychoanalytic 
concepts in the “purified light of Heidegger’s phenomenology”, Knowles (2002) 
acknowledges that Medard Boss does criticise Jung’s work in an interview in 1968 
where he states Jung “wanted to remain a natural scientist and at the same time to 
become a phenomenologist. That's like trying to be both wood and iron” (Knowles, 
2002, p.39)15. Consequently, my thesis aims to fill this ‘knowledge gap’ left by Boss by 
re-interpreting Jung’s writing in the “purified” light of phenomenology. Thus, my work 
continues the writing of Boss who aims to cure psychotherapists “of what he refers to 
as a new neurosis best called 'psychoanalytis'" (Craig, 1988, p.15), which means to 
explain the findings in psychoanalysis through the precise and appropriate method of 
phenomenology. 
 
1.7 Natural Science and Human Science 
 
Binswanger (1963, p.155, p.169), Boss and Adolf Grunbaum consider psychoanalysis 
a natural science16. For example, Grunbaum highlights this well when he says, “Freud 
                                               
15 See Boss (1977, p.140) for his brief criticism Jung’s ‘collective unconscious’ which he describes as 
having “faulty assumptions” and “an instance of reductionism”. He then adds that in comparsion to 
Heidegger’s ontology, “All notions of a psychic unconscious that have become rooted in modern 
psychology turn out to be artificial products of theory, false footholds made to advance a preconceived 
and inadequate approach to human being”. 
16 See Heidegger (2001, p.310-311) for a summary of the philosophical assumptions of Freud’s 
‘metapsychology’.  
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insisted that the psychoanalytic enterprise has the status of a natural science. As he 
told us at the very end of his life, the explanatory gains from positing unconscious 
mental processes ‘enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any 
other’" (Grunbaum, 1985, p.2). In contrast, phenomenology is a human science. Van 
Manen argues, “The distinction of ‘Human’ Science versus ‘Natural’ Science is often 
attributed to Wilhelm Dilthey” (Van Manen 1990, p.3). Storolow adds to this by 
explaining that: “According to Dilthey, the human sciences are to be distinguished from 
the sciences of nature because of a fundamental difference in attitude toward their 
respective objects of investigation: the natural sciences investigate objects from the 
outside whereas the human sciences rely on a view from the inside” (Storolow, 
Atwood, 1984, p.88). My thesis avoids the natural scientific description of 
psychoanalysis that “studies ‘objects of nature,’ ‘things,’ ‘natural events,’ and ‘the way 
that objects behave’” (Van Manen 1990, p.3). This is important because if 
psychoanalysis remains with a natural scientific description of the human being “it 
reduces humans to things. Or to a thing with processes that are not genuinely human” 
(Aanstoos, 1996, p.7). 
 
The reason psychoanalysis adopted the natural scientific approach is because: 
 
Historically, when psychology broke away from a philosophical mode of 
scholarship it strove to become a natural science. This meant that it largely 
imitated the concepts and practices of the natural sciences which included the 
use of abstract terms to designate many of its phenomena with the consequence 
that psychology is often more abstract and generic than it ought to be (Giorgi, 
2011, p.26). 
 
It is clear that when psychoanalysts uncritically adopts this method to explain behaviour 
it is naïve because psychoanalysis “was implicitly accepting physical objects as the 
model for psychical phenomena. And the parameters that were determinative of 
‘physicality’ were the parameters that came to determine how psychical phenomena 
were conceptualized” (Giorgi, 2007, p.46). Traditionally, psychoanalysts have studied 
the human being with the natural scientific method; however, “the price paid was 
severe distortion of the phenomenon” (Giorgi, 2007, p.46). Unfortunately, this method 
used by psychoanalysts to develop knowledge of the human being appears to be 
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erroneous because the “desire to be a natural science actually preceded an 
examination of its subject matter and by adopting and imitating the pre-existing natural 
scientific methods and criteria, its methods preceded its problems” (Giorgi, 2014, 
p.235). 
 
As a result of psychoanalysis developing within a natural scientific framework to 
conceptualise the human being from an external point of view “the meaning of 
experience is ignored” (De Castro, 2003, p.46). Therefore, “psychologists have not 
seen that the only thing that they have been doing is to project their own theories on 
to the subjects as a way to validate them” (De Castro, 2003, p.46). Consequently, De 
Castro argues, "To ignore the phenomena of conscious life just as they are given in 
experience is to abnegate the ultimate source of all knowledge in favor of physicalistic 
dogma" (De Castro, 2003, p.47). This dogma is still active since “Mainstream 
psychology has been guided by the naturalistic perspective and those who argue for 
a non-naturalistic view are fewer in number and are usually marginalized” (Giorgi, 
2013, p.250). My thesis aims to balance this one-sidedness by utilising a human 
science methodology to reinterpret the psychoanalytic theories of Jung with 
Heidegger’s phenomenology. 
 
1.8 Phenomenology 
 
My thesis adopts Husserl’s maxim “Back to the things themselves!” (Husserl 
1950/1964, p. 6) which means that I explain Jung’s psychoanalytic findings from “the 
way things are experienced rather than various extraneous concerns which might 
simply obscure and distort what is to be understood” (Gallagher, Zahavi, 2013, p.6). A 
number of authors have recognised this problem in Jung’s work. For example, Mook 
says, “leading phenomenologists critiqued Jung’s implicit ontology and epistemology 
as Cartesian” (Mook, 2003, p.233). Additionally, “Although Jung often referred to 
himself as a phenomenologist, his writings show that his understanding of 
phenomenology was naïve and that he lacked knowledge of its philosophy” (Mook, 
2003, p.233). My thesis aims to turn the perspective of Jung’s writing from a third 
person approach to a phenomenological first person approach. This is important 
because if the experience of the phenomena being studied is eliminated there is only 
an outside perspective to understand the theories of Jung “which would be divorced 
from the sense of the whole of the experience for the person who lives it” (De Castro, 
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2003, p.48).  
 
My thesis utilises the phenomenological work of Heidegger to overcome the limitations 
of Jung’s natural scientific approach to psychoanalysis and to refocus this “inquiry, 
concentrating not on descriptions of worldly objects but on descriptions of experience. 
This requires a change in the attitude or attunement of the researcher from a natural 
perspective to a phenomenological perspective” (Polkinghorne, 1989, p.41). My work 
counters the reductionism of the natural scientific method of Jung and follows the ideas 
initiated by Husserl that aim “to expand the philosophical outlooks so that all possible 
experienceable or intuitable phenomena can receive rigorous treatment” (Giorgi, 2007, 
p.66).  
 
When psychoanalysis eliminates first person experience to explain human behaviour 
it follows the natural scientific method. The premise of this method is explained by 
Deese who writes, “Because individual minds are private affairs,” they are not the 
subject for scientific observation ... [and] are beyond the techniques of the scientist” 
(Deese, 1964, p. 2). In response to this limitation of the natural scientific method Deese 
explains, "any psychologist, however, can see and hear what you do and say, and 
from his observations that psychologist can construct a theory of what your mind is 
like" (1964, p.2). This is what Jung has done with his writing. Morgan (1986, p.7) also 
provides a valuable description of Jung’s method: 
 
From what is done and said, psychologists can and do make inferences about 
the feelings, attitudes, thoughts, and other mental processes which may be 
behind behavior. In this way, internal mental events can be studied as they 
manifest themselves through what people do - their behaviour. Thus, it is through 
behavior that we can actually study and come to understand internal mental 
processes that would otherwise be hidden from us (Morgan, 1986, p.7). 
 
This highlights that Freud’s and Jung’s work, and any other psychoanalytic theory that 
uses the natural scientific method, falls prey to methodological convenience over an 
authentic theoretical framework. In addition: “what comes easy in this way does not 
come cheap, for this method-centered definition of behaviour requires the psychologist 
to ignore behavior's own interior significance” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.25). What this 
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means is that Jung’s natural scientific approach to explain his findings is “a psychology 
of alienation. Its practiced ignorance refers therefore to the psychologist's deliberate 
forgetfulness of what he or she knows about behavior from his or her own behaving” 
(Valle & Halling, 1989, p.26). Jung has fallen prey to the biased epistemology of natural 
science17 that only investigates the visible behaviour of a subject from an external view. 
The use of natural science in psychoanalysis excludes the experience of the subject 
because it is invisible to the researcher: “Thus it is not the subject matter in psychology 
that is privileged but its methods and its attitude” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.26). 
 
Another problem with Jung’s natural scientific approach is to dismiss the actual first 
person experience because it is invisible to the researcher, but then to substitute “in its 
place the observer's inferred meaning” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.26). This is problematic 
because it distorts the first person experience due to the dogmatic insistence of the 
natural scientific method. This method distorts the lived experience because it refuses 
to explain theory from the first person point of view. This forces an explanation to ignore 
that experience and then to establish an inference of that point of view from an 
objectifying third person perspective. 
 
Phenomenology offers a more fruitful alternative to the inference of experience from a 
third person point of view. Phenomenology places emphasis on the lived experience 
and therefore engages in an interpretation of that experience which “means to read 
something that by definition is there” instead of inferring, which “means to place or to 
posit something that by definition is not yet there” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.26). Jung’s 
natural scientific method assumes “that behavior first lacks meaning and requires the 
constructions of the observer for behaviour to be meaningful” (Valle & Halling, 1989, 
p.26). Phenomenology, in contrast, “assumes that behaviour is a meaning to be read” 
(Valle & Halling, 1989, p.27) and so is open to the first person perspective. 
 
The differences between Jung’s natural scientific view and the phenomenological view 
of my thesis “can be seen, moreover, in the root meanings of the terms. Infer means 
‘to bring into,’ whereas interpret means ‘agent or negotiator’” (Valle & Halling, 1989, 
p.27). The phenomenological approach of my thesis is more faithful to the investigation 
                                               
17 This is supported by Boss (1957, p.52). Jung “had at his disposal only the old approach of natural 
science which never allowed him to free himself from the objectivization of the human being”. 
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of human behaviour because interpretation “is an act of negotiation” (Valle & Halling, 
1989, p.27). Phenomenology allows an active involvement of both the third person 
(observer) point of view and the first person (observed) point of view. Consequently, 
my thesis engages with Jung’s third person view and Heidegger’s first person view to 
come to a more balanced understanding of Jung’s findings. With this, my thesis 
contributes a “reciprocal, dialectical relation” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.27) of 
interpretation between these viewpoints so “meaning passes both ways” and there is 
“mutual participation” between the human sciences and natural sciences. 
 
Finally, there are also a number of other reasons to translate Jung’s writing into the 
language of phenomenology. For example, “phenomenological research supplies a 
deeper and clearer understanding of what it is like for someone to experience 
something” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.58). This is very important especially for 
psychotherapy as it allows a better understanding of the problem a patient wants to 
resolve; and psychotherapists “can appreciate and be more sensitive to those involved 
in these experiences” (Valle & Halling, 1989, p.58). Furthermore, Cooper argues the 
natural scientific method is “‘ethically problematic’ and ‘therapeutically 
disadvantageous’” (Cooper, 2007, p.12). He reasons: “it is clear that a whole range of 
psychological difficulties are related to low self-esteem (e.g. Barrowclough et al., 
2003). If psychotherapists, then, engage with their clients through an epistemological 
‘lens’ that is implicitly de-humanizing, it seems possible that this may have a negative 
impact on their clients” (Cooper, 2007, p.12). As a result, my thesis avoids these issues 
associated with the natural scientific method that excludes the first person human 
experience from its theoretical framework. Importantly, Cooper also highlights the 
difference between phenomenological psychotherapies and psychoanalysis. He 
claims: “the roots of clients’ difficulties are not seen as lying in inaccessible regions of 
their minds or in the distant past, but in the very fabric of their lived-experiences”. As 
a result, phenomenological psychotherapy removes the “abstract hypothesis for why 
clients are the way they are, and [focuses] more on working collaboratively with clients 
to help them explore their actual experiencing” (Cooper, 2007, p.12). 
 
1.9 Daseinsanalysis and Psychopathology 
 
Daseinsanalytic author Hicklin (Hicklin, 1988) explains in her paper “The significance 
of life‐history in Daseinsanalytic Psychotherapy” that Daseinsanalytic therapists are 
35  
attentive to a person’s immediate ways of relating with the psychotherapist to identify 
historical ways a person has obstructed their openness and freedom to being-in-the- 
world. Hicklin explains that this is important to identify because a narrowing of a 
person’s being-in-the-world “leads to incomplete or inaccurate perception of one's 
world and one's self” (Hicklin, 1988, p.135). Hicklin refers to this inaccurate prejudicial 
perception of the world as "paranoid experiencing" (Hicklin, 1988, p.135) which is 
observed as defensiveness and a closed off relation in psychotherapy. Hicklin explains 
that this "rigor mortis" (Hicklin, 1988, p.135) toward others and the world involves a 
strong resistance to change because it has defended a person against experiencing 
pain and suffering. She suggests that a Daseinsanalytic therapist must appreciate and 
be empathetic to this resistance to assist a person to let go of closing off to their world. 
However in “Recent Considerations in Daseinsanalysis” Boss (1988) points out that 
helping a person to achieve complete openness is not easy and the difficulty of this 
task depends on the length of the closed off relation a person has had toward the 
world. Boss compares this to physical injuries that restrict a person’s ability to 
participate in the world. He claims that Daseinsanalysis is similar to physical 
rehabilitation where the longer the injury or closed off relation to the world, the longer 
and more difficult the rehabilitation will be to achieve an openness to being-in-the- 
world. 
 
In “The self understanding of the psychotherapist”, Brenner (1988) explains that the 
goal of Daseinsanalysis is to open a person to their full range of possibilities for being- 
in-the-world. She explains that when a person enters psychotherapy they typically only 
possess two possibilities for being-in-the-world which are to “resist and defend against 
what is encountered or they surrender to it” (Brenner, 1988, p.143). These two possible 
restricted ways of existing (withdrawal or surrender) find support in Kouba’s (Kouba, 
2014) Heideggerian definition of mental illness (which I go on to discuss below). 
Brenner also explains the importance of the psychotherapist’s own self understanding 
who should reflect on their “own unique manner of erecting obstacles to free and open 
relationships” (Brenner, 1988, p.149). Brenner recommends this not only for the 
psychotherapists own mental health but also for the benefit of the patient who comes 
to psychotherapy so a psychotherapist can help a person to an awareness of “life-
denying patterns and conflicts” (Brenner, 1988, p.150). 
 
Finally, Cooper (2003) explains Daseinsanalysis emphasises the importance of 
openness to loving and trusting others for mental health and wellness. Cooper 
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supports Hicklin (1988) when he says a Daseinsanalyst attends to the analysand’s 
behaviour toward them as this can identify areas of openness or closedness towards 
others. Daseinsanalysts help a person identify past experiences, which lack openness 
to certain aspects of life, and the therapist may highlight choices that the analysand 
has not discovered or considered. When a detailed picture of the analysand’s 
narrowed existence has been discussed, and when areas of resistance have been 
identified, the Daseinsanalyst can then facilitate “a ‘trial world’” (Cooper, 2003, p.41) 
which permits the analysand to discover new possibilities for being open to the world. 
 
1.10 The Phenomenon of Mental Disorder 
 
Petr Kouba’s book The Phenomenon of Mental Disorder: Perspectives of Heidegger’s 
Thought in Psychopathology (Kouba, 2014) supports a number of arguments 
presented in my thesis. In this book, Kouba claims that Heidegger’s critique in the 
Zollikon seminar provides evidence for the value of ontology in psychology and marks 
out a new path to define human health and illness. Kouba argues the Zollikon seminars 
aim is to demonstrate that “the primary goal of therapeutic effort can only be to help 
the patient to achieve an open and steady being-in-the-world” (Kouba, 2014, p.3). 
 
Kouba points out that Heidegger defines illness as a deprivation (lack) of possibilities 
for being-in-the-world. Kouba provides examples that include, claustrophobia, which 
demonstrates a lack of the possibility to enter closed spaces or any other neurosis that 
limits possibilities for being-with-others. Kouba claims that psychopathology involves 
closing off to possibilities for being-in-the-world. Health involves being intimately 
involved with the world whereas illness involves not being able to respond adequately 
to being-in-the-world and this ultimately results in falling prey to the world. Kouba also 
explains that illness involves a lack of being able to encounter the world while 
preserving a sense of self. As a result, to preserve a sense of self and to avoid falling 
prey to the world, a person who has mental illness “closes himself/herself off from 
everything that could subjugate him/her by its requirements” (Kouba, 2014, p.98). Boss 
provides a number of explanations to understand why a person closes off to 
possibilities available to them. He says that Dasein may fear the freedom of 
independence that results in a “loss of protective dependencies” (Boss, 1963, p.122). 
Furthermore, Dasein can fear “falling prey to and perishing in what it defends against, 
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because the defended-against seems to have so much more power than itself” (Boss, 
1963, p.122). Finally, Dasein may shut out possibilities available because of a fear of 
being outcast by others “by admitting realms of beings which are regarded as sinful 
and dirty” (Boss, 1963, p.122). By closing off to being-in-the-world Dasein “deepens 
the ongoing self-alienation and depersonalization” (Kouba, 2014, p.4) resulting in a 
feeling of guilt. Consequently, the aim of psychotherapy is to assist a person to adjust 
to the facticity of their being-in-the-world to open possibilities which had been closed 
and therefore “treatment proves to be both adaptation and liberation” (Kouba, 2014, 
p.100). 
 
Kouba continues to explain that the goal of psychotherapy is to remove all constraints, 
obstructions, and blocks for being-in-the-world in order to allow the person to achieve 
a cheerful and relaxed calmness, which Heidegger calls Gelassenheit (see 
Gildersleeve, 2017 where I have connected this to work by Lacan and Zizek). 
Consequently, Kouba claims that experiencing anxiety marks a “pathologically 
narrowed relation to the world” (Kouba, 2014, p.110). Anxiety is proof of an un-free 
and dependent existence, and an analysand gains health by replacing anxiety with 
Gelassenheit, which is evidence of the removal of pathological obstructions to “attain 
a truly free relation to the world” (Kouba, 2014, p.111). Gelassenheit brings the 
openness and unconcealment of the “significative and referential relations between 
beings” (Kouba, 2014, p.173) from authentically being-in-the-world. Kouba says the 
openness and freedom of Gelassenheit brings “consummate happiness” (Kouba, 
2014) because this happiness is a “feeling that appears when the realization of all 
essential possibilities of behavior has been opened for individual existence” (Kouba, 
2014, p.104). Consequently, happiness and health arise through a maximum 
openness to “encounter the significative richness of beings” (Kouba, 2014, p.104) 
which allows a person to fulfil their possibilities and to avoid guilt. 
 
To achieve maximum openness means to be able to stand “open to the challenges 
and claims of what is announced in the significative and referential context of its world” 
(Kouba, 2014, p.104). Identifying pathology involves spotting those areas of being-in- 
the-world where obstructions prevent maximum openness to the world of possibilities. 
Kouba says mental illness occurs because an individual cannot “adequately respond 
to the challenges and requirements of their surrounding” (Kouba, 2014, p.107) and 
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therefore individuation is lacking because their understanding of responding to their 
surroundings has not been developed. To achieve a sense of self a person may close 
off to the world as this prevents falling prey to the world and feeling a disintegration of 
the self. However, this distancing brings a “narrowing of the open existence” (Kouba, 
2014, p.108) and an experience of guilt for not fulfilling an authentic existence. Kouba 
adds to this by saying psychosis occurs when a person is unable to adequately 
respond to challenges of the surrounding world. He argues psychosis can disappear 
“once the patient retreats into the significative and referential context in which he/she 
is capable of adequately facing the claims and challenges of surrounding” (Kouba, 
2014, p.108). With this established, Kouba argues there are two ways to provide a 
Heideggerian explanation of mental illness: 
 
1. Closing off to possibilities for being-in-the-world 
2. Falling prey to being-in-the-world. 
 
 
These two ways to explain mental illness highlight that “The pathology in such patients 
is their lack of the possibility available to the healthy person to assemble his responses 
and behavior to be self-reliant, free, open and enduring in the face of whatever may 
be encountered” (Kouba, 2014, p.109). 
 
Kouba adds that health involves a person’s “ability to open itself to chaos as to that 
dimension in which all sense and order perish. Health proves itself in the ability to bear 
chaos and to come to terms with the disintegration of a firmly given order; its essence 
is the readiness to face situations in which the appearing reality makes no sense” 
(Kouba, 2014, p.160). Being open to chaos allows a person to be open to 
understanding new possibilities and therefore to develop individuation providing them 
with the ability to respond to the challenges of being-in-the-world. Kouba says existing 
in a habitual understanding of being-in-the-world demands less health than exposure 
to the uncertainty of what is not understood (chaos) because chaos contains new 
possibilities for openness to being-in-the-world. 
 
Heidegger (2000) discusses chaos in a book on the poet Hölderlin, and Kouba claims 
that for Heidegger chaos “is understood as primordial vigor” (Kouba, 2014, p.160). 
Kouba elaborates by saying chaos is “the inexhaustible realm of always new 
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possibilities and transmutation, chaos is absolute vigor out of which all beings draw  
their own health” (Kouba, 2014, p.160). He also says that total chaos is “the boundless 
openness to uncalculable possibilities and to their transformations would be 
unbearable for human being”. Therefore, although chaos expands new possibilities 
and openness to being “we need certain limits and restrictions in order to exist at all” 
(Kouba, 2014, p.160). 
 
Kouba explains that without an order and limit to the chaos of possibilities it “would be 
actually absolute suffering” (Kouba, 2014, p.160) and this is the suffering experienced 
in psychopathology. It is important to recognise that health is determined by a balance 
between order (understanding being-in-the-world) and chaos (that which is not 
presently understood) because “they mutually condition and complement each other” 
(Kouba, 2014, p.160). Chaos provides new possibilities and openness to occur 
whereas order prevents a person from falling prey to the experience of this chaos 
(more on this in chapter 6). Thus, human health involves a balanced relationship 
between order and chaos, where illness occurs when either order excludes chaos or 
chaos excludes order. Hence, Kouba describes psychopathology as “essentially the 
suffering from chaos” and he suggests it is essential to understand a person’s 
psychopathology “from the imminent threat of the disintegration of his/her individual 
being” (Kouba, 2014, p.171). 
 
This also means health arises through openness to chaos and involves a person’s 
ability to understand chaos to develop “a new sense and order” (Kouba, 2014, p.160). 
To be healthy means for a person to be open to the chaos of being-in-the-world they 
do not understand so they can individuate by discovering new possibilities for being- 
in-the-world. Thus, healthy development involves the disruption of the established 
order of understanding being-in-the-world, and a new understanding of being-in-the- 
world follows, whereas illness does not achieve a new understanding and order from 
exposure to chaos. This understanding of health arising from establishing order in 
chaos also appears to be supported by Heidegger’s explanation of illness in the 
Zollikon seminars where he says a psychotherapist “has to investigate how the sick 
person's relation to the world is disturbed by the disturbance of the interconnection 
between things and the ‘ready-to-handedness’ is interfered with” (Heidegger, 1988, 
p.89). 
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Kouba adds to his explanation by citing Blankenburg (1971), to explain that 
psychopathology involves “the loss of natural self-evidence” (Kouba, 2014, p.173). 
The loss of natural self-evidence suggests that a person experiences illness when they 
lose “the feeling of security and safety provided by the anchoredness in the 
significative and referential context of the everyday world” (Kouba, 2014, p.173). The 
importance of this safety and security for health is reflected when a person avoids the 
chaos which is not understood. This highlights a “desperate need to avoid all 
unexpected surprises which could evoke the invasion of chaos into the preordained 
order” (Kouba, 2014, p.173) emphasizing a narrow understanding of being-in-the- 
world. 
 
In the final sections of Kouba’s book, he argues individuation takes place by a 
“disintegration and the subsequent reintegration of individual being” (Kouba, 2014, 
p.180) by bringing order to chaos through an understanding of chaos. Dasein stands 
between order and chaos, and the difference between health and illness “depends on 
the mode in which order and chaos relate to one another” (Kouba, 2014, p.194). Kouba 
says health involves openness to chaos to develop openness further and to give birth 
to new possibilities for being-in-the-world. Alternatively, illness involves falling prey or 
a closedness to chaos that restricts possibilities. As a result, Kouba concludes it is 
essential to guard against the tendency to categorize health as a lack of suffering. 
Instead, Kouba says it is important to recognise that the initial suffering from not 
understanding chaos allows the achievement of a new form of openness to being-in- 
the-world, and that “suffering is the price we pay for our freedom” (Kouba, 2014, 
p.196). 
 
1.10 Outline of Thesis 
 
So far, this introductory chapter has explained that the aim of my thesis is to re- 
interpret Jung’s psychoanalytic concepts in the “purified light of Heidegger’s 
phenomenology”. The Zollikon seminars organised by Boss focus on criticizing Freud’s 
psychoanalytic theory and therefore a Heideggerian critique of Jung’s theory has not 
been undertaken. As a result, my thesis works to inspire psychotherapy by opening up 
a new view of Jungian psychology. My thesis continues a Heideggerian critique of 
psychoanalysis and fills a gap in this area of investigation by focusing on Carl Jung’s 
writing. My work adds to Boss’s interpretation of Freud to form a more comprehensive 
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“regional ontology of psychiatry”. I extend the work initiated by Boss by translating 
Jung’s psychoanalytical findings into the "language of description of phenomena" and 
as “particular modes of being in the world, which make them possible”. Although Boss 
has outlined a regional ontology of psychiatry for Freud’s concepts including 
projection, identification, regression, repression, Jung’s work has yet to receive the 
same attention, and my thesis focuses on a phenomenological explanation of three 
aspects of Jung’s writing: the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium 
Philosophorum. 
 
My introduction has described Daseinsanalysis’s principles and its impact on 
psychotherapy and this forms a foundation for a Daseinsanalytic critique of Jungian 
psychology in my thesis. This final section of the introduction to my thesis summarises 
the limited existing literature that has endeavoured to develop Jung's psychology with 
Heidegger, and this displays the areas of Jung's work unexamined in the light of 
Heidegger's philosophy. These areas, which form the focus of chapters 2-6, are the 
transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum. By the end of 
my thesis, I will unify these areas of Jungian psychology to demonstrate that the 
transcendent function exemplifies Nietzsche's Will to Power as interpreted by 
Heidegger. Finally, in the conclusion of my thesis, I demonstrate that this new 
understanding of the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium 
Philosophorum are consistent with the principles of Daseinsanalysis. This shows that 
my work provides a valuable addition to this developing area of psychotherapy, as well 
as making an important contribution to research that has explained Jung’s work in 
relation to Heidegger and the theory and practice of the transcendent function. 
 
1.12 Reading Jung with Heidegger - Literature Review 
 
 
In Along a path apart: conflict and concordance in C.G. Jung and Martin Heidegger, 
Knowles (2002) highlights the similarities between Heidegger’s and Jung’s respective 
projects. Knowles recognises both were attracted to Eastern philosophy, Rilke, 
Hölderlin, Heraclitus, Nietzsche, Meister Eckhart and both of their work featured 
religious and holy themes. Consequently, Knowles suggests that it is a surprise that 
an “engagement and dialogue never occurred between Heidegger and Jung” 
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(Knowles, 2002, p.6)18 and that this has not been seriously undertaken by their 
followers. Knowles highlights that in a series of letters between Jung and Boss, Jung 
argues that what Boss “finds revelatory and original in Heidegger is something Jung 
had been saying all along” (Knowles, 2002, p.41). Jung’s opinion is clear when he 
says, "You believe that you have discovered something entirely new and unknown to 
psychology in your 'pre-given world pattern' and are not aware that by this somewhat 
fulsome phrase you are describing exactly what I mean by the archetype" (Knowles, 
2002, p.41)19. Knowles states that what is striking about these comments between 
Jung and Boss is that neither Boss nor Jung did anything to discover the deeper 
implications of this accordance between their works. Knowles considers this occurred 
due to a “clash of personalities” (Knowles, 2002, p.42). 
 
In view of that, Knowles claims that Boss, Heidegger and Jung would have all found 
“a brother in spirit” (Knowles, 2002, p.6) which could have illuminated further meaning 
to each other’s work by highlighting how they all could have contributed to developing 
each other’s thinking and writing. As a result, Knowles suggests that by investigating 
how to use Jung for Heidegger and Heidegger for Jung “a better understanding of 
philosophy's and psychology's projects will be achieved, an understanding which 
grants a fuller appreciation of where these projects meet and overlap, and where they 
are best kept distinct” (Knowles, 2002, p.24). My thesis retrieves these connections 
highlighted by Knowles to investigate the claim that “Jung and Heidegger were saying 
the Same differently” (Knowles, 2002, p.245). 
 
Knowles has reviewed the literature comparing Jung and Heidegger and she provides 
a summary of this research in the appendix of her thesis: “presented in the hope that 
they may be useful in guiding further research” (Knowles, 2002, p.369). She points out 
that the work in English comprises a few dissertations mostly written over 40-50 years 
ago, and one book which was now written over 25 years ago by Brooke (1991) titled 
Jung and Phenomenology. Knowles’s review highlights the scarcity of research in this 
area, as well as the lack of published work available to a wide audience that brings 
Jung’s and Heidegger’s writing together. In the following sections, I summarise this 
                                               
18 See the volume 1 of the letters of Jung (1973, p.273, p.330-332) where he discloses his opinion of 
Heidegger in a number of places, which may explain why this dialogue never occurred. See also volume 
2 of Jung’s letters (Jung, 1976a, p.501) which includes two letters to Medard Boss p.xl-xlv).  
19 In contrast to this, see Boss (1963, p.54) for his criticism of Jungian archetypes.  
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small amount of research to highlight what areas have been investigated in the 
relationship between Heidegger and Jung, and what has yet to be examined to form 
the investigation of my thesis. 
 
Jeffery Soleau’s doctoral thesis, The Whole and the Holy: 'Thing' and 'Symbol' as 
Structures of Integration in the Thought of Martin Heidegger and Carl Jung, was 
submitted in 1965. Here he argues that Heidegger’s concept of “the Thing'' - which 
unifies earth, sky, mortals and immortals - and Jung's concept of the symbol - as a 
connection between consciousness and the unconscious - which is experienced when 
the four psychological functions unify - describe the same phenomena. Soleau claims 
that both Thing and Symbol incorporate alienated aspects of life by unifying the past 
and future through “tension, strife, rift” (Knowles, 2002, p.375) to bring authenticity into 
being. He also acknowledges that Jung and Heidegger both advocate Eckhart’s 
statement of “letting-be”, and suggests that this can be recognised where Heidegger 
speaks of "dwelling" and Jung speaks of “withdrawing projections as a form of ceasing 
to dominate others” (Knowles, 2002, p.375). Finally, Soleau explains that Jung and 
Heidegger unite both practice and theory and that they both show the morality of a 
person’s relationship with Being or the collective unconscious. 
 
Richard Capobianco’s doctoral thesis, A Philosophical Examination of C G. Jung’s 
Notion of the Self, was submitted in 1966. Here Capobianco argues that Jung’s work 
is in harmony with Heidegger’s more than any other psychoanalyst or existentialist. 
Capobianco argues that the unconscious in Jung’s work can be equated with 
Heidegger’s explanation of Being. He claims that the ontological dimension of Dasein 
contains the same relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. 
Capobianco argues that just as the unconscious is related but irreducible to 
consciousness, Being and Dasein are related but are irreducible to each other. He 
also says that Being has a primacy over Dasein in the same way the unconscious has 
a primacy over consciousness. Capobianco argues Jung's writing on the unus mundus 
matches Heidegger's thinking, where Being is unified as One. Finally, Capobianco 
argues that Heidegger’s work in the Zollikon seminars on the healing effects of being 
open to the truth of Being are in agreement with Jung’s work where consciousness is 
healed by uncovering the numinous aspects of the unconscious. 
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Brooke (Brooke, 1991) is the only person to have published a book dedicated to 
examining Jung’s work with Heidegger’s philosophy, and the title is Jung and 
Phenomenology. Although the book is advertised as examining Jung with 
phenomenology, only chapters 5-8 “constitute a serious effort to rethink basic and 
classical Jungian concepts with the aid of philosophical phenomenological thought” 
(Murray, 1994, p.137). Brooke claims that Jung’s psychology can have substantive 
and valuable insights for existential phenomenology, and that existential 
phenomenology can provide an ontological foundation that Jung’s work desperately 
requires. Brooke states this clearly when he says, “I want to argue more than that 
Jung's psychology can be reworked phenomenologically, or even merely that Jung 
and phenomenology are intimately compatible. I want to explore the more daring claim 
that Jung saw and understood as an existential phenomenologist but that he lacked 
the conceptual tools to express his insights in a phenomenologically rigorous way” 
(Brooke, 1991, p.2). Brooke appears to be in agreement with the Daseinsanalytic 
critique of psychoanalysis, which I have presented in earlier sections of this 
introduction, as he says, "Jung saw as a phenomenologist even as he generally 
continued to think theoretically as a natural scientist" (Brooke, 1991, p.10). 
 
In a review of Brooke’s publication, Murray (1994) further highlights some of the 
philosophical issues with Jung’s work. These include his “philosophical limitations 
despite his intuitive brilliance; his vague and even at times ambivalent articulations 
with their own share of theoretical and/or empirical inconsistencies; his adherence to 
the Cartesian mind-body dualism, along with his repudiation of crass materialism and 
rationalism” (Murray, 1994, p.135). Despite Jung’s theoretical issues, Murray 
recognises that Brooke demonstrates that Jung’s concept of the psyche is in 
agreement with Heidegger’s Dasein. Brooke also argues that “Jung's psychological 
types delineate typical modes of being-in-the world that set existential (ontic) 
parameters for psychological life" (Knowles, 2002, p.380). Additionally, Brooke points 
out that both Heidegger and Jung recognise the hermeneutic structure of human 
existence and that Jung never acknowledged how important Medard Boss and Martin 
Heidegger could have been for his work. 
 
In the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger explains that grounding psychoanalysis in an 
understanding of the human being as Dasein allows the application of phenomenology 
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to psychoanalysis. Brooke’s project clearly builds on this aspect of Heidegger’s critique 
of psychoanalysis as he argues that Jung’s concept of the psyche is understandable 
as Dasein. For example, Brooke says the “psyche as understood by Jung approaches 
Heidegger’s explication of Dasein, and interpreted in terms of Dasein it achieves 
ontological and structural clarity” (Brooke, 2015, p.12). Heidegger says that the 
meaning of the human being as Dasein is an openness to existence and Brooke also 
advocates that Jung’s concept of individuation involves appropriating an openness to 
possibilities for being-in-the-world because “individuation does not shut one out from 
the world but gathers the world to oneself” (Brooke, 2015, p.109). As a result, this 
shows that Brooke builds on Heidegger’s critique of psychoanalysis in the Zollikon 
seminars by including areas of psychoanalysis that Heidegger had not engaged with. 
Brooke has provided a foundation for future research to explain the work of Jung with 
Heidegger together. He argues, “Jung did not write consistently from any particular 
perspective, which reflects his continual dissatisfaction with his own formulations” 
(Brooke, 2015, p.2). Brooke has provided an important book, which starts the ball 
rolling and provides consistency to explain Jung’s writing in the light of Heidegger’s 
philosophy. However, I want to argue that there is still much more work in this area in 
need of study “to reap the tremendously rich harvest” (Brooke, 2015, p.xvii) of insights 
Heidegger can provide to Jung’s writing. In my thesis, I provide these new insights. 
 
Although Boss outlines a regional ontology of psychiatry for Freud’s concepts including 
projection, and repression, and Jung’s concepts of ego, self, individuation, psyche, 
unconscious and archetypes have received the same attention by Brooke, a 
phenomenological explanation of a large number of ideas from Jung‘s writing remain 
unexamined. A short list of these include providing a Heideggerian explanation for 
Jung’s writing on active imagination, alchemy, transference, dreams, psychic energy, 
specific archetypes including (hero, mother, trickster, anima, child), the practice of 
psychotherapy, synchronicity and religious themes contained in volume 11 of Jung’s 
collected works (Psychology and Religion). It is also important to note that many of 
Heidegger’s publications are missing from Brooke’s reference list. Brooke only refers 
to three of Heidegger’s publications, out of a selection of over 80 different publications 
in English translation, and with over 100 publications in the Heidegger 
Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works).  
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Finally, the most influential work for my research, which has examined Heidegger and 
Jung together, is a doctoral thesis written in 1973 by John Haule, Imagination and 
Myth: A Heideggerian Interpretation of C G. Jung. According to Knowles, Haule 
achieves a Heideggerian deconstruction of Jung's writing by using Heidegger’s 
phenomenological language. Knowles lists a number of the “convergences and 
structural similarities Haule finds” (Knowles, 2002, p.370) between Jung and 
Heidegger. This includes that they both investigate the wholeness of a human being 
and were both critical of herd behaviour that resists individuation and authenticity. 
Haule claims that Jung was “philosophically naive” (Haule, 1973, p.58) and his work 
aims to discard much of Jung’s terminology to demonstrate an enhanced explanation 
and description which allows Jung's work to achieve greater lucidity. Haule argues that 
his interpretation carries Jung’s work forward by "dreaming the myth of Analytical 
Psychology onward” (Haule, 1973, p.60) through phenomenological language. Haule 
says Jung’s “dreaming the myth onward” stopped short of twentieth century 
phenomenology because “his philosophical, medical, and psychological mentors are 
all men of the nineteenth century, or even earlier” (Haule, 1973, p.31). 
 
Haule models his interpretation of Jung on Heidegger and he quotes Heidegger 
saying, “interpretation must show what does not stand in the words and is nevertheless 
said. To accomplish this the exegete must use violence" (Heidegger cited in Haule, 
1973, p.33). Haule explains this violence as a "destruction" of traditional concepts used 
by Jung that "blocks our access to those primordial 'sources'"(Haule, 1973, p.33). 
Destruction of Jung’s natural scientific view allows a phenomenologically and 
ontologically adequate perspective and meaning to appear in Jung’s writing. Just as 
Heidegger interpreted Greek philosophy "in an even more Greek manner", a 
phenomenological destruction allows Jung to be interpreted “in an even more Jungian 
manner” (Haule, 1973, p.57). My thesis also aims to re-interpret Jung’s writing 
(focusing on the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum) 
using Heidegger’s phenomenology to highlight the implicit ideas in Jung’s work. 
 
Haule explains that a phenomenological destruction of Jung’s writing is required 
because “there is a good deal of inconsistency in Analytical Psychology. Jung's jack- 
of-all-concepts way of thinking brings together a great variety of ill-fitting models and 
concepts which may at first approach be rather misleading” (Haule, 1973, p.59). 
47  
Therefore, Haule says his own work aims to discover a consistent idea to assemble 
and unify Jung’s “unsystematic thought” and “congeries of heterogeneous models” 
(Haule, 1973, p.59). To achieve this, Haule says he will search for an "unthought 
element" (Haule, 1973, p.59) in Jung's writing to bring Jung’s work together. He names 
this unifying element in Jung’s work "Living One's Myth” and he uses this theme “to 
write a consistent philosophy based upon Analytical Psychology in which the 
inconsistencies of Jung’s expression are resolved into the luminous insight 
summarized by the phrase ‘Living One's Myth’” (Haule, 1973, p.60). My thesis also 
explores Jung’s use of a variety of concepts in his writing such as the transcendent 
function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum. As a result, my investigation 
has similar objectives to Haule where I discover a “unifying element” which is 
“unthought” by Jung to provide Jung’s work with a consistent concept that shows the 
interrelation of the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium 
Philosophorum. By the end of my thesis, I will phenomenologically re-interpret these 
concepts with Heidegger’s philosophy and I will tie them together with Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s Will to Power. 
 
Although Jung claims to be a phenomenologist in some of his writing, in a review of 
Brooke’s book, Kugelmann says there has been a “negative evaluation of Jung's 
thought by leading phenomenologists” (Kugelmann, 1995, p.61). Haule adds to this 
saying: “the most common example of Jung's non-phenomenological perspective is 
his conceptual model of the psyche as a kind of container” (Haule, 1973, p.150). Haule 
highlights this with examples such as “contents of the unconscious" and "the collective 
unconscious contains the whole spiritual heritage of mankind's evolution” (Haule, 
1973, p.151). Another non-phenomenological aspect of Jung’s writing is that Jung 
claims there is an outside and inside to the container. This creates a problem as to 
how the inside and outside interact and demonstrates that Jung’s writing is embedded 
in the Cartesian natural scientific method20. Haule suggests this is added evidence 
that Jung’s work “was put together of odds and ends” (Haule, 1973, p.155) without 
consistency. Jung’s unfortunate use of natural science is also obvious when he 
describes the human being using models and principles of hydrodynamics, such as 
when he says psychic energy can be explained as “liquid damming up behind and 
                                               
20 See similar Heideggerian criticisms are found in Askay and Farquhar (2011, p.20, p. 126) and Boss 
(1957, p.52). 
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spilling over the walls between the various ‘compartments’ within the psyche” (Haule, 
1973, p.155).  
 
Another non-phenomenological concept Jung uses is to model human behaviour on 
an “invisible, ‘subtle’ body” (Haule, 1973, p.162). Haule explains that Jung bases the 
"Subtle body" on biological models of the body that is thought to have organs such as 
(archetypes, instincts, and complexes) which interact to maintain homeostasis. Haule 
suggests that Jung believes he can justify this model by arguing that the organs show 
themselves through psychological symptoms. This model of a subtle-body provides 
more evidence that Jung did not use phenomenology to describe his findings: he had 
not transcended the natural scientific view of the human being, and therefore his ideas 
miss critical aspects of reality to understand the human being. Jung’s description of 
the human being is inadequate, as it does not provide support for his theories through 
direct experience. His concept of a subtle body posits organs that are not directly 
experienced which is thought to be responsible for “‘determining,’ ‘forcing,’ ‘directing,’ 
‘compelling,’ ‘stimulating,’ or ‘forming’” (Haule, 1973, p.163) what is observed. 
 
Haule accurately concludes that these models of the human being (container, 
thermodynamic, subtle-body) demonstrate that Jung did not adhere to 
phenomenology. Jung violated its ultimate tenet, which is to reject explaining 
experience through something that cannot be apprehended. The experience (which 
Husserl calls the thing-itself) alone provides the necessary data to explain behaviour. 
Thus, phenomenology does not wonder about ‘noumenon’ that may explain the 
experience, and Haule suggests Jung does try to do this with his description of ideas 
such as libido and archetype. 
 
Haule declares that Jung creates more problems when he writes “like a jack-of-all- 
concepts” (Haule, 1973, p.167). Problems arise due to Jung’s inconsistent and 
conflicting models to explain the human being such as subtle bodies, thermodynamic 
principles, containers and inner and outer worlds. Haule claims that “His writings are 
more esoteric and arcane for many modern readers than the Gnostic and alchemical 
texts he uses to illustrate his views” (Haule, 1973, p.167). He also points out that Jung 
has made the mistake of applying a “Conjuring Trick” to his work that is "the fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness" (Haule, 1973). When Jung explains behaviour by “positing 
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another reality as the cause or source or explanation of the concrete fact” (Haule, 
1973, 169), it takes thinking away the actual experience and distorts thinking with a 
“bogus model” (Haule, 1973, p.169) and an imaginary cause. By directing thought 
toward a “bogus model”, it invites problems that have no relevance to the matter under 
investigation. Accordingly, Haule recommends that phenomenology would advise 
Jung to limit his thinking to what can be experienced and to avoid hypothetical 
explanations (e.g. container) behind and responsible for what is apprehended. 
 
Haule concludes that Jung’s language and concepts result in a “clumsy proto- 
phenomenology” (Haule, 1973, p.180) because he retains traditional assumptions and 
models of natural science. Haule says Jung willingly admits that his theories are 
tentative as he classifies himself as a scientist and therefore he believes his theoretical 
construction based on trial and error is defensible. Jung’s concepts are all 
"hypothetical constructs" (Haule, 1973, p.184) because they are not verifiable by 
immediate experience because Jung infers them from what shows itself. This means 
that all of Jung’s writing is open to improvement or rejection because he has not 
developed his ideas using the direct experience that phenomenology provides. Jung 
builds his ideas in a way that phenomenology prohibits, which is by positing a reality 
behind the experience that is not verifiable. For these reasons, Jung’s work requires a 
phenomenological description and interpretation to do away with the inadequate 
conceptual framework he has used. This will “unconceal” the actual experience that 
Jung unsuccessfully describes, and this is my objective in the following chapters. 
50  
Chapter 2: Unconcealing Jung's Transcendent Function with Heidegger 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
In the first sentence of his book The Transcendent Function, Jeffery Miller writes, “The 
transcendent function is the core of Carl Jung’s theory of psychological growth and the 
heart of what he called individuation, the process by which one is guided in a 
teleological way toward the person he or she is meant to be” (Miller, 2004, p.1). 
Consequently, for Jung, the transcendent function is the question of unveiling the 
unconscious for individuation to take place, or as Heidegger would say, the question 
of unveiling Being for authenticity to take place21. As a result of the apparent 
equivalence, these questions can be synthesised to demonstrate that when read 
together, each of these thinkers brings deeper understanding, meaning and 
interpretation to the projects of the other in such a way that an extension for application 
is created for both philosophy and psychotherapy. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Jung aptly describes the importance of focusing on psychological individuation for the 
interests of the wider world when he states that from the process of individuation "there 
arises a consciousness which is no longer imprisoned in the petty, oversensitive, 
personal world of the ego, but participates freely in the wider world of objective 
interests" (Jung, 1992, p.178). The purpose of this chapter is to build on Jung’s work 
guided by Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, to provide a phenomenological and 
ontological description of Jung’s psychological concepts of individuation and the 
transcendent function. An important starting point and direction for this chapter is to 
argue that psychopathology results from ‘falling prey in inauthenticity’. Once I have 
descibed psychopathology using Heidegger’s philosophy, Jung’s description of 
individuation and the transcendent function can be interpreted and developed with 
                                               
21 Note, “the ontological would thereby remain the determining factor of the factical itself” (Heidegger, 
2001, p.205). In other words, Jung’s ontic investigation is grounded in Heidegger’s ontological findings 
(see Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.66). Furthermore, this is a legitimate objective since “Heidegger had 
no qualms about the development of a properly oriented psychiatric Daseinanalysis (ZS 163-64). 
Otherwise, he would not have proofread Boss's books which had this as their aim” (Heidegger, 2001, 
p.306) and “psychoanalysis without Daseinsanalyse is in danger of biased distortion of the patient’s world” 
Binswanger, 1963, p.59). The aim of my work is to show how Jung’s work is ontologically grounded in 
attempting to gain “insight into his own daseins-structure” (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.15).    
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insights from Heidegger’s writing in Being and Time, which include Dasein, 
worldliness, attunement, understanding, meaning, care, guilt, angst, resoluteness, 
truth, conscience, temporality and historicity. 
 
Ultimately, this chapter will grant the reader a deeper and wider understanding of the 
transcendent function, illustrated from both psychological and ontological perspectives 
by integrating Heidegger's phenomenology. Furthermore, Jung's work on the 
unconscious can bring new insights to light in Heidegger’s philosophy. This means my 
chapter allows the reader to understand Heidegger's work by seeing the connections 
to Jung's project. I show that this chapter is significant because it demonstrates how 
these two thinkers are compatible and shows the potential of bringing other areas of 
their work together again in the future. This chapter is also important for 
psychotherapists who practice Jungian therapy as it can widen their approach to the 
transcendent function. In due course the central driving thesis of this chapter will 
emerge; it involves the recommendation that the transcendent function is only possible 
when the human being has moved out of an average, every day and familiar approach 
to existence to an ontologically authentic mode of 'anticipatory resoluteness'. As a 
result, I argue that catalysing the transcendent function involves bringing guilt, death, 
conscience, angst, temporality and historicity to light in psychotherapy. What this 
means more specifically is that the ‘unification of opposites’, conscious/unconscious 
(Jung) and authenticity/inauthenticity (Heidegger) extends the psychic dynamic to 
include the ontological dimensions of lived experience, and this provides a fully- 
‘fleshed’ illustration of the potentiality of the transcendent function for individuating 
human being. 
 
2.2 Jungian Individuation and Heideggerian Authenticity 
 
 
In ‘The Relations Between the Ego and the Unconscious’ Jung says “Individuation 
means becoming an "in-dividual,' and, in so far as "individuality" embraces our 
innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one's own 
self. We could therefore translate individuation as "coming to selfhood" or "self- 
realization" (Jung, 1992, p.173). By contrast, but in the same mode of thinking, 
Heidegger says “We shall call the distinctive, authentic disclosedness attested in Da- 
sein itself by its conscience - the reticent Self projection upon one’s ownmost Being- 
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guilty which is ready for Angst - resoluteness” (Heidegger, 2000, p.343) and “In 
understanding the call [of conscience] Dasein lets its ownmost Self take action in 
itself.” (Heidegger, 2000, p.334) By the end of this chapter, the reader will be able to 
recognize the significant consonance between Jung’s ‘individuation’ and Heidegger’s 
‘authenticity’. In addition, I will show the important connection of Jung’s ‘transcendent 
function’ to Heidegger’s description of ‘anticipatory resoluteness’. With these two 
fundamental connections outlined, my work will be able to contribute significantly to an 
interpretation and application of both Jung’s and Heidegger’s work to psychotherapy 
and philosophy respectively. 
 
To begin this chapter it is important to explain its structure and layout. Heidegger 
provides a radical philosophy, so it is important that the sections of this chapter be 
guided by describing the concepts that Heidegger presents in Being and Time and 
supplementing Jung’s analytical psychology wherever the opportunity arises. This 
layout will provide the reader with the understanding necessary to appreciate how 
Heidegger’s work can be synthesised with Jung to expand the application of these two 
thinkers. Importantly, this chapter not only presents a scholarly or academic 
‘transcendent function’ but the contents of this chapter will also demonstrate its 
application to the treatment of psychopathology within a Jungian psychoanalytical 
framework. 
 
2.3 Finding Jung in Heidegger’s Being and Time 
 
 
Heidegger published Being and Time in 1927 and the book was written to clarify the 
question: What is the meaning of Being? To approach this question Heidegger says, 
"The being whose analysis our task is, is always we ourselves" (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.39). To name our human way of Being Heidegger assigns the term Dasein. I will 
describe the meaning of Dasein in greater and greater detail as this chapter proceeds. 
The journey that I will articulate will lead to uncovering the meaning of Being, which 
Heidegger equates with time. I will now proceed to describe the ontological structures 
of Dasein and link them to Jung's concepts of analytical psychology as the 
opportunities arise. 
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2.4 Dasein 
 
 
Heidegger distinguishes Dasein’s ontological Being from that of a thing or object like 
a desk or chair. What first distinguishes Dasein from objects is that “in its being it is 
concerned about its very being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.12) – its being is an issue for it. 
Since Dasein is concerned about its Being, there is a relationship to Being, which 
means that Dasein also understands itself in some way. This has relevance to Jung 
because it is evident that when a psychologically ill person enters psychotherapy, they 
are there because they implicitly understand and are concerned about their Being. 
Heidegger explains that Dasein understands itself in terms of its possibilities for itself 
and these possibilities can be authentically chosen, "stumbled upon…, or in each 
instance already grown up in them" (Heidegger, 1996, p.10). Dasein can seize upon 
or neglect possibilities to care for because it is a finite being, which transcends. In 
other words, “An understanding of Being belongs to Dasein’s ontological structure” 
(Heidegger, 2000, p.226). Although Dasein has an innate understanding of Being, this 
understanding is pre-ontological, so Dasein’s being-in-the-world can be led astray 
through an inauthentic understanding of Being. 
 
Heidegger’s philosophy of inauthenticity can ontologically describe how the 
unconscious can be neglected22 leading to psychological illness and this presents a new 
perspective to understand Jung’s analytical psychology description of neurosis. 
Dasein can cover over its authentic, individuated being-in-the-world because “Da-sein 
tends to understand its own being in terms of that being to which it is essentially, 
continually, and most closely related – the ‘world’” (Heidegger, 1996, p.14). What will 
become evident at the conclusion of this chapter is that an inauthentic worldview leads 
to psychopathology because temporality is “the horizon of every understanding and 
interpretation of Being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.15) and an inauthentic understanding of 
time conceals Dasein’s authentic temporality. 
                                               
22 This is supported by Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.119) who says, “For Heidegger, self-deception operates 
on the level of the relationship to our own being. As already explained, it is only in anxiety that the human 
being overtly knows how matters stand with his own being. It follows from this that he has an elementary 
interest in deceiving himself about his own being and thus escaping anxiety. Although Heidegger never 
once uses the adjective ‘unconscious’, the subject of the flight into forgetting and into the making 
unconscious of our own being is a key element of his existential definition of the human being as dasein. 
This matter has incidentally already been addressed in my earlier explanations under the term ‘the 
screening out of ‘pre-ontological inclusions’, which also already made clear that this does not involve a 
single act but an ever-recurrent disregard of the anxiety-inducing truth about our own being, in order thus 
to keep it in forgetting”. 
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Heidegger argues Dasein’s ‘having-been’ always constitutes a structural part of its 
being-in-the-world throughout the entirety of existence. Heidegger explains that this is 
usually not explicit to Dasein but Dasein is its own past “in such a way that its past, as 
it were, pushes itself along ‘behind’ it, and that it possesses what is past as a property 
that is still present and has an effect on it” (Heidegger, 1996, p.17). To add to this 
explanation, Heidegger also says, “Da-sein ‘is’ its past which ‘occurs’ out of its future” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.17). This statement can appear confusing if the reader 
understands time in an inauthentic manner, i.e. as a linear succession. What 
Heidegger is saying is that having-been sets into the ‘future’ of Dasein. In other words, 
having-been comes from Dasein itself, unified with the other ec-stases of temporal 
existence, ‘present’ and ‘future’. The entities that Dasein encounters within the ‘world’ 
can be ‘past’, but only Dasein exists as ‘having-been’. 
 
Dasein is concerned about its Being and has the tendency to seek comfort in the 
average and familiar ways of existing. This entangles Dasein in an inauthentic 
understanding of its Being that can ultimately lead to jeopardising its care for its being- 
in-the-world. By being entangled in the ‘world’, Dasein loses sight of its authentic 
potentiality for existing and can forget the influence of Being during existence. With 
this in mind, in this chapter, I argue that Heidegger’s phenomenology can highlight how 
the transcendent function can regain authenticity and the sight of Dasein’s Being. 
Heidegger’s phenomenology provides a “way of encountering being and the structures 
of being in the mode of phenomenon” (Heidegger, 1996, p.32), but encountering the 
Being of Dasein “must first be wrested from the objects of phenomenology” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.32) because it remains concealed in Dasein’s average and 
familiar everydayness. 
 
By understanding authentic temporality as well as the ontological aspects of 
anticipatory resoluteness, the transcendent function can let beings in the world be 
wrested from inauthenticity (discovered). Authentic time (temporality) grants Dasein 
an understanding of an authentic horizon to care for being-in-the-world. This horizon 
opens through anticipatory resoluteness and allows Dasein to interpret authentic 
possibilities. Through an authentic interpretation of Dasein’s own existence, truth and 
the “proper meaning of being and the basic structures of the very being of Da-sein are 
made known to the understanding of being that belongs to Da-sein itself” (Heidegger, 
55  
1996, p.33). 
 
2.5 Care 
 
Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of its Being is it’s “mineness” (Gemeinigheit); 
“if the ‘I’ is an Essential characteristic of Dasein, then it is one which must be 
Interpreted existentially” (Heidegger, 2000, p.152). Therefore, it makes sense that an 
authentic interpretation of the meaning of existence belongs to Dasein’s mineness and 
other Da-seinde cannot interpret Dasein’s authenticity. As only Dasein can interpret 
its existence authentically/truthfully, Dasein’s mineness is the only Being that is 
authentically “related to its being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.61) and therefore “is entrusted 
to its own being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.61). Dasein’s mineness highlights that Dasein 
bestows itself with entrustment and concern about its being-in-the-world but Dasein 
can also cover over its authentic possibilities for care. However, I will illustrate that 
Jung’s notion of the transcendent function is a mode of care for Dasein’s authentic 
Being and allows authentic possibilities to be revealed. Dasein’s essence as being-in- 
the-world is care, but if Dasein has an inauthentic understanding of its Being, Dasein 
can be said to be “fleeing from it and of forgetting” (Heidegger, 1996, p.41) its Being. 
This is similar to Jung’s notion of self-alienation due to a resistance to individuation. 
 
2.6 Worldliness 
 
Dasein’s world is always a with-world (Mitwelt). In other words, Dasein always already 
finds itself alongside other beings and entities and with limited, finite possibilities. 
Dasein exists within a totality of significance or ‘situation’ which Heidegger calls 
facticity. He says, “The factuality of the fact Da-sein, as the way in which every Da- 
sein actually is, we call its facticity” (Heidegger, 1996, p.52). The essence of Dasein is 
care for its factical being-in-the-world and therefore existence is not primarily 
recognised as “perceptual cognition, but, rather, a handling, using, and taking care of 
things which has its own kind of "knowledge” (Heidegger, 1996, p.63). In Heidegger’s 
section on the worldliness of the world, he describes the ontological structure of the 
world, which allows Dasein to care and transcend its situation. One aspect of the 
worldliness of the world is that “There always belongs to the being of a useful thing a 
totality of useful things in which this useful thing can be what it is” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.64). As a result, “A useful thing is essentially ‘something in order to . . .’” and “The 
structure of ‘in order to’ contains a reference of something to something.” Heidegger 
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explains that Dasein understands the totality of “relations in a preliminary disclosure” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.81) of its own being-in-the-world. Dasein becomes familiar with 
the relations of beings in the world and “Da-sein ‘signifies’ to itself.” It gives “itself to 
understand its being and potentiality-of-being with regard to its being-in-the-world” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.81). 
 
Dasein discovers its potentiality of being-in-the-world through the “freeing of beings for 
a totality of relevance” (Heidegger, 1996, p.102). However, if Dasein neglects 
possibilities that are unfamiliar to its everydayness, Dasein can become alienated from 
its authentic Being. Dasein can neglect and pass over unique possibilities for itself 
because “Initially and for the most part, Da-sein is taken in by its world” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.107). This mode of being absorbed in the world can lead to a lack of 
understanding regarding threatening possibilities from the future that may soon be 
present. 
 
2.7 Being with others and ‘the they’ 
 
Heidegger says that instead of authentically understanding existence, Dasein 
“understands itself, initially and for the most part, in terms of its world, and the Mitda- 
sein of others” (Heidegger, 1996, p.113). When human beings meet, they encounter 
each other in their everyday being-in-the-world. In being-with and caring for others 
present in the everyday world, Mitda-sein discloses itself within a commensurable 
averageness and this can establish a concealment of one’s own significance in favour 
of this levelled worldliness way of being-in-the-world. Heidegger provides an example 
to demonstrate the structure of Dasein’s world by being with others when he 
phenomenologically describes Dasein’s average everydayness of being-in-the-world: 
“In utilizing public transportation, in the use of information services such as the 
newspaper, every other is like the next. Being-with-one-another dissolves one's own 
Da-sein completely into the kind of being of ‘the others’ in such a way that the others, 
as distinguishable and explicit, disappear more and more. In this inconspicuousness 
and unascertainability, the ‘they’ unfolds its true dictatorship” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.119). By being-with-others in this way, Mitda-sein can conceal Dasein’s own 
authentic possibilities for being-in-the-world since the world presents itself in a way 
that is already found to be cared for. In this way, Dasein can fall into this levelled or 
‘common’ existence instead of choosing its own authentic possibilities to care for the 
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world. Being-with-others by following their ‘common’ mode of being-in-the-world 
neglects the authentic meaning of Dasein’s mineness [which Heidegger calls 
thrownness (Heidegger, 2000, 174)]. I will now integrate Jung’s writing to provide some 
insight to compare the psychological mechanisms of this neglect of Dasein’s 
authenticity. 
 
Jung claims that the unconscious compensates for consciousness when a person 
neglects to discover their whole self. He says, “we can lay it down that the unconscious 
processes stand in a compensatory relation to the conscious mind. I expressly use the 
word ‘compensatory’ and not the word ‘contrary’ because conscious and unconscious 
are not necessarily in opposition to one another, but complement one another to form 
a totality, which is the self” (Jung, 1992, p.177). Thus, if repression prevents an aspect 
of the total (authentic) self from entering consciousness, i.e. by following the being-in- 
the-world of others, these authentic parts of the self will be uncompensated, i.e. remain 
unconscious, and this can eventually result in psychopathology. Heidegger personifies 
the name for being-with-others and following their average, everyday way of existing 
as ‘the they’. Heidegger explains existing as ‘they’ do is tempting and tranquilising to 
Dasein relative to the burden of responsibility entailed in existing authentically. 
 
I will now contrast this inauthentic understanding of being-in-the-world in light of Jung’s 
work concerning the psychological damage caused from neglecting authentic 
possibilities by identifying with a public persona. Jung recognised both the importance 
of individuation for the expansion of consciousness but also the human tendency to 
avoid the investment of the effort to confront the unconscious and individuate 
personality. He writes, 
 
Consciousness is continually widened through the confrontation with previously 
unconscious contents, or—to be more accurate—could be widened if it took the 
trouble to integrate them. That is naturally not always the case. Even if there is 
sufficient intelligence to understand the procedure, there may yet be a lack of 
courage and self-confidence, or one is too lazy, mentally and morally, or too 
cowardly, to make an effort (Jung, 1971, p.300). 
 
This explains why ‘the they’ can seduce and alienate Dasein from itself “because the 
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‘they’ presents every judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of 
Da-sein away from it. It can most easily be responsible for everything because no one 
has to vouch for anything. The ‘they’ always ‘did it,’ and yet it can be said that ‘no one’ 
did it” (Heidegger, 1996, p.119). Likewise, Jung describes a persona archetype that is 
equivalent to following ‘the they’ when a man “tries to appear as this or that, or he 
hides behind a mask, or he may even build up a definite persona as a barricade” (Jung, 
1971, p.123). In Heidegger’s ontological terms, this mask means Dasein’s authentic 
being-in-the-world is concealed by conforming to the common possibilities of ‘the they’. 
This mask, which is ontologically grounded in projecting the common possibilities of 
‘the they’, can temporally hide Dasein’s responsibility for its own Being23. 
 
When a persona exists and existence is understood by following others “Da-sein is 
dispersed in the ‘they’ and must first find itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.121). By following 
‘the they’, the ‘for the sake of which’ Dasein exists is prescribed and limited to the 
levelled averageness of ‘the they’. Dasein reduces authentic possibilities to mere wish- 
fulfilment. As this chapter progresses it will become clear that the transcendent 
function allows individuation “by clearing away coverings and obscurities, by breaking 
up the disguises with which Da-sein cuts itself off from itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.121). 
Jung describes this inauthenticity in his own words as “alienations of the self” (Jung, 
1971, p.122) which take place when a person favours “an external role or in favour of 
an imagined meaning” (Jung, 1971, p.122). When Dasein has fallen prey to ‘the they’, 
an existential crisis (angst) can cut away this inauthenticity because for Dasein, in this 
moment, ‘the they’ world drops away, leaving ‘nothing’ to cling to; Dasein authentically 
understands the nullity of its ‘they’ existence. 
 
2.8 Disclosedness of Dasein (Attunement) 
 
When Heidegger describes the disclosedness of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, he 
begins by explaining that moods “make manifest ‘how one is and is coming along’” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.127). Heidegger explains that mood is an attunement to Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world, as "how one is" in the now from where it has been and where it 
                                               
23 To not translate Jung’s ontic description into Heidegger’s ontology is to cause “a rift, a gap through 
which it is clear that what is being scientifically studied is not the whole man” (Binswanger, 1963, p.169). 
this translation provides “an ontologically deepended understanding of mental suffering” (Holzhey-Kunz, 
2014, p.259). Both Jung and Heidegger recognise the human being being “disposed to flee the truth 
about himself in illusions” (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.13). 
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understands itself to be going. Attunement discloses and brings Dasein’s ‘having been’ 
with it throughout existence. Dasein discloses itself through attunement but this “does 
not, as such, mean to be known” (Heidegger, 1996, p.127). In addition, “For the most 
part, its mood is such that its thrownness gets closed off” (Heidegger, 2000, p.321) 
therefore, disclosedness equates to Jung’s use of the concept of the unconscious. For 
Dasein to exist authentically Dasein requires a discovery of its authentic potentiality of 
being-in-the-world by developing an understanding of attunement. Later in this 
chapter, I illustrate that the dis-coveredness of Dasein’s truth is the ontological ground 
of Jung’s description of bringing the unconscious into dialogue with consciousness. 
 
Heidegger says attunement discloses Dasein’s thrown (individuated) being into the 
world and “Thrownness means Dasein is in a world in a definite way and this comes 
from its past and being with a factical world with finite possibilities available” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.203). What is important to grasp from Heidegger’s words is that 
having-been (which is a part of Dasein’s thrownness) is disclosed to Dasein through 
attunement. Thrownness is incredibly important for an ontological understanding of 
psychopathology, which describes how the unconscious can affect Dasein’s being-in- 
the-world. The inescapability of thrownness (which is recognised by Jung as the 
unconscious pushing for expression), is clearly elucidated by Heidegger when he says 
“In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things 
that matter to us can be encountered” (Heidegger, 1996, p.130). 
 
Through attunement (or mood), the world affects and moves Dasein by “Letting things 
be encountered” (Heidegger, 1996, p.129) (such as the unconscious); therefore 
Dasein is directed toward the world to care for its being-in-the-world. Attunement also 
provides Dasein with an understanding of the worldliness of the world from having- 
been which has thrown Dasein into the present. This attunement is particularly evident 
in moods such as fear and angst when Dasein’s existence is threatened. Profoundly, 
Heidegger says being concerned with the world is only possible because of 
attunement: “The moodedness of attunement constitutes existentially the openness to 
world of Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1996, p.129). Thus, because of this ontological 
openness to the world, the unconscious can have the influence it does on the 
psychologically ill. 
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When Heidegger discusses fear in the section on attunement he recognises that fear 
derives itself from inauthentically facing existence where “Fearing discloses this being 
in its jeopardization, in its being left to itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.132). For that reason, 
it is important to recognise that for the transcendent function to take place the 
analysand entering psychotherapy and needing help from the psychotherapist must 
be prepared to turn authentically to himself or herself to discover the solution to his or 
her existential difficulties. The section after attunement in Being and Time is also 
fundamental for an ontological explanation of the transcendent function and is an 
outline of another aspect of Dasein’s disclosedness of being-in-the-world, which 
Heidegger calls understanding. 
 
2.9 Disclosedness of Dasein (Understanding) 
 
Dasein discloses the meaning of its existence as the for-the-sake-of-which and 
Heidegger calls this understanding. Dasein ‘understands’ its potentiality for being-in- 
the-world, as something being possible. Heidegger says the essential possibility for 
“Dasein concerns the ways of taking care of the ‘world’ which we characterized, of 
concern for others and, always already present in all of this, the potentiality of being 
itself, for its own sake” (Heidegger, 1996, p.134). Heidegger claims that the essential 
possibility for Dasein is its “own most potentiality of being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.135). 
As Dasein discloses possibilities in a factical world to itself understandingly, Dasein 
not only discloses its ownmost potentiality but other beings are also disclosed and 
“freed for their own possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.135). Heidegger calls the 
understanding of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality of being a ‘project’. Dasein’s ownmost 
potentiality of being in projecting consists of its facticity and thrownness and this is 
what Heidegger calls ‘destiny’. It is important to recognise that by its ontological nature, 
Dasein is always projecting as long as Dasein exists and therefore can always flee the 
possibility of living authentically. 
 
Dasein’s understanding of its ownmost authentic potentiality of Being is capable of 
being unconcealed from the transcendent function of individuation. In its character of 
projecting, understanding creates the ontological horizon or sight for Dasein. This sight 
in the project involves taking care of Being and the considerateness of concern for- 
the-sake-of-which Dasein exists. The truth of Dasein’s thrownness determines the 
project of Dasein’s ownmost potentiality of Being. Heidegger describes Dasein’s 
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authentic being-individuated par excellence when he says, “Existent beings glimpse 
‘themselves’ only when they have become transparent to themselves equiprimordially 
in their being with the world, in being together with others as the constitutive factors of 
their existence” (Heidegger, 1996, p.137). As will become clearer in later parts of this 
chapter, Heidegger is here describing in ontological terms, the objective of Jung’s 
transcendent function. Dasein can discover the disclosure of its authentic potentiality 
of being in projecting possibilities for care, where Dasein glimpses itself in the bright 
lightness of its individuality which is phenomenologically distinct from the experience of 
Dasein found in the everyday averageness of ‘the they’. This echoes the outcome of 
Jung’s transcendent function as “It is called “transcendent” because it makes the 
transition from one attitude to another organically possible, without loss of the 
unconscious” (Jung, 1971, p.279). 
 
2.10 Interpretation and Meaning 
 
Dasein’s understanding of existence projects its being-in-the-world upon possibilities. 
This being toward possibilities that understands is itself a potentiality for being because 
of the way possibilities come back to Dasein. Dasein’s projecting of understanding its 
being-in-the-world has the possibility of development which Heidegger calls 
interpretation. Dasein’s interpretation of being-in-the-world is the development of 
possibilities projected in understanding. The projecting of understanding discloses 
beings in their possibilities to Dasein. Dasein’s interpretation of being-in-the-world 
provides an understanding of innerworldly beings projected toward the world and 
toward a totality of significance in whose referential relations taking care, is being-in-
the-world. With this interpretation “innerworldly beings are discovered, that is, have 
come to be understood, we say that they have meaning” (Heidegger, 1996, p.142). 
 
Thus Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless and “This means that its own being 
and the beings disclosed with that being can be appropriated in understanding or they 
can be confined to incomprehensibility”. Additionally, “only what is unmeaningful can 
be absurd” (Heidegger, 1996, p.142). The absurdity of existence can show itself when 
Dasein is alienated from authenticity. Individuation provides insight into a meaningful 
existence for Dasein and psychological development because Dasein “fulfils the 
individual qualities given; in other words, it is a process by which a man becomes the 
definite, unique being he in fact is” (Jung, 1971, p.122). When Dasein follows the 
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inauthentic understanding of ‘the they’, Dasein neglects the truth and meaning of its 
thrown being into existence. Jung’s writing reflects the development of meaning 
through interpretation when he says the transcendent function’s role in individuation is 
a “Constructive treatment of the unconscious, that is, the question of meaning and 
purpose, paves the way for the patient’s insight into that process which I call the 
transcendent function” (Jung, 1971, p.280). I will return to this later in this chapter to 
show how Heidegger’s philosophy can be compared to how the transcendent function 
establishes this meaning and purpose. 
 
2.11 Falling Prey and Psychopathology 
 
As being-in-the-world that understands, Dasein "listens to" itself and to Mitda-sein. 
However, “it is in the nature of the self-assurance of the majority - the ‘they’ of being 
interpreted that under its protection, Da-sein can drift toward an increasing alienation 
from its ownmost potentiality of being in the world” (Heidegger, 1996, p.166). If Dasein 
follows the average ‘anonymous One’ of the ‘they’ its authentic understanding for its 
ownmost thrown project for care goes astray which Heidegger calls “the entanglement 
of Da- sein” (Heidegger, 1996, p.164). Entanglement arises from a lack of authentic 
understanding of Dasein’s own Being because of its absorption in its everydayness 
with the ‘they’. Heidegger says entanglement leads to Dasein “Falling prey to the 
‘world’, its absorption in being-with-one-another guided by idle talk, curiosity, and 
ambiguity” (Heidegger, 1996, p.164). Falling prey is the constitution of inauthentic 
existence and falling prey “tears understanding away from projecting authentic 
possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.167). 
 
Dasein establishes its disclosedness of being-in-the-world through attunement, 
understanding, and discourse. However, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity 
characterise Dasein’s average inauthentic mode of Being. This means Dasein does 
not possess an authentic discourse of possibilities from idle talk, attunement is 
ambiguous to the meaning of mood and understanding lacks the sight of Dasein’s own 
authentic possibilities because curiosity leads it astray. As Dasein falls prey in 
inauthenticity from following ‘the they’, the possibilities of care for its ownmost being- 
in-the-world are limited. This limitation and narrow outlook may lead to a neglect and 
loss of meaning of Dasein’s existence resulting in Dasein falling prey to 
psychopathology. This proposal for the cause of psychopathology is supported by 
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Jung's writing which says “As a result of their narrow conscious outlook and their 
cramped existence they save energy; bit by bit it accumulates in the unconscious and 
finally explodes in the form of a more or less acute neurosis” (Jung, 1971, p.135). 
 
At this point in the chapter, it has become clear that care is structural of Dasein’s Being 
and because Dasein is concerned about its being, Dasein goes astray inauthentically 
when Dasein does not possess an authentic ontological understanding of its Being. 
The next section of this chapter moves into explaining the kind of understanding that 
Dasein requires for an ontologically authentic existence. This analysis is significantly 
important for Jungian psychology because this helps to compare ontologically the 
individuation process through the transcendent function. Jung’s explanation of 
individuation that involves removing the “false wrappings of the persona” (Jung, 1971, 
p.123) also emphasises Heidegger’s notion of cutting away the inauthentic 
understanding of ‘the they’. 
 
2.12 Angst 
 
Since Dasein is limited by ‘the they’ in its possibilities for existence, an ability to 
authentically care for Dasein’s own thrownness is closed and neglected. Through this 
inauthentic neglect, Dasein has not individuated and can become a “touchy, egotistical 
bundle of personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions which always has to be 
compensated or corrected by unconscious counter-tendencies” (Jung, 1992, p.178). 
Heidegger provides an ontological reason to explain why this may happen, “The 
absorption of Da- sein in the ‘they’ and in the world taken care of reveals something 
like a flight of Da- sein from itself as an authentic potentiality for being itself” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.172). In this flight, Dasein avoids existing authentically24. 
 
When Dasein understands existence through ‘the they’ Dasein has fallen prey 
because Dasein has turned away from its thrownness. Heidegger explains that this 
flight from thrownness must have “a threatening character” (Heidegger, 1996, p.174) 
which is not a threatening character from something in the world because Dasein flees 
there to escape. Dasein flees from its Self. Heidegger explains Dasein has an 
attunement to angst when turned toward authentic existence. The indefinite ending of 
Dasein’s existence results in an uncanny experience of the insignificance and 
                                               
24 Cf “Dasein makes light of itself” Binswanger (1963, p.177) 
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irrelevance of the meaning disclosed to Dasein from the average everydayness of ‘the 
they’. Once Dasein has fallen prey to average everydayness, which conceals Dasein’s 
own authentic meaning, Dasein is anxious about being-in-the-world because the world 
is now meaningless for existence. Heidegger says, “The ‘world’ can offer nothing more, 
nor can the Mitda-sein of others. Thus, Angst takes away from Dasein the possibility 
of understanding itself in terms of the ‘world’ and the public way of being interpreted” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.175)25. These negative features of angst liberate Dasein to turn 
toward its own authentic meaning, its thrown existence. 
 
In his essay on the transcendent function, Jung emphasizes that to initiate 
individuation through the transcendent function the person must bring consciousness 
into contact with the unconscious contents causing the psychopathology. Jung argues 
the resistance separating conscious and unconscious needs to be removed: “This 
cannot be done by condemning the contents of the unconscious in a one-sided way, 
but rather by recognizing their significance in compensating the one-sidedness of 
consciousness and by taking this significance into account” (Jung, 1971, p.279). 
Dasein can dissolve this resistance by authentically understanding itself in angst and 
by critically interpreting its thrown being-in-the-world to determine those neglected 
elements, which threaten its care for being-in-the-world. In other words, this requires 
‘analysis’ as defined by Heidegger, which means, "’to loosen, for instance, to release 
a chained person from his chains, to liberate someone from captivity.’ Heidegger 
believed that by reclaiming the Greek sense of the word ‘analysis,’ psychology (et al.) 
would become free to engage in the ‘freeing activity’ of analysis” (Heidegger, 2001, 
312)26. 
 
2.13 Thrownness and Possibilities 
 
By falling prey to a meaningless existence, Dasein encounters angst that can 
individuate “Dasein to its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as understanding, 
projects itself essentially upon possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.176). Importantly, 
angst about being-in-the-world can bring Dasein face to face with the concealed 
                                               
25 “In genuine Angst, Dasein discovers that not only does the ‘they-self’not provide the foundation for 
existence, but nothing else does either (i.e., there is no cosmic meaningfulness or significance which 
underlies and sustains existence). Angst discloses to us ‘the nothingness which forms the core of human 
existence.’ It shows that, at bottom, we are nothing more than nothingness, that our existence is ultimately 
groundless, an abyss” (Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.107).  
26 See also Askay and Farquhar (2013b, p.598) 
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authentic possibilities of existence – concealed by falling into ‘the they’. Jung notes a 
similar concealment of authentic existence, which results in psychological problems 
where he says, “The unconscious processes that compensate the conscious ego 
contain all those elements that are necessary for the self-regulation of the psyche as 
a whole” (Jung, 1971, p.127). In other words, the unconscious processes are 
ontologically grounded in Dasein’s possibilities for being-in-the-world.  
 
In angst, Dasein has an "uncanny" feeling that is completely different to the 
tranquilized feeling of following the average everydayness of ‘the they’. Angst 
individualises Dasein from other beings to free it for its own authentic possibilities. 
However, at the same time, Dasein has a feeling of not-being-at-home because of its 
thrown differences to other beings in the world that Dasein must care for. Dasein 
attempts to flee this thrownness by concealing it by existing as others do. This 
uncanniness of authentic individuation is similar to Jung’s writing where he says “To 
develop one's own personality is indeed an unpopular undertaking, a deviation that is 
highly uncongenial to the herd, an eccentricity smelling of the cenobite, as it seems to 
the outsider. Small wonder, then, that from earliest times only the chosen few have 
embarked upon this strange adventure” (Jung, 1954, p.174). 
 
Falling prey to ‘the they’ blinds Dasein to authentic possibilities for care. Alternatively, 
authentic being-a-self ‘lets’ Dasein consider possibilities with the knowledge that ‘the 
they’ cannot prescribe Dasein’s ownmost potentiality for Being. When Dasein has 
been individualised by angst in the understanding of thrown-not-being-at-home-in-the- 
world, Dasein can authentically understand the possibilities to care for its own 
existence and other beings because its thrownness is explicit. What this means when 
read with Jung is that through authentic being-a-self which involves the care for one’s 
own personal unconscious, authentic (individuated) Dasein can exist by caring for 
“collective problems, which have activated the collective unconscious because they 
require collective rather than personal compensation” (Jung, 1971, p.127). 
 
2.14 Truth and Discoveredness 
 
Once Heidegger describes the function of angst in Dasein’s existence, he moves into 
describing the role that truth plays for Dasein. Heidegger says Being-true “means to- 
be-discovering” (Heidegger, 1996, p.201) and being true means to let beings be seen 
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in their unconcealment (discoveredness), taking them out of their concealment. Now 
this is important to again connect with Jung’s transcendent function which, as Jung 
explains, is “as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with equal 
rights” (Jung, 1971, p.297) and “from which emerges some new position or 
perspective” (Miller, 2004, p.4). The Heideggerian comparison for this process of 
dialogue is to take beings out of concealment, which results in a new perspective 
through the discovery of the truth of a being. Heidegger explains that discovering is a 
way of being-in-the-world because “taking care of things, discovers innerworldly 
beings” (Heidegger, 1996, p.203). He says, “it is discoveredness of authentic 
disclosedness of Da-sein the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained. Dasein is 
in the truth means the disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its existential 
constitution” (Heidegger, 1996, p.203). What Heidegger is saying is that authentically 
being-in-the-world involves discovering one’s ownmost potentiality of being, which is 
disclosed by attunement, understanding, and discourse. The truth of discoveredness, 
care for one’s ownmost potentiality of being, is disclosed in an authentic understanding 
of “being-ahead-of-itself-already-being-in-a-world-as being together with innerworldly 
beings” (Heidegger, 1996, p.203). 
 
With Heidegger’s definition of truth outlined, it becomes clear that Dasein’s authentic 
project for being-in-the-world is “being toward its own potentiality-of-being” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.203). This means, “when Da-sein discovers the truth it discloses 
itself to itself in its ownmost potentiality-of being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.204). 
Discovering truth through an authentic understanding of Dasein’s disclosedness is in 
contrast to the untruth of falling prey to an inauthentic understanding: “Dasein can be 
in ‘truth’ and ‘untruth’ because Dasein is a thrown project” (Heidegger, 1996, p.205). 
Dasein cares for is ownmost Being by being in the truth of its existence articulated to 
itself through attuned understanding. Discovering authentic truth through the 
transcendent function “must always first be wrested from beings. Beings are torn from 
concealment” (Heidegger, 1996, p.204). 
 
As Dasein is constantly thrown and projecting itself throughout existence something is 
always still outstanding for Dasein’s ownmost potentiality-of-its-being. Consequently, 
Dasein remains a constantly unfinished being until its death and this lack of a totality 
of care for its ownmost being means that Dasein constantly faces the possibility of 
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inauthenticity until death. Jung’s understanding of the unconscious supports this 
proposal for the seemingly limitless possibility of authentic individuation until death. 
Jung explains this by saying, 
 
Since it is highly probable that we are still a long way from the summit of absolute 
consciousness, presumably everyone is capable of wider consciousness, and 
we may assume accordingly that the unconscious processes are constantly 
supplying us with contents which, if consciously recognized, would extend the 
range of consciousness. Looked at in this way, the unconscious appears as a 
field of experience of unlimited extent (Jung, 1971, p.135)27. 
 
2.15 Conscience 
 
Heidegger considers how Dasein reveals disclosedness to itself and this leads him to 
describe the role conscience plays in the existence of Dasein. He explains that 
conscience discloses attunement, understanding, falling prey, and discourse to 
Dasein. Heidegger says conscience calls to Dasein to summon “Da-sein to its 
ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of being 
a lack” (Heidegger, 1996, p.249) and “Conscience summons Dasein’s Self from its 
lostness in the ‘they’. The Self to which the appeal is made remains indefinite and 
empty in its ‘what’” (Heidegger, 2000, p.319). To add to this description of conscience, 
Jung explains his own idea of conscience as a voice leading to psychological growth 
and “this ‘growth’ is the objective activity of the psyche, which, independently of 
conscious volition, is trying to speak to the conscious mind through the inner voice and 
lead him towards wholeness” (Jung, 1954, p.183). Jung also emphasises the role of 
the psychotherapist to help the analysand find their own authentic conscience by 
saying, “we physicians of the soul are compelled by professional necessity to concern 
ourselves with the problem of personality and the inner voice, however remote it may 
seem to be” (Jung, 1954, p. 184)28. 
 
The call of conscience discloses Dasein as it is factically through attunement, although 
the call “might be concealed with regard to its why, but the ‘that-it-is’ has itself been 
                                               
27 Note Heidegger would not use Jung’s Cartesian language to describe this phenomenon  
28 This is a path to interpretation as opening up the ontical-ontological difference (see Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, 
p.266). 
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disclosed to Da-sein” (Heidegger, 1996, p.255). The call of conscience calls Dasein to 
understand its thrownness authentically, which reveals itself constantly in attunement. 
The attunement of the call of conscience to angst allows Dasein to turn away from 
falling prey and “makes possible for Da-sein its projecting upon its ownmost 
potentiality-of-being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.256). The call of conscience is always with 
Dasein but Dasein can inauthentically conceal this call by listening to the ‘loudness’ of 
the idle talk of ‘the they’. Jung also advocates listening to an authentic conscience 
arising out of one’s most intimate Being when he says, “the inner voice is the voice of 
a fuller life, of a wider, more comprehensive consciousness” (Jung, 1954, p.184). 
Jung’s work is considerably important here to contrast with Heidegger’s description of 
conscience. Jung says, “The fear that most people naturally have of the inner voice is 
not so childish as might be supposed. As a rule, they signify the specific danger to 
which the person concerned is liable to succumb. What the inner voice whispers to us 
is generally something negative, if not actually evil” (Jung, 1954, p.184). Like 
Heidegger, Jung recognises that conscience is negative but wise, since conscience 
highlights the importance of the collective concern for Dasein as being-in-the-world- 
with-others: “The inner voice, as I have explained above, makes us conscious of the 
evil [inauthenticity] from which the whole community is suffering, whether it be the 
nation or the whole human race” (Jung, 1954, p.185). 
 
2.16 Guilt 
 
Jung states that, in his experience, his patients do what they can to avoid a 
confrontation with their inner voice and Heidegger, too, highlights that conscience 
discloses responsibility to Dasein. Heidegger explains that conscience is a call of care 
to Dasein to disclose being-in-the-world authentically. Conscience discloses Dasein’s 
thrown project and calls Dasein forth to care by summoning Dasein out of falling prey 
to ‘the they’. For the call of conscience to effect and be understood by Dasein, 
Heidegger explains that conscience speaks of Dasein’s "guilt" from inauthentically 
falling prey to ‘the they’29. The call discloses the uncanniness of angst from thrown 
individuation as if conscience tells Dasein ‘they’ are not ‘you’. Conscience calls Dasein 
back to authenticity, which is disclosed as Dasein’s thrownness into the world “not of 
its own accord"; “It exists as a potentiality-of being which belongs to itself, and yet has 
                                               
29 Note this is only one interpretation of guilt and a deeper analysis is possible but it is not possible to go 
into more depth in this thesis.  
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not given itself to itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.262). Angst reveals Dasein’s thrownness 
into its own individuality and authentic project of being-in-the-world as a burden in need 
of care. In addition, because of Dasein’s projecting character, Dasein constantly lags 
behind its possibilities and therefore is constantly responsible for the nullity of itself 
during existence. 
 
The authentic understanding of Dasein’s being guilty as the ground of the nullity of its 
existence is incredibly important to the process of individuation presented by Jung.  
Dasein must authentically realise this by breaking out of the ‘they-self’ through the 
experience of ‘Angst.’ Jung says that the process of individuation involves a withdrawal 
of unconscious projections toward the world. What this means in Heidegger’s 
language is that for Dasein to be authentic, Dasein must understand it is the ground 
for the care of its being-in-the-world and so must understand its guilt for the nullity of 
what it is not. Jung highlights how the withdrawal of projections is a tough process and 
therefore supports Heidegger’s proposition that Dasein falls prey to ‘the they’ to flee 
authenticity as “the they accommodates Da-sein in its tendency to take things easily 
and make them easy” (Heidegger, 1996, p.120). In addition, Jung like Heidegger 
acknowledges the essential value of understanding authentic guilt by saying “If you 
imagine someone who is brave enough to withdraw all these projections, then you get 
an individual who is conscious of a considerable shadow. Such a man has saddled 
himself with new problems and conflicts” (Jung, 1938, p.83). 
 
Furthermore, in the same passage, Jung demonstrates an implicit understanding of 
Heidegger’s writing on authenticity by saying that individuation requires an acceptance 
of guilt. As a result, man 
 
has become a serious problem to himself, as he is now unable to say that they 
do this or that, they are wrong, and they must be fought against. He lives in the 
‘House of the Gathering’. Such a man knows that whatever is wrong in the world 
is in himself, and if he only learns to deal with his own shadow he has done 
something real for the world. He has succeeded in shouldering at least an 
infinitesimal part of the gigantic, unsolved social problems of our day (Jung, 1938, 
p.83). 
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This last sentence demonstrates that Jung, like Heidegger, understands authentic 
individuation to involve a concern not only for one’s own individual contribution to the 
world but concern for the world (Being) as a whole. 
 
2.17 Resoluteness 
 
The call of conscience discloses Dasein as being guilty for the nullity of its existence - 
a call to care authentically for existence. Therefore, for the transcendent function to 
succeed, it seems that Dasein must resolutely face the “uncanniness of being a thrown 
project” (Heidegger, 1996, p.255). This is because the transcendent function appears 
to allow Dasein to resolve falling prey to ‘the they’ and discover its ownmost authentic 
potentiality-of-being-in-the-world. When Dasein responds to this possibility, Dasein 
understands a readiness for “projecting oneself upon one's ownmost authentic 
potentiality for becoming guilty” (Heidegger, 1996, p.265). Since conscience discloses 
Dasein’s thrown project to itself through attunement, understanding, and discourse, 
resolute “wanting-to-have-a-conscience” (Heidegger, 1996, p.216) discloses Dasein’s 
ownmost potentiality for being itself. Consequently, understanding the call of 
conscience discloses Dasein in its individuation and becomes a readiness for angst 
so Dasein can develop an authentically attuned understanding of its thrown project. 
When Dasein understands the call and wants a conscience, Heidegger calls this 
resoluteness, which is the “authentic disclosedness attested in Da-sein itself by its 
conscience - the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty which is 
ready for Angst”. Resoluteness “is interpreted existentially as primordial truth” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.273). 
 
2.18 Anticipatory Resoluteness 
 
Authentic Dasein understands it is essentially being-guilty and resoluteness 
authentically “resolves itself for this being-guilty” (Heidegger, 1996, p.282). As a result, 
to exist authentically Dasein must resolutely “project upon itself this being-guilty that 
Da-sein is as long as it is” (Heidegger, 1996, p.282). For Dasein to project being guilty 
as long as it is means Dasein must project itself "up to its end" (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.282) (death). As a result, resoluteness is only authentic when Dasein projects being 
guilty up to its end as an anticipation of death. When Dasein understands existence 
as toward a possibility of death (being-toward-death), resoluteness brings Dasein to 
understand the truth of the indefiniteness of the moment of Dasein’s death. As a result, 
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the anticipation of death “brings Da-sein face to face with a possibility that is constantly 
certain and yet remains indefinite at every moment as to when this possibility becomes 
impossibility” (Heidegger, 1996, p.285). 
 
The certainty of death “reveals the nullity that determines Da-sein in its ground” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.285) and angst discloses the indefiniteness of death and thus 
frees Dasein for its ownmost potentiality in every moment until the end30. Since the 
moment of death is indefinite, Dasein’s authentic selfhood grounds itself in the 
constancy of being authentic from being-toward-death. Heidegger explains that this 
selfhood “is only to be found in the authentic being of Da-sein as care” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.296). The authentic constancy of the self illustrates Dasein’s gaining a stand 
on its own thrown projection. The lack of constancy of the self is irresolute and falls 
prey to ‘the they’. Anticipatory resoluteness is being toward one's ownmost potentiality-
of-being and this is only possible in such a way that “Da-sein can come toward itself 
at all in its ownmost possibility” (Heidegger, 1996, p.299). Anticipatory resoluteness 
makes Dasein authentically futural, as Dasein has understood coming toward oneself 
out of a futural projection. Therefore, authentic caring for thrown being- in-the-world is 
only possible because Dasein is always “I am-having-been” (Heidegger, 1996, p.299) 
and in this way Dasein has the possibility of caring for its thrownness by futurally 
coming toward its projected being-in-the-world and making it present. Vitally, 
Heidegger explains that the future arises from having-been and “releases the present 
from itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.300). Heidegger calls “the unified phenomenon of the 
future that makes present in the process of having-been - temporality” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.300). As a result, it is only possible for Dasein to be an authentic potentiality-
of-being-a-whole because of the unity of temporality and for this reason Heidegger 
says, “Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.300). 
 
2.19 Historicity and the Hermeneutic Circle 
 
                                               
30 The importance of this resoluteness in the face of nullity is elucidated by Heidegger in Pathmarks when 
he says, “Anxiety makes manifest the nothing” and “The lucid courage for essential anxiety assures us 
the enigmatic possibility of experiencing being. For close by essential anxiety as the horror of the abyss 
dwells awe. Awe clears and cherishes that locality of the human essence within which humans remain at 
home in that which endures” (Heidegger, 1998, p.234). In other words, because Dasein is essentially held 
into the nothing, when the world drops away and there is no-thing that Dasein can grasp to ground itself, 
it is left purely with the uncanniness of the Nothing - its true ground. This is the cause and source of anxiety 
- that at bottom Dasein is THE NOTHING. 
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John Caputo argues that Heidegger uses Kierkegaard’s idea of repetition when he 
explains Dasein’s historicity as this allows him to demonstrate the structure of Dasein’s 
kinesis as a circular existence, “‘the circular Being of Dasein’ (SZ 315/363)” (Caputo, 
1988, p.60). Dasein exists by moving forward toward the future through a projection of 
possibilities and Caputo stresses that “this forward movement is taken by Heidegger to 
be at one and the same time a movement back” (Caputo, 1988, p.60). Consequently, 
Dasein’s ontological structure of historicity should be understood as a forward futural 
‘projection’ and backward having-been ‘retrieval’. 
 
Repetition/retrieval occurs as Dasein projects a new horizon of possibilities for being- 
in-the-world toward the future. Dasein retrieves and unconceals possibilities from 
having-been when Dasein develops a new understanding that it did not have in the 
past. With this, Dasein “‘circulates’ between its ‘futurity’ and its ‘having been’” (Caputo, 
1998, p.60) as a projection of possibilities unconceals the meaning of possibilities that 
were undiscovered in the past. Consequently, Caputo argues ‘retrieval’ is a better 
translation of Wiederholung than repetition as it highlights the recovery of possibilities, 
which were “hidden, lost, or fallen” (Caputo, 1988, p.60). 
 
Heidegger explores the ontology of retrieval in his chapter on the historicity of Dasein 
in Being and Time. In this chapter, Heidegger explains that when Dasein comes toward 
itself in a projection of possibilities, Dasein can also come back to itself to retrieve and 
unconceal the meaning of possibilities hidden from understanding from having-been. 
Thus, Dasein’s circular movement unconceals possibilities from having- been and 
“Dasein opens up possibilities latent in the tradition, bringing forth something new. In 
repetition/retrieval Dasein is productive of what is repeats; it does not simply go over 
old ground” (Caputo, 1988, p.90). Therefore, retrieval is “first, a breakthrough, a 
retrieval which pushes forward, which opens what was previously closed, liberates 
what was formerly held in check. Repetition is a new beginning which aims at the 
possible” (Caputo, 1988, p.90). Campbell adds, “Retrieval is necessary to recover that 
which remains hidden” (Campbell, 2012, p.91) and this circular movement of Dasein 
discovers new possibilities for being-in-the-world. Finally, Caputo explains that 
retrieval answers the call of conscience by responding to what has been, which makes 
a “‘rejoinder’ which consists in bringing forth something for which Dasein has up to 
now only obscurely groped. The rejoinder (Erwiderung) is a rebuff (Widerruf) of the 
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inertial weight of the past” (Caputo, 1988, p.91). 
 
Caputo recommends that to grasp the meaning of Heidegger’s Being and Time 
accurately, it must be understood in the light of the "hermeneutic circle" of Dasein’s 
movements of projecting forward into the future and a backward retrieval of having- 
been. As a result, Caputo claims Heidegger applies his theory to practice in Being and 
Time. There is a “circular strategy” which is presented throughout the book through 
the hermeneutic circle to demonstrate the circular movement of Dasein’s 
understanding and interpretation of being-in-the-world. Caputo highlights this by 
explaining that division one of Being and Time culminates in a projected understanding 
that the meaning of Dasein is temporality. Heidegger’s circular movement of 
interpretation can then be recognised as division two of Being and Time, “retrieves” 
division one, and is interpreted in a “‘temporal analysis’ (§§65-83) in which the 
temporal sense of the elements disclosed in the existential analytic can be spelled out, 
item by item” (Caputo, 1988, p.68). Heidegger says “Thus, when temporality has been 
exposed, the task arises for the existential analytic of retrieving the analysis of Da-sein 
in the sense of interpreting the essential structures with a view to their temporality” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.281). Dasein interrogates the meaning of a Being further and 
further through this forward and backward movement of projection and retrieval. The 
hermeneutic circle moves between understanding and interpretation and Caputo 
explains, “Interpretation is the way understanding gets developed, filled in, articulated” 
(Caputo, 1988, p.69)31. Interpretation makes the possibilities projected by 
understanding determinate and specific through the process of forward and backward 
movements in the hermeneutic circle. This allows Dasein to discover the meaning of 
beings in a horizon of references and significations. 
 
Heidegger’s method in Being and Time also demonstrates that Dasein is 
phenomenological as well as hermeneutic when Dasein understands and interprets 
existence. Heidegger highlights this in the section of Being and Time entitled "The 
Phenomenological Method of Investigation", where he explains the meaning of 
phenomenology with the Greek word, phainomenon, which he says means "that which 
shows itself, the manifested, revealed" (Palmer, 1969, p.127). Palmer argues the ‘pha’ 
                                               
31 Interpretation involves engagement of the ontical and ontological dimensions of existence (see 
Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.266). 
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is close to the Greek word phos, which means lighting so "something can become 
manifest, can become visible" (Palmer, 1969, p.127). Consequently, Dasein’s 
hermeneutic and phenomenological existence can be understood as a circular 
movement that allows the meaning of its authentic existence to become visible, “or 
can be brought to light" (Palmer, 1969, p.127). 
 
Finally, Heidegger explains that the suffix “ology” in phenomenology, comes from the 
Greek word logos and he says logos means letting something appear "as" something 
in reference to other things. Heidegger writes, “logos have the structure of synthesis” 
which means “to let something be seen in its togetherness with something, to let 
something be seen as something” (Heidegger, 1996, p.29). Therefore, the 
combination of phainomenon and logos, means Dasein reveals beings as what they 
are in relation to other beings (cf. structural linguistics) and because Dasein 
understands hermeneutically, revealing the meaning of beings is not fixed but 
historically shaped. 
 
2.20 The Transcendent Function 
 
Now that I have presented the essential ideas of Heidegger’s Being and Time and I 
have shown similarities and differences with Jungian psychology where appropriate, I 
will read the ideas of these two thinkers further to outline a Heideggerian (ontological) 
description of the transcendent function32. It is important that prior to working through 
the following three stages of this Heideggerian informed transcendent function that a 
psychotherapist has helped the analysand understand and accept why authentic 
anticipatory resoluteness is important to assist in surpassing the impasses of 
psychopathology. This means that prior to discovering how Dasein has fallen prey to 
‘the they’ through the transcendent function, the analysand will need to display 
anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness is an “authentic disclosedness 
attested in Da-sein itself by its conscience-the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s 
ownmost being-guilty which is ready for Angst” and to “project upon itself this being 
guilty that Da-sein is as long as it is” (Heidegger, 1996, p.273). When examined under 
the lens of Heidegger’s philosophy, the transcendent function adheres to the principles 
of Daseinsanalysis as it aims “to help the patient to achieve an open and steady being-
                                               
32 This is aligned with Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.58) who advocates adopting “a positive phenomenological 
attitude to psychoanalytic theories”.  
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in-the-world” (Kouba, 2014, p.3). 
 
2.21 Stage 1: Evoking the Unconscious 
 
The first stage of a Heideggerian description of the transcendent function involves 
focusing on encountering the unconscious, which is troubling the analysand. Jung 
says, “First and foremost, we need the unconscious material” (Jung, 1971, p.283)33. 
Phenomenologically this involves identifying and retrieving some historical ways a 
person has fallen prey and obstructed their openness and freedom to Being. Jung 
suggests a technique called active imagination for conjuring unconscious material, 
where the symptom provides a start to the transcendent function: “The patient would 
like to know what it is all for and how to gain relief. In the intensity of the emotional 
disturbance itself lies the value, the energy which he should have at his disposal in 
order to remedy the state of reduced adaptation” (Jung, 1971, p.289). The analysand 
can “resist and defend against what is encountered or they surrender to it” (Jung, 1971, 
p.289) and this encounter is disclosed by the transcendent function to discover the 
meaning of a symptom. 
 
Miller explains, “The goal is not to eliminate the symptom but rather to dive into the 
energy locked inside of it. The core of active imagination is finding a way into the 
symptom or emotional state. Only then can the symptom be seen constructively, as 
being involved in pulling one in a purposeful way” (Miller, 2004, p.23). Jung instructs 
that the analysand: 
 
must make himself as conscious as possible of the mood he is in, sinking himself 
in it without reserve and noting down on paper all the fantasies and other 
associations that come up. Fantasy must be allowed the freest possible play, yet 
not in such a manner that it leaves the orbit of its object, namely the affect, by 
setting off a kind of “chain-reaction” association process. . . . Out of this 
preoccupation with the object there comes a more or less complete expression 
of the mood, which reproduces the content of the depression in some way, either 
concretely or symbolically. Since the depression was not manufactured by the 
                                               
33 To relate the unconscious to Heidegger it must be translated into his phenomenological ontology. For 
example, see Heidegger (2001, p.287). For another author’s example of this see Holzhey-Kunz (2014, 
p.119 and p.49).  
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conscious mind but is an unwelcome intrusion from the unconscious, the 
elaboration of the mood is, as it were, a picture of the contents and tendencies 
of the unconscious that were massed together in the depression (Jung, 1971, 
p.289)34. 
 
Now, as Heidegger discusses in Being and Time, Dasein always has an attunement 
to the world through a mood that discloses how Dasein is or how Dasein is coming 
along in its being-in-the world. However, Dasein’s disclosure through attunement 
“does not, as such, mean to be known” (Heidegger, 1996, p.127) and therefore I argue 
that Jungian evoking of the unconscious is ontologically grounded in disclosedness35. 
Heidegger says when Dasein is as it is in its being there, attunement discloses its thrown 
(individuated) being into the world. He adds, “Thrownness means Dasein is in a world 
in a definite way and this comes from its past and being with a factical world with finite 
possibilities available” (Heidegger, 1996, p.203). I argue that one aim of the 
transcendent function is to retrieve the meaning of Dasein’s mood from having-been. It 
is important to retrieve the meaning of this mood as it can highlight the guilt Dasein 
experiences for falling prey and closing off to possibilities for being-in-the-world. Now 
with Heidegger’s philosophy and Jung’s transcendent function juxtaposed in this way, 
I can ontologically re-interpret Jung’s description of evoking the unconscious with the 
transcendent function36. 
 
Firstly, Jung says the person must make their mood as conscious as possible. In 
Heidegger's ontological terms, this means Dasein is required to retrieve and develop 
an interpretation of the meaning of their thrown being-in-the-world and how the mood 
has been created out of guilt from falling prey by closing off to possibilities from ‘having- 
been’. This part of the transcendent function should also involve noting down the 
associations from the projection of possibilities as to the meaning of the guilty mood. 
                                               
34 Note Heidegger would reject Jung’s language here (see footnote above and Askay and Farquhar, 2006, 
p.221-222) but my aim is to understand Jung through Heidegger’s ontology. It is also interesting to note 
how Jung and Freud may respond to this Heideggerian criticism (see Askay and Farquhar, 2006, p.223-
229).  
35 Evoking the unconscious is grounded in disclosedness because in contrast to Jung, Heidegger “inquires 
into the being of man as a whole” (Binswanger, 1963, p.211). This is an example why Jung needs 
Heidegger and how “Heidegger’s analytic of existence can broaden his horizon” (1965, p.212). 
36 This is a reinterptation of the ontic (Jung) into the ontological (Heidegger). This is a ‘freeing activity’ see 
Askay and Farquhar (2011, p.133). When Heidegger meets psychoanalysis in this way the “two 
approaches are mutually reinforcing and beneficial” (Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.142). This is important 
because Jung’s ontic investigation is “on principle is barred from the fullest understanding of the patient” 
(Binswanger, 1963, p.32) because it “brackets out existence” (p.170). 
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This means that the meaning of Dasein’s guilty mood should be understood in relation 
to how Dasein’s concern for being-in-the-world projects ways of taking care of the 
world and the ways Dasein conceals possibilities that have been relinquished to ‘the 
they’. 
 
When Dasein falls prey to a meaningless existence, Dasein encounters angst, which 
can lead “Da-sein to individuate its ownmost being-in-the-world. Attunement as 
understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.176). 
Importantly, with this mood of angst and guilt from falling prey, Dasein can retrieve the 
concealed (unconscious) authentic possibilities of existence, concealed by falling into 
‘the they’. Therefore, the process of the transcendent function would require the 
involvement of Dasein’s authentic anticipatory resoluteness, which means Dasein is 
required to understand that it is essentially being-guilty and “resolves itself for this 
being-guilty” (Heidegger, 1996, p.282). As a result, to exist authentically Dasein must 
resolutely “project upon itself this being-guilty that Da-sein is as long as it is” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.282). Anticipatory resoluteness involves a readiness for angst that 
is associated with thrownness so that ‘having-been’ of falling prey and the meaning of 
the disclosive mood is retrievable and brought into a conscious synthesis. Anticipatory 
resoluteness allows Dasein to project possibilities for the meaning of the guilty mood 
from falling prey with the psychotherapists help37. When Dasein has been individuated 
by its awareness of having-been and thrownness through guilt and angst38, Dasein 
can project and retrieve possibilities of the meaning of the guilty mood because 
Dasein’s thrownness has not been forgotten. This assists Dasein to remove “life-
denying patterns and conflicts” from being-in-the-world. 
 
Jung’s description of active imagination in his essay on the transcendent function adds 
to a Jungian comparision to Heidegger through Jung’s statements about the fantasy- 
making capacity of the psyche. This Jungian (ontic) contrast to Heidegger is important 
in order to outline a practical way Dasein can discover and retrieve the truth and 
meaning of its guilty mood from falling prey from having-been. Through fantasy and 
active imagination, Dasein can retrieve, interpret and develop a creative 
understanding (assimilation of the unconscious) of possibilities to explain the meaning 
                                               
37 This is consistent with Binswanger (1963, p.348). 
38 This is consistent with advice from Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.215). 
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of Dasein’s guilty mood. In this way, Dasein can come to retrieve and understand the 
meaning of a guilty mood from having-been: “This is the beginning of the transcendent 
function, i.e., of the collaboration of conscious and unconscious data” (Miller, 2004, 
p.24). In this Heideggerian description of the transcendent function, ‘the they’ functions 
as a thesis provided by an (inauthentic) ego-consciousness. This average, familiar and 
everyday understanding of being-in-the-world has led to Dasein falling prey and 
experiencing angst and guilt. This is in comparison to an anti-thesis from the creative 
(authentic) understanding, which appears through an interpretation of possibilities that 
retrieves and discovers the meaning of Dasein’s guilty mood from having been. A 
hermeneutic interpretation of the meaning of Dasein’s guilty mood aids Jung’s 
aesthetic and understanding formulations of the unconscious material. Jung discusses 
how one deals with the unconscious prompted by active imagination and he identifies 
“two main tendencies” that emerge: the “way of creative formulation” and the “way of 
understanding”. Jung writes, “we could say that aesthetic formulation needs 
understanding of the meaning, and understanding needs aesthetic formulation. The 
two supplement each other to form the transcendent function” (Jung, 1971, p.293). 
This active formulation allows Dasein to authentically retrieve and creatively interpret 
possibilities for the meaning of its guilty mood from having-been. This is important as 
it will lead to unconcealing how Dasein has closed itself to possibilities and the call of 
conscience by falling prey to understanding its world inauthentically through ‘the they’. 
Dasein can develop an interpretation and retrieve an understanding of the meaning of 
a guilty mood emanating from the unconscious, by projecting possibilities concerning 
the meaning for the guilty mood through the forward and backward movement of the 
hermeneutic circle. A hermeneutic interpretation of the mood-affects involves the 
development of possibilities for the meaning of the mood projected in understanding. 
In the projecting of understanding, it is possible to disclose and retrieve ‘how’ beings 
have affected Dasein’s guilty mood. This meaning of a mood can be discovered in the 
logos through a projection and retrieval of possibilities which allows an understanding 
of innerworldly beings projected toward a totality of significance of referential relations 
to be understood. With this interpretation of the meaning of Dasein’s guilty mood, 
“innerworldly beings are discovered, that is, have come to be understood, we say that 
they have meaning” (Heidegger, 1996, p.142). 
 
This development of meaning is important because Jung describes the role of the 
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transcendent function in individuation as a “Constructive treatment of the unconscious, 
that is, the question of meaning and purpose, paves the way for the patient’s insight 
into that process which I call the transcendent function” (Jung, 1971, p.280). As a 
result, it has now become clear that a Heideggerian interpretation of the transcendent 
function can explain how Dasein can discover the meaning of a guilty mood from falling 
prey to ‘the they’. This occurs through the development of an interpretation of 
possibilities projected toward and retrieved from a totality of significance in referential 
relations of Dasein’s being-in-the-world. In this interpretation of possibilities for being- 
in-the-world, Dasein can discover and develop a meaningful understanding of its 
ownmost potentiality of Being through a retrieval interpretation of a guilty mood from 
having-been39. In addition, this part of the transcendent function makes the previously 
undisclosed beings meaningful, which provides Dasein the possibility to care 
authentically for its thrown existence by transcending the incomprehensibility and un- 
meaningful, absurdities from falling prey to ‘the they’. 
 
2.22 Stage 2: Bringing the Ego together with the Unconscious 
 
Jung explains the next step in the transcendent function by saying, 
 
Once the unconscious content has been given form and the meaning of the 
formulation is understood, the question arises as to how the ego will relate to this 
position, and how the ego and the unconscious are to come to terms. This is the 
second and more important stage of the procedure, the bringing together of 
opposites for the production of a third: the transcendent function (Jung, 1971, 
p.295). 
 
Jung then describes in detail the interaction between the ego and the unconscious. He 
writes “It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with 
equal rights, each of whom gives the other credit for a valid argument and considers it 
worth while to modify the conflicting standpoints by means of thorough comparison 
and discussion or else to distinguish them clearly from one another” (Jung, 1971, p.297). 
This interaction between opposing psychic contents creates a tension of energy for 
“the transcendent function of the opposites” (Miller, 2004, p.28). He explains that the 
transcendent function requires these opposites, as “There is no energy unless there 
                                               
39 This is why Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.25) says the daseinanalytic therapist is “the ally of the patient’s 
dormant maturational potential”.  
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is a tension of opposites” (Jung, 1992, p.53). This increased psychic tension and 
energy can be translated into Heidegger’s ontology as a disclosure of angst, indicating 
Dasein’s attunement to the presence of an obstruction (tension of opposites) when 
Dasein retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and discloses Dasein’s concealment to 
available possibilities. The opposition that creates angst can be thought as arising from 
the discovery of the untruth of the inauthentic understanding of Dasein’s being-in-the- 
world from listening to ‘the they’ compared to an authentic understanding when Dasein 
retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood from having-been from stage 1 of the 
transcendent function. 
 
Jung supports my proposal in this chapter that the transcendent function involves 
resolving the opposites between an inauthentic understanding provided by others and 
Dasein’s authentic understanding provided by anticipatory resoluteness. Jung's 
support is clear when he says that the ability to resolve this opposition between the 
ego (grounded in inauthentic understanding) and the unconscious (grounded in 
authentic understanding) requires both intrapsychic and interpersonal skills. He says 
that the transcendent function involves a person being able to validate perspectives 
other than their own and without this ability to weigh the unconscious (grounded in 
authentic understanding) and ego (grounded in inauthentic understanding) equally, it 
will impede personal relationships. “Everyone who proposes to come to terms with 
himself must reckon with this basic problem. For, to the degree that he does not admit 
the validity of the other person, he denies the ‘other’ within himself the right to exist—
and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a touchstone for outer objectivity” 
(Jung, 1971, p.297). 
 
Jung also states that the desired outcome from this interaction of opposites is a new 
perspective to resolve the psychological tension that a person may experience. He 
writes: 
 
The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent 
function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension 
charged with energy and creates a living, third thing—not a logical stillbirth in 
accordance with the principle tertium non datur but a movement out of the 
suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a 
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new situation (Jung, 1971, p.298). 
 
This new situation or perspective arises out of the confrontation of the ego (grounded in 
inauthentic understanding) with the unconscious (grounded in authentic 
understanding) and Heidegger’s philosophy can explain and develop this further40. 
The transcendent function retrieves, projects and creates a new, third viewpoint to 
remove Dasein’s guilty mood from having-been. This takes place from Dasein’s 
anticipatory resoluteness to establish an authentic resolution that allows a constancy 
of the self out of falling prey to ‘the they’. Heidegger’s philosophy explains the way the 
transcendent function of opposites unites through anticipatory resoluteness. The 
transcendent function unites opposites to open Dasein to new possibilities to listen to 
the call of conscience for being-in-the-world and “letting oneself be summoned out of 
one's lostness in the they” (Heidegger, 1996, p.275). Reaching the third viewpoint 
occurs when Dasein develops a new understanding through the interpretation of a 
projection of possibilities in anticipatory resoluteness as Dasein listens to the call of 
conscience which has not been prescribed by ‘the they’. Dasein discovers a new 
perspective to be open to possibilities to listen to the call of conscience and to avoid 
guilt through an “authentic having-been retrieve” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311). When 
Dasein is resolute to project possibilities for being-in- the-world to listen to the call of 
conscience41, Dasein can retrieve possibilities from having been which have been 
concealed and this allows an authentic understanding (unconscious) to unify with an 
inauthentic understanding (ego) prescribed by ‘the they’. This unification opens Dasein 
to new possibilities to listen to the call of conscience and avoid falling prey. 
 
Just as Jung emphasizes that both unconscious and ego need to have equal say in 
the dialogue of the transcendent function of opposites, Heidegger too emphasizes that 
the ‘resolution’ of the opposites between ‘the they’ and Dasein’s conscience or 
‘ownmost potentiality of being’ requires reciprocity and mutual settlement to achieve 
authenticity. Heidegger explains this by saying: 
 
                                               
40 This is another example where Jung’s ontic psychological ideas are grounded in Heidegger’s ontology: 
“The two are inseparable. The ontological is the deeper level of meaning from which the ontic is made 
possible” (Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.66) (See also Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.133 how Heidegger’s 
ontology provides the ground for Freud’s ‘body-ego’. This is so since “Bodily being is possible because 
Being-in-the-world always already consists ‘of a receptive/perceptive relatedness to something which 
addresses us from out of the openness of our world’” (Askay and Farquhar, 2006, p.215). 
41 This is the patient as “reluctant philosopher” (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.194). 
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Even resolutions are dependent upon the ‘they’ and its world. Understanding this 
is one of the things that resolution discloses, resoluteness first gives to Dasein 
its authentic transparency. In resoluteness, Da-sein is concerned with its 
ownmost potentiality-of-being that, as thrown, can project itself only upon 
definite, factical possibilities. Resolution does not escape from ‘reality’, but first 
discovers what is factically possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible, 
as one's ownmost potentiality-of-being in the they (Heidegger, 1996, p.275). 
 
2.23 Stage 3: The Transcendent Function 
 
This final section shows the importance of Heidegger’s analysis of temporality and 
historicity to explain the ontology of the transcendent function. Heidegger explains that 
the totality of care of Dasein means to authentically be “Ahead-of-itself-already-being- 
in (a world) as being-together-with (beings encountered within the world)” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.292). Heidegger adds, Dasein “temporalizes possible ways of itself” and 
temporality allows care “outside of itself' in and for itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.302). 
 
Heidegger identifies the importance of the future in authentic temporality because 
“authentic temporality temporalizes itself out of the authentic future” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.302). Jung also highlights the importance of the future for the transcendent function 
when he says, “The unconscious is continually active, combining its material in ways 
which serve the future” (Jung, 1971, p.293). Heidegger explains, “Temporality does 
not temporalize itself constantly out of the authentic future. However, this inconstancy 
does not mean that temporality at times lacks the future, but rather that the 
temporalizing of the future is changeable” (Heidegger, 1996, p.310). This gives a clue 
that falling prey and alienating the call of conscience are understandable in terms of 
how temporality temporalizes to explain the ontology of the transcendent function42. 
 
The crucial connection between Jung and Heidegger in this chapter has now arisen 
and could not have been described or acknowledged properly if the preceding pages 
were not first presented. This crucial connection concerns Heidegger’s notion of ‘the 
moment’ (Heidegger, 1996, p.311) and Jung’s transcendent function. Heidegger 
explains that ‘the moment’ is the authentic present within Dasein’s temporality which 
                                               
42 See Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.163) “The denial of temporality”.  
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contrasts to the inauthentic present which Heidegger calls ‘making present’. Heidegger 
explains that ‘the moment’ temporalizes itself out of the authentic future. What this 
means for Jung’s transcendent function is that ‘the moment’ of the unification of 
opposites occurs when Dasein temporalizes its being-in-the-world out of an authentic 
future and retrieves possibilities that have-been. This is evident when Heidegger says, 
“a resolute holding oneself free for taking back, is the authentic resoluteness to retrieve 
itself”. Additionally, “Retrieve is explicit handing down, that is, going back to the 
possibilities of the Da-sein that has been there” (Heidegger, 1996, p.352). 
Furthermore, “Authentic coming-toward-itself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the 
same time a coming back to the ownmost self thrown into its individuation” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.311). This means that through anticipatory resoluteness, a projection of 
Dasein’s authentic possibilities for care for itself within its thrown being-in- the-world- 
with ‘the they’, insight into Dasein’s “ownmost self thrown into its individuation” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.311) can be discovered in ‘the moment’ of a retrieval of the 
unification of opposites. 
 
As a result, Heidegger’s ‘moment’ provides an ontological description for Jung’s 
transcendent function which, as Jung explains, aims to discover meaning and purpose 
from the individuation process for “the revelation of the essential man” (Miller, 2004, 
p.58). My claim that Heidegger can provide an ontological description of the 
transcendent function can be made and is supported because Heidegger describes 
that in ‘the moment’, Dasein discovers a sense of its fatefully “authentic historical 
constancy of the self” (Heidegger, 1996, p.377). Dasein’s anticipatory resoluteness 
establishes a unity and constancy of Dasein through a projection of possibilities, which 
is a “retrieve of possibilities that have-been”. Accordingly, “Da-sein brings itself back 
‘immediately,’ that is, temporally and ecstatically, to what has already been before it” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.357). Dasein establishes a constancy of itself through a “retrieve 
which is futurally in the process of having-been”. “Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty 
of existence to its own self” (Heidegger, 1996, p.357) when Dasein projects 
possibilities, which retrieve the meaning of hidden possibilities that have been. When 
Dasein is resolute and Dasein listens to the call of conscience by retrieving hidden 
possibilities from a guilty mood from having been, the ego (inauthentic understanding) 
unites with the unconscious (authentic understanding). This is when the “temporality 
of authentic historicity, as the Moment that anticipates and retrieves, undoes the 
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making present of the today and the habituation to the conventionalities of the they” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.357). 
 
In this way, Heidegger explains the unity of opposites between falling prey to 
inauthentic understanding and listening to the call of conscience with authentic 
understanding when he says, “The existence of the Moment temporalizes itself as 
fatefully whole, stretching along in the sense of the authentic, historical constancy of 
the self” (Heidegger, 1996, p.377). This moment of an authentically fateful, historical 
constancy of the self, results in the “growth of personality [and] is synonymous with an 
increase of self-consciousness” (Jung, 1954, p.184). This growth occurs because 
Dasein understands and retrieves possibilities to be authentic by being open to 
listening to the call of conscience: “Resolutely coming back to itself, it is open in 
retrieve for the ‘monumental’ possibilities of human existence” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.362). 
 
Dasein’s “authentic having-been retrieve” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311) occurs by 
developing an interpretation of the meaning of a guilty mood from having-been. This 
allows a discovery of possibilities for being-in-the-world to be retrieved hermeneutically 
and unconcealed phenomenologically when Dasein understands how to be open to 
the call of conscience in a world with others. This is in contrast to a lack of individuation 
which is associated with inauthenticity where there is no ‘having-been retrieve’ 
because Dasein has not been resolute to project possibilities to discover the meaning 
of a guilty mood and to be open to the call of conscience as “Da-sein has forgotten 
itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-of-being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311). Within the 
present, where psychotherapy takes place, a futural projection of possibilities which 
allows Dasein to be open to listening to the call of conscience within its thrown being- 
in-the-world-with ‘the they’, an insight of Dasein’s “ownmost self thrown into its 
individuation” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311) can be retrieved and discovered in ‘the 
moment’ of the unification of opposites. As a result, individuation of the self through 
the transcendent function can be ontologically explained as grounded in temporality 
and historicity as the authentic constancy of the self is established in the ecstatic unity 
of the future, having-been, and present of ‘the moment’ in the unification of opposites 
(unconscious/ego, authentic/inauthentic understanding). 
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Consequently, the transcendent function is successful when a person can 
authentically recognise the facticity of their existence, which involves other worldly 
beings and that the possibilities inherent in these beings “is not under the control of 
Da-sein.” Only ‘what’, ‘in which direction’, ‘to what extent’, and ‘how’ it actually 
discovers and discloses beings is a matter of freedom, although always within the 
limits of its thrownness” (Heidegger, 1996, p.334). The transcendent function allows 
Dasein to determine which direction, to what extent, and how these beings are 
encountered so Dasein can be authentically open to the call of conscience and avoid 
falling prey to the inauthentic understanding prescribed by ‘the they’. 
 
This chapter has provided a Heideggerian description of the transcendent function and 
a Jungian discussion of some features of Being and Time. This chapter illustrates that 
the transcendent function is grounded in Heidegger’s philosophy which can also be 
understood as ultimately aiming to develop Dasein’s anticipatory resoluteness where 
there lies an authentic love of fate where Dasein “hands itself down to itself, free for 
death, in a possibility that it inherited and yet has chosen” (Heidegger, 1996, p.351). 
Jung also provides support to the importance of understanding existence in this way 
as he explains that neurosis is born out of a lack of a love of one’s own fate (Amor 
Fati). Jung argues “Behind the neurotic perversion is concealed his vocation, his 
destiny: the growth of personality, the full realization of the life-will that is born with the 
individual. It is the man without amor fati who is the neurotic; he, truly, has missed his 
vocation” and without this amor fati, man “has failed to realize his life's meaning” (Jung, 
1954, p.183)43. 
 
2.24 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter illustrates that the transcendent function is ontologically 
elucidated with the help of Heidegger’s philosophy. The transcendent function 
ultimately aims for Dasein to resolutely project possibilities to hermeneutically and 
phenomenologically retrieve and unconceal hidden possibilities from having been 
which Dasein experiences as a guilty mood from falling prey to an inauthentic 
understanding prescribed by ‘the they’44. When Dasein opens new possibilities to listen 
                                               
43 Cf “Only he who scorns these limits, who – in Kierkegaard’s terms – is at odds with the fundamental 
conditions of existence, can become ‘neurotic’” (Binswanger, 1963, p.218). 
44 Cf Binswanger (1963, p.115) 
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to the call of conscience Dasein is authentic and “hands itself down to itself, free for 
death, in a possibility that it inherited and yet has chosen” (Heidegger, 1996, p.351). 
 
My aim in this chapter has been to assist the reader to recognise that psychotherapists 
can conceptualise Jung’s transcendent function through the ontology and 
phenomenology of authentic 'anticipatory resoluteness'. As a result, I have 
demonstrated the importance of anticipatory resoluteness, which consists in the 
authentic (ontological) understanding of guilt, death, conscience, angst, temporality 
and historicity for psychotherapy to catalyse the transcendent function. Finally, my 
work in this chapter also highlights that “authentic temporality temporalizes itself out 
of the authentic future” (Heidegger, 1996, p.302). Through a futural projection of 
possibilities which allows Dasein to be open to listening to the call of conscience within 
Dasein’s thrown being-in- the-world-with ‘the they’, an insight of Dasein’s “ownmost 
self thrown into its individuation” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311) can be retrieved and 
discovered from Dasein’s circular movement. This is ‘the moment’ of the unification of 
authentic/inauthentic, conscious/unconscious opposites. 
 
2.25 Layout of the Subsequent Chapters 
 
My thesis as a whole and the presentation of each chapter reflects this description of 
the transcendent function by moving in a hermeneutic circle of projecting and retrieving 
possibilities in Jung’s writing. With each new projection and retrieval, my thesis further 
unconceals the phenomenological and ontological meaning of Jung’s writing. In 
chapter 5, I retrieve the analysis of the transcendent function from this chapter, which 
deepens the ontological and phenomenological meaning of complexes and the 
Rosarium Philosophorum, which I present in chapter 3 and 4 respectively. Finally, 
once complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum are interpreted and made 
meaningful in connection with the transcendent function in chapter 5, a new meaning 
of the transcendent function will be discovered when it is retrieved and interpreted with 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Will to Power. 
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Chapter 3: The Phenomenology and Ontology of Complexes 
 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, I continue the work presented in the previous chapter with the 
integration of Jung’s theory on complexes and a Daseinsanalytic description of 
narcissism. The foundation I presented in the previous chapter on Heidegger’s work 
in Being and Time is essential to describing the work of the current chapter. The overall 
purpose of this chapter is to discover more of the similarities and differences between 
Heidegger’s and Jung’s work45. Specifically, I focus on providing a phenomenological 
description of Jung’s complex theory with the use of Heidegger’s ontology. In addition, 
I demonstrate how a Daseinsanalytic description of narcissism is significantly 
elucidating when read with a phenomenological understanding of complexes. 
 
I will argue that the meaning of a complex is phenomenologically disclosed when 
Dasein’s world is conspicuously experienced as unready-to-hand and “not-being-at- 
home”. The experience of a complex saliently discloses angst, conscience, and guilt 
in a moment of conspicuous obstructiveness and obstinacy, which results in the ready- 
to-hand losing its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. I also describe the authentic and 
inauthentic understanding of the meaning of complexes after this moment and relate 
them to Jung’s psychoanalysis. 
 
I aim to demonstrate that an authentic projection provides a way for Dasein to discover 
an authentic worldhood and “being-at-home” which results from listening to the call of 
conscience and confronting the angst and guilt disclosed in the experience of a 
complex. In contrast, an inauthentic fleeing and Being perfect projection from this 
moment perpetuates an inauthentic worldhood and an obstinate experience of “not- 
being-at-home” as the readiness-to-hand of the world falls into obstructiveness 
whenever Dasein returns to the “region” or “situation” where the complex is 
experienced. 
 
In the final section, I explain that the understanding towards beings for Dasein to 
initiate and discover the authentic meaning of a complex requires resoluteness for 
                                               
45 This also “enables the psychiatrist to consider the mentally ill person not only as a bearer of 
symptoms, but as an entire human being” (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.8). 
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Dasein to assimilate an understanding of a complex into being-in-the-world. 
Resoluteness involves authentically understanding the call of conscience that 
discloses Dasein in the angst and guilt of its individuated being-in-the-world, thus 
providing the direction for Dasein to develop an authentic understanding of its project 
for being-in-the-world. As a result of this authentic understanding of being-in-the-world, 
an unconcealment of the primordial truth of beings in the world can be appropriated 
by resolutely encountering a complex and developing an interpreted understanding of 
their meaning, thus providing Dasein a more authentic ability to care for being-in-the- 
world. I describe this phenomenological and ontological interpretation of complexes with 
the assistance of a Daseinsanalytic paper by Kastrinidis and Being and Time by 
Heidegger. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a phenomenological description and 
explanation of Jung’s complex theory to incorporate it into the Daseinsanalytic 
literature. This chapter is possible because of the work by Heidegger in Being and 
Time and Kastrinidis in his paper “the phenomenology of narcissistic neurosis” 
(Kastrinidis, 1988). I show that complexes arise when Dasein’s understanding of 
existence is inauthentically narrow and dogmatically averse to the authentic meaning 
of the call of conscience, which discloses the truth of Being. I highlight that the 
disclosure of angst, guilt and the call of conscience from a complex indicate Dasein 
has fallen prey to being-in-the-world due to fleeing an authentic existence. A 
phenomenological and ontological interpretation of complexes indicates that they are 
signposts to assist Dasein toward its authentic being-in-the-world, but complexes 
threaten Dasein’s being-in-the-world when these signposts have not been understood 
authentically. An authentic understanding of the meaning of a complex requires 
resolutely listening to the call of conscience, which discloses the truth of Dasein’s 
Being to itself as a call of guilt when angst is encountered within the world. 
 
My primary task is to disclose phenomenologically the fundamental characteristics of 
the lived experience of a complex. Kastrinidis paper on narcissism provides a useful 
platform to describe and explain the phenomenology of complexes; however this work 
requires additional details prior to and following its discussion from Being and Time to 
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describe and explain complexes in greater clarity. Furthermore, I argue that complexes 
persist from an inauthentic understanding of their experience, which involves a 
projection of Being-perfect. Being perfect is a projected inauthentic understanding by 
Dasein that understands itself to have developed to the very apex of its potential and 
couples with a closedness to other possibilities (e.g. imperfection, failure, and guilt.) 
 
As a result, instead of authentically understanding the experience of a complex as the 
call of guilt from conscience, disclosing the truth of Dasein’s “not being at home”, a 
Being-perfect projection flees facing the truth of guilt from falling prey and therefore 
lacks the discovery of new possibilities for being-in-the-world. Conversely, if Dasein 
resolutely listens authentically to the call of conscience to discover a truth of Being, 
Dasein can authentically confront complexes and develop an interpreted 
understanding of new possibilities to expand the meaning of its being-in-the-world. 
This understanding is essential to fulfilling Dasein’s authentic potential for being-in- 
the-world. This also allows Dasein to avoid inauthentically falling prey to complexes, 
which leads to an incomprehensible, insignificant and obstructive existence. 
 
3.2 Individuation and Authenticity 
 
Jung writes, “Individuation culminates in a develop-mental process which is peculiar 
to the psyche and consists in integrating the unconscious contents into consciousness. 
This means that the psychic human being becomes a whole” (Jung, 1969, p.223). This 
concept of wholeness is fundamental to the theme of this chapter. I explain that 
complexes arise when Dasein lacks the openness to the process of becoming whole, 
which means to be ontologically authentic. Instead of authentically and resolutely 
reflecting on the ontological meaning of the experience of a complex, which is 
disclosed through the call of a guilty conscience and an attunement to angst, an 
inauthentic Being-perfect projection in response to the complex prevents individuation 
to psychic wholeness46. Being inauthentic misses the development of new possibilities 
for existing to remove the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world. The 
inauthentic Being-Perfect projection allows Dasein to ignore the guilt and call of 
conscience from falling prey from an inauthentic understanding of existence, but 
prevents Dasein from discovering a truth of being-in-the-world. Ultimately, this 
                                               
46 In other words this is when “Dasein can no longer freely allow the world to be, but is, increasingly 
surrended over to one particular world-design” (Binswanger, 1963, p.284) 
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inauthentic projection culminates in complexes alienating Dasein from the truth and 
meaning of Being which results in Dasein falling prey once again as Dasein’s world 
becomes conspicuously and obstinately obstructive. The more obdurately and 
inauthentically the ontological meaning of a complex is denied an indication of guilt, 
the more likely an inauthentic understanding of the complex (the ego) will assert itself 
with violent/aggressive outbursts toward the obstructive world it encounters, thus 
further perpetuating Dasein’s alienation from an authentic understanding. 
Alternatively, by authentically understanding the complex, the unconscious can be 
“made conscious, it results not only in their assimilation to the already existing ego- 
personality, but in a transformation of the latter” (Jung, 1969, p.224). 
 
Jung argues individuation is a rare occurrence, “which is experienced only by those 
who have gone through the wearisome” (Jung, 1969, p.223). Individuation involves 
the process of integrating the unconscious components of the personality with 
consciousness. I highlight the phenomenology of what Jung says about unconscious 
complexes and I explain why there is a tendency to flee inauthentically the process of 
individuation. Additionally, I explain that for individuation to take place, the wearisome 
process of individuation involves what Heidegger calls resoluteness, which is an 
authentic understanding of existence that avoids falling prey to an inauthentic 
existence. Falling prey occurs when Dasein inauthentically flees from the ontological 
truth of existence disclosed in the experience of angst, guilt, and conscience. As a 
result, the process of individuation requires the integration of irruptions of the 
unconscious into consciousness. Since the experience of the integration of 
consciousness with an unconscious complex is new and unfamiliar to ego- 
consciousness, a resolute projection toward this experience is required to avoid fleeing 
this experience, which would prevent the truth of Being to be authentically 
unconcealed. 
 
3.3 The Phenomenology and Ontology of Complexes 
 
First, I explain and describe the ontological meaning and the phenomenology of 
complexes. Next, I explain and describe how a complex can remain unconscious by 
inauthentically understanding its ontological meaning. Finally, I provide a description 
and explanation of the process to authentically understand the meaning of a complex, 
which can result in its assimilation into consciousness for individuation to take place. 
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Jung presents his concept of a complex by explaining that the ego is “frequently 
disturbed by strong feeling tones” (Jung, 1907, p.39); he adds: “A situation threatening 
danger pushes aside the tranquil play of ideas and places in its stead a complex of 
other ideas of the strongest feeling-tone” (Jung, 1907, p.19). Jung describes his theory 
about the feeling tones of complexes through his experimental work on word 
association tests. He says, “we have proven that complexes disturb association 
experiments in a characteristic and regular manner” (Jung, 1907, p.42). Jung adds, 
“Indifferent reactions follow smoothly and generally have very short reaction times. 
They are always at hand for the ego-complex to dispose of at pleasure. It is different 
with the complex reactions!” (Jung, 1907, p.43). 
 
Jung continues, “It would be expected that an educated subject would react easily, but 
indeed this is not the case. At the very simplest words there appear obstructions and 
other disturbances which can be explained only by the fact that the stimulus word has 
excited a complex. The emotional inhibition must be cited as the main hindering cause” 
(Jung, 1907, p.43). The experience of a complex also creates problems when reacting 
to stimulus in daily life, exerting hindrances and disturbances. Jung says an 
individual’s self-control of thought and actions is disturbed in proportion to the strength 
of the complex. 
 
Jung provides an example of the effect of a complex by saying, 
 
I was taking a walk with a very sensitive and hysterical gentleman. The village 
bells were pealing a new and very harmonious chime. My companion, who 
generally displayed great feeling for such tunes, suddenly began to rail at it, 
saying that he could not bear the disgusting ringing in the major key, that it 
sounded abominably, that this was an especially disagreeable church and 
unsightly village. This remarkable and inadequate affect interested me and I 
continued my investigation. My companion then began to abuse the local parson. 
His reason for the abuse was that the minister had an ugly beard and wrote very 
bad poetry. My companion, too, was talented lyrically. The affect then lay in 
poetic rivalry (Jung, 1907, p.38). 
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With these descriptions by Jung on his theory of complexes, I now integrate 
Heidegger’s phenomenology to explain and describe the ontological meaning and the 
lived experience of a complex. To achieve this integration it is important to review 
Heidegger’s work on being-in-the-world. Heidegger says Dasein exists within a totality 
of significance or ‘situation’ which Heidegger calls facticity, “The factuality of the fact 
Da-sein, as the way in which every Da-sein actually is, we call its facticity” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.52). In Heidegger’s section on the worldliness of the world, he describes the 
ontological structure of the world, which allows Dasein to care and transcend its 
situation. One aspect of the worldliness of the world is that “There always belongs to 
the being of a useful thing a totality of useful things in which this useful thing can be 
what it is” (Heidegger, 1996, p.64). As a result, “A useful thing is essentially ‘something 
in order to . . .’” and “The structure of ‘in order to’ contains a reference of something to 
something.” Heidegger explains that Dasein understands the totality of “relations in a 
preliminary disclosure” (Heidegger, 1996, p.81) of its own being-in-the-world. Dasein 
becomes familiar with the relations of beings in the world and “Da-sein ‘signifies’ to 
itself.” It gives “itself to understand its being and potentiality-of-being with regard to its 
being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1996, p.81). Dasein discovers its potentiality of being- 
in-the-world through the “freeing of beings for a totality of relevance” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.102). However, if Dasein neglects possibilities that are unfamiliar to its average 
everydayness, Dasein can become alienated from its authentic Being. In other words, 
if Dasein ignores or does not interpret new possibilities by leaving a complex 
unconscious, the process of individuation cannot take place. 
 
Heidegger also says that to the everydayness of Being-in-the-world, there belong 
certain modes of concern. This permits Dasein to encounter the entities with which it 
concerns itself in such a way that Dasein faces the worldly character of what is within 
the world. When Dasein is concerned with something, entities, which are ready-to- 
hand, may be met with something unusable and not appropriately modified for the use 
that has been chosen. As a result, when Dasein discovers unusability, equipment 
becomes conspicuous and “This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand 
equipment as in a certain un-readiness-to hand” (Heidegger, 1962, p.103). We can 
use this explanation of Dasein’s being-in-the-world to inform Jung’s theory of 
complexes. Jung recognises a similar disturbance a complex has on a person: “At the 
very simplest words there appear obstructions and other disturbances which can be 
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explained only by the fact that the stimulus word has excited a complex” (Jung, 1907, 
p.43). The similarity between Jung’s descriptions of the experience of a complex on a 
person’s consciousness is very much the same as Heidegger’s description of Dasein 
encountering the world as conspicuous and unready-to-hand47. Due to this connection 
between Jung’s and Heidegger’s work, Jung’s theory of complexes can be 
phenomenologically and ontologically developed and clarified. 
 
The ontological meaning of the experience of a complex can be further understood by 
recognising that “In our concernful dealings, however, we not only come up against 
unusable things within what is ready-to-hand already: we also find things which are 
missing which not only are not 'handy' but are not 'to hand' at all” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.103). When Dasein notices the un-ready-to-hand, the world of entities ready-to-hand 
becomes obstructive, which means the world “cannot be budged without the thing that 
is missing” (Heidegger, 1962, p.103). Consequently, anything, which is un-ready-to- 
hand, is disturbing to Dasein and enables Dasein to see the obstinacy of that with 
which Dasein must concern itself (the complex). Heidegger explains this by saying 
“With this obstinacy, the world makes itself known in a new way as the Being of that 
which still lies before us and calls for our attending to it” (Heidegger, 1962, p.104). In 
other words, the ontological meaning of the experience of a complex calls for Dasein 
to attend to its obstinate obstructiveness to being-in-the-world. 
 
Now as Jung’s writing highlighted before, the experience of a complex disturbs and 
hinders daily life in the same way Heidegger phenomenologically describes the world 
as unready-to-hand. As a result, what should now be apparent from the introduction 
of Heidegger’s writing is that the experience of a disturbing complex is an important 
moment for Dasein. This is because it not only indicates that the current way of existing 
is unsuitable because of the conspicuous and obstructiveness of the world but it also 
indicates its obstinacy and needs care to remove this obstructiveness from being-in- 
the-world. 
 
Heidegger says that the “structure of the Being of what is ready-to-hand as equipment 
is determined by references or assignments” (Heidegger, 1962, p.105). As a result, 
                                               
47 Note Jung’s is an ontic description and is fundamentally grounded in Heidegger’s broader ontology. 
As a result, Heidegger’s philosophy can extend the meaning of Jung’s psychoanalysis.  
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when the world of Dasein becomes conspicuously unready-to-hand, the reference or 
assignment has become explicit and the obstructive environment discloses itself, 
which means it is opened or unconcealed. This opening of the obstructiveness of the 
world is a fundamental step in the process of making the unconscious complex, 
conscious in the process of individuation. I provide a phenomenological explanation of 
the process of authentically understanding a complex and assimilating it into 
consciousness in the last third of this chapter, under the heading “authentic 
understanding of the experience of a complex”. 
 
When Jung discusses complexes in other parts of his writing he points out that, they 
can “produce a fragmentation of the experience and wholeness of life” (Jung, 1969, 
p.98) as the complex disturbs consciousness. In addition, when a complex becomes 
active Jung says, “The unity of consciousness and memory is disrupted and the 
intentions of the will are impeded or made impossible” (Jung, 1969, p.96). As a result, 
Jung postulates that the unconscious complex can possess an energetic value more 
than consciousness. In addition, Jung describes a complex as “strongly accentuated 
emotionally and is, moreover, incompatible with the habitual attitude of consciousness” 
(Jung, 1969, p.96). This further highlights the connection between Jung’s description 
of the experience of a complex with Heidegger’s description of the conspicuous world 
that can turn from the everyday, habitual and familiar ready-to-hand, being-in-the- 
world to the unfamiliar obstructiveness of the unready-to-hand, being-in-the-world. 
 
As a result, it is reasonable to argue that the experience of a complex can have an 
"uncanny" feeling that is completely different to the tranquilized feeling of the average 
everydayness of habits. From Jung’s writing, the complex displays the characteristics 
of individualising a person from other beings and in the same experience, there 
appears to produce a feeling of “not-being-at-home” in the world. The uncanniness of 
this individualised ‘not being at home’ event from the experience of a complex reflects 
Heidegger’s description of Dasein’s experience of angst. Jung recognises that the 
feeling of a complex disrupts consciousness in the same way Heidegger explains 
angst disrupting Dasein’s being-in-the-world. This similarity of emotion linking the 
complex with angst is evident when Jung suggests, “The emotional inhibition must be 
cited as the main hindering cause” (Jung, 1907, p.43) to consciousness. Thus, emotion 
or angst inhibits the habitual and familiar everydayness for being-in-the-world. With this 
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connection established between Jung and Heidegger, I explain in later parts of this 
chapter that when a person allows a complex to remain unconscious, this is a mode 
of inauthentically understanding being-in-the-world with others. Being inauthentic 
covers up the authentic meaning of guilt, conscience and angst of complexes, which 
results in a neglect of a truth, and meaning of Dasein’s existence. 
 
Heidegger says, “that in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the world” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.231), however, that in the face of which one has anxiety is not an 
entity within-the-world. To understand the ontology and phenomenology of complexes 
it is important to note that Heidegger says that in the face of which one is anxious is 
completely indefinite and this tells Dasein that entities within-the-world are not 
relevant. Thus, when something threatening brings itself close, the experience of the 
anxiety of a complex “does not 'see' any definite 'here' or 'yonder' from which it comes” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.231). The meaning of the complex is unconscious and therefore 
“that in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what 
threatens is nowhere” (Heidegger, 1962, p.231). The experience of an unconscious 
complex leads to conscious understanding not knowing what the cause of the anxiety 
is. This experience of a complex indicates anxiety about being-in-the-world and thus 
takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, in the way of its previous 
interpretation. Dasein is authentic when understanding this experience of a complex 
as a feeling “not-at-home" due to an uncanny, obstructive and unfamiliar world. 
 
In addition to this attunement to anxiety from the experience of an unconscious 
complex, reasons suggest that conscience would also take part in this experience. The 
experience of a complex also appears to reveal the call of conscience as an appeal to 
Dasein. Heidegger says the call of conscience calling Dasein back, calls Dasein forth 
to an authentic projection in the face of anxiety from “not being home in the world”. 
Conscience calls conspicuously and indefinitely to disclose that the world cannot be 
understood in the current familiar everydayness mode of being-in-the-world. The call of 
conscience’s indefiniteness positively shows that Dasein has been inauthentic in its 
understanding of the world and calls Dasein forth to understand the truth of the 
meaning of the world it is anxious about. The experience of a complex involves the 
call of conscience discoursing by keeping silent and calls Dasein back from falling prey 
from being inauthentic. The call of conscience pursues Dasein and is a threat to 
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Dasein’s lostness in everydayness, which has forgotten itself.  
 
Heidegger’s explanation of conscience has a strong resemblance to Jung’s description 
of the autonomy of complexes. This is clear when Heidegger writes, “Indeed the call 
is precisely something which we ourselves have neither planned nor prepared for nor 
voluntarily performed” (Heidegger, 1962, p.320). In addition, there are many similar 
meanings between Heidegger’s phenomenology of angst, conscience and guilt and 
Jung’s description of complexes and emotions. For example, Jung says, “Emotions 
are instinctive, involuntary reactions which upset the rational order of consciousness 
by their elemental outbursts” (Jung, 1981, p.278). He adds, “In a state of affect a trait 
of character sometimes appears which is strange even to the person concerned” 
(Jung, 1981, p.279). Heidegger likewise indicates the alien nature of conscience by 
saying, “'It' calls, against our expectations and even against our will” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.320). Additionally, “The call comes from me and yet from beyond me” (Heidegger, 
1962, p.320). 
 
Finally, the last component of providing an ontologically authentic meaning to describe 
the experience of a complex involves Heidegger’s work on guilt. Heidegger claims that 
the 'voice' of conscience speaks of Dasein's 'guilt'. The call of guilt by conscience 
means “‘having responsibility for'- that is, as Being-the basis for..” or “Being-the-basis 
of a nullity" (Heidegger, 1962, p.331)48. Thus, Heidegger’s ontology of guilt allows a 
comprehensive phenomenological elucidation of the experience of a complex. The 
experience of a complex points to conscience calling Dasein guilty for being the basis 
for its unfamiliar and obstructive “not being at home in the world” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.233). As a result, I argue that the experience of a complex consists of anxiety, 
conscience, and guilt, and Dasein understands this authentically as a call of care from 
itself. 
 
Dasein authentically cares for its being-in-the-world when Dasein understands the call 
of guilt in the experience of a complex. In the experience of a complex Dasein stands 
together with the truth of its primordial being and the emotionally charged complex is 
                                               
48 This can be extended by noting “It shows that, at bottom, we are nothing more than nothingness, that 
our existence is ultimately groundless, an abyss. Dasein realizes that even it cannot provide the foundation 
or basis to its own being, and yet one must continue to cope with this given fact as long as one exists. 
This is part of what Heidegger calls the very “burden of our existence,” and it is a primary aspect of what 
Heidegger refers to as Being-guilty” (Askay and Farquhar, 2011, p.107).   
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a call to Dasein to understand that it is ‘not at home’, so to call Dasein forth to the 
possibility of authentically finding its home within the truth of Being. Consequently, the 
keeping silent of the call of conscience as the world loses its relevance in the 
experience of a complex summons Dasein into the stillness of itself, and conscience 
calls Dasein “back as something that is to become still” (Heidegger, 1962, p.343). This 
stillness is clear in Jung’s work when he says, “The emotional inhibition must be cited 
as the main hindering cause” (Jung, 1907, p.43) of consciousness. Therefore, the 
phenomenological and ontological description of the experience of a complex is angst 
at not being at home in the world with a call of conscience that Dasein is the basis for 
the nullity of the unfamiliar and obstructive world it encounters49. The world in its 
unfamiliarity is disclosed by its conspicuous, obstructive and obstinate character, 
which shows the world to Dasein as insignificant and in need of attention and care to 
leave Dasein searching for authentic possibilities to find its being at home in the world. 
 
In summary, the experience of a complex is an important moment for being-in-the- 
world because it has the potential to liberate Dasein to turn toward its authentic 
meaning for Being, with the disclosedness of angst, conscience, and guilt. If Dasein 
understands itself authentically from the experience of a complex, Dasein can critically 
interpret its being-in-the-world to determine those neglected, unfamiliar and 
obstructive elements, which threaten Dasein’s care while being-in-the-world. By falling 
prey to a complex which discloses an unfamiliar, absurd and meaningless world, 
Dasein encounters an obstinate and obstructive existence which calls Dasein forth to 
individuate “to its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as understanding, projects itself 
essentially upon possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.176). Importantly, the positive 
nature of the experience of a complex can bring Dasein face to face with the concealed 
authentic possibilities of existence, which have the potential to appropriate the 
unready-to-hand and the obstructive world in an act of individuation. I will discuss this 
in section 3.5 of this chapter titled “authentic understanding of the experience of a 
complex”. 
 
3.4 Inauthentic Understanding of the Experience of a Complex 
 
In this section, I outline the phenomenology and ontology of an inauthentic 
                                               
49 This is equivalent to the daseinsanalysis definition of mental suffering as “suffering from our own 
being” (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.261).   
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understanding of complexes. To begin with, Jung states that complexes are psychic 
contents, which are outside the control of the conscious mind: “They have been split 
off from consciousness and lead a separate existence in the unconscious” (Jung, 
2001, p.81). It is therefore now important to provide a phenomenological description 
as to how it is ontologically possible a complex can split off from consciousness and 
exists unconsciously. 
 
Firstly, it is essential to recognise that by its ontological nature, Dasein is always 
projecting as long as it is and therefore can flee the possibility of living authentically. If 
Dasein follows a familiar average everydayness which turns away from authentically 
understanding the unfamiliarity of a complex, the care for its being-in-the-world project 
goes astray, and Heidegger refers to this as “the entanglement of Da-sein” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.164). Heidegger says entanglement leads to Dasein “Falling prey to the 
‘world’, its absorption in being-with-one-another guided by idle talk, curiosity, and 
ambiguity” (Heidegger, 1996, p.164) instead of an authentic understanding of the 
experience of a complex. Falling prey is the constitution of inauthentically turning away 
from understanding the meaning of the experience of a complex. Falling prey to 
familiar average everydayness “tears understanding away from projecting authentic 
possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.167) leaving the complex covered and therefore 
unconscious. As a result of Dasein falling prey from inauthentically understanding the 
meaning of the experience of a complex, the truth of its possibilities of care for its 
ownmost authentic being-in-the-world is limited. This limitation and narrow outlook can 
lead to a neglect and loss of meaning to Dasein’s existence resulting in the obstinacy 
of complexes and the obstructiveness of being-in-the-world. 
 
To further explain how Dasein comes to experience obstinate and obstructive 
complexes, it is important to note that Heidegger says “The absorption of Da-sein in 
the ‘they’ and in the world taken care of reveals something like a flight of Da-sein from 
itself as an authentic potentiality for being itself” (Heidegger, 1996, p.172). In this flight, 
Dasein avoids a confrontation with its authentic existence, which involves facing the 
obstructiveness and obstinacy of complexes, which disclose through guilt, angst, and 
conscience. Through an inauthentic understanding of the meaning of the experience 
of a complex, Dasein flees the truth of its authentic self and the complex remains 
undiscovered and unconscious. Dasein is entrusted with and concerned about its 
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being-in-the-world but can cover over its authentic possibilities for care, which remain 
unconscious or undiscovered. Dasein’s essence as being-in-the-world is care, but 
when Dasein’s understanding is inauthentic, Dasein can be said to be “fleeing from it 
and of forgetting” (Heidegger, 1996, p.41) its authentic being which discloses itself in 
the experience of a complex. 
 
To add to this, Jung explains that complexes originate and always contain something 
like a “conflict-they are either the cause or the effect of a conflict” (Jung, 1969, p.98). 
Dasein has inauthentically understood the conflict that complexes represent. Dasein 
can attempt to flee the truth of their existence by denying the authentic meaning they 
contain (that Dasein has fallen prey to encountering an obstructive world because it 
has not discovered an understanding of a truth of Being). Jung’s work is helpful to 
understand why Dasein is inauthentic when he writes, “Certainly one of the 
commonest causes is a moral conflict, which ultimately derives from the apparent 
impossibility of affirming the whole of one's nature. This impossibility presupposes a 
direct split, no matter whether the conscious mind is aware of it or not” (Jung, 1969, 
p.98). In addition, since Dasein can flee from understanding the truth that complexes 
reveal, complexes “are ‘vulnerable points’ which we do not like to remember and still 
less to be reminded of by others, but which frequently come back to mind unbidden 
and in the most unwelcome fashion” (Jung, 2001, p.81). Heidegger’s 
phenomenological description of uncanniness also highlights what Jung is saying, 
which is that attempting to escape the truth of Being can only be escaped 
inauthentically: “This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its 
everyday lostness, though not explicitly” (Heidegger, 1962, p.234). 
 
Consequently, for Dasein to exist authentically, Dasein requires a discovery of its 
authentic potentiality of being-in-the-world by developing an authentic understanding 
of its attunement to complexes. The necessity of Dasein’s attunement to Being, to exist 
authentically, is clearly elucidated by Heidegger when he writes “In attunement lies 
existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can 
be encountered” (Heidegger, 1996, p.130). Attunement to a complex moves and 
affects Dasein by “Letting things be encountered” (Heidegger, 1996, p.129) and this 
makes authenticity and inauthenticity in relation to complexes ontologically possible. 
As a result, complexes ontologically represent the truth of Being which Dasein does 
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not want to understand. However inauthentically fleeing is ineffective as the truth of 
Being continues to exist even if Dasein inauthentically flees. Since the truth of Being 
persists although Dasein inauthentically prefers otherwise, complexes “always contain 
memories, wishes, fears, duties, needs, or views, with which we have never really 
come to terms, and for this reason they constantly interfere with our conscious life in 
a disturbing and usually a harmful way” (Jung, 2001, p.81). These reactions to the 
factical situation that led to the experience of a complex support the proposition that 
Dasein has inauthentically turned away from understanding a truth of existence, which 
does not disappear. 
 
As a result, this highlights the necessity of understanding resolutely and authentically 
the meaning of the complex. I explain this in section 3.5 of this chapter. Without this 
mode of being authentic, Dasein’s Being is under constant threat because it is in the 
untruth of Being and therefore cannot care appropriately or realistically for its being- 
in-the-world. Complexes contain the truth of Dasein’s undiscovered possibilities for 
being authentic and although “Complexes represent a kind of inferior consciousness” 
(Jung, 2001, p.82) they contain “an opening to new possibilities of achievement” (Jung, 
2001, p.82); “Complexes are therefore, in this sense, focal or nodal points of psychic 
life which we would not wish to do without” (Jung, 2001, p.82). 
 
Jung further explains that the genesis of a complex “arises from the clash between a 
requirement of adaptation and the individual's constitutional inability to meet the 
challenge” (Jung, 2001, p.82). He suggests, “Naturally, in these circumstances there 
is the greatest temptation simply to follow the power Instinct and to identify the ego 
with the self outright, in order to keep up the illusion of the ego's mastery” (Jung, 1969, 
p.224). When this aspect of Jung’s writing is analysed phenomenologically, identifying 
with the ego means Dasein has fled from an authentic understanding of the experience 
of a complex to identify with an inauthentic familiar everyday being-in-the-world. 
Fleeing into the average everyday familiarity with the world to tranquillize the angst, 
guilt, and conscience of a complex provides a phenomenological description of 
identifying with the ego and the inability to adapt to life’s challenges. By fleeing into 
the familiarity of the "at-home" Dasein avoids the truth of understanding the "not-at 
home" (Heidegger, 1962, p.234) which is disclosed by the experience of a complex. 
In addition, by leaving the self, unconscious means to cover over a truth of Dasein who 
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does not understand the meaning of guilt, conscience, and angst for existence. 
 
By inauthentically understanding the experience of a complex Dasein “does so by 
turning away from it in falling; in this turning-away, the ‘not-at-home’ gets 'dimmed 
down'” (Heidegger, 1962, p.234). By identifying with the “at home” of the familiar, 
Dasein flees to the “relief which comes with the supposed freedom of everydayness” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.321). In Jung’s own words, the complex can be “fled from with an 
effort of will, but not argued out of existence, and at the first suitable opportunity it 
reappears in all its original strength” (Jung, 1969, p.96). Thus, Dasein can flee to the 
familiar and tranquilising feeling of “being at home” but the truth of “not being at home” 
remains in existence. The antithesis to fleeing the “not at home” is to want to have a 
conscience. In wanting to have a conscience lies “the choosing to choose a kind of 
Being-one's-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call 
‘resoluteness’” (Heidegger, 1962, p.314). I explain resoluteness in length in section 
3.5 of this chapter. 
 
Jung also points out that although ignoring complexes is possible they return in 
dreams, “It is a negative admission of the instinctive fear which primitive man has of 
invisible things that move in the dark. Complexes are swamped by day, but at night 
raise their voices all the more clamorously, driving away sleep or filling it with bad 
dreams” (Jung, 1969, p.100). In addition, Jung argues fear of a complex prevents 
knowledge of the unconscious. Jung says, “Fear of complexes is a bad signpost, 
however, because it always points away from the unconscious and back into 
consciousness” (Jung, 1969, p.101). When Dasein has an inauthentic understanding 
of a complex they “are something so unpleasant that nobody in his right senses can 
be persuaded that the motive forces which maintain them could promise anything 
good” (Jung, 1969, p.101). I have now described and explained that the understanding 
of a complex can be inauthentic. Being inauthentic means Dasein does not understand 
the ontological or authentic meaning of angst, guilt, and conscience. In this final 
section of a description of an inauthentic understanding of complexes, I focus on 
integrating the Daseinsanalytic work of Kastrinidis (1988). 
 
In his paper on the phenomenology of narcissism, Kastrindis claims that the 
narcissistic individual exists with a distinctive concern for perfection and wholeness 
and this colours all of their behaviours. Kastrinidis says that narcissistic individuals 
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require that all situations of their lives provide them with a tangible, certain sense of 
being perfect and whole. Although Heidegger highlights that Dasein exists as a 
potentiality-for-Being-a-whole (Heidegger, 1962, p. 349), it is not possible to exist 
factually as a whole since Dasein perpetually transcends itself, which means Dasein 
can never factually catch up with itself while existing. As a result, Heidegger claims  
that Dasein can only realize this potentiality-for-Being-a-whole by dying. As long as 
Dasein exists, Dasein can never be finally, factually complete because all that Dasein 
has not yet been, still, exists as not actualised. 
 
Kastrinidis’s analysis of narcissism is important for a phenomenological interpretation 
of Jung’s writing on complexes as his work highlights a possible mechanism to conceal 
inauthentically a complex in the unconscious. Jung notes, “The conscious mind is 
invariably convinced that complexes are something inappropriate and should therefore 
be eliminated somehow or other” (Jung, 1969, p.101) and Kastrinidis work can assist 
to provide a phenomenological explanation for Jung’s statement. In addition, 
Kastrinidis can help explain why Jung tacitly recognises the resistance to an authentic 
understanding of complexes when he says “complexes have always existed and are 
ubiquitous, people cannot bring themselves to regard them as normal phenomena of 
life” (Jung, 1969, p.102). 
 
We can construct a phenomenological explanation for this behaviour from Kastrinidis’s 
work by focusing on describing a phenomenological characteristic of the narcissist 
called Being-perfect, “which means narcissistic individuals have a special openness 
to projecting themselves as a Being-perfect” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.172). Kastrinidis 
writes, 
 
the German word for perfect is vollkommen and comes from the words ‘full’ and 
‘to come’, thus suggesting something which has ‘come fully’ into its being, which 
has fully arrived, which has fully developed, and which, therefore, has come as 
far as it possibly can. Such a fully arrived, perfect response is one to which 
nothing can be added. An individual can do no better. It is this perfection, this 
indubitably ideal response in which nothing is lacking, that narcissistic individuals 
require of themselves in their relation to others, to things, to the world as a whole 
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(Kastrinidis, 1988, p.173)50. 
 
Through this inauthentic understanding, a Being perfect projection allows complexes 
to be understood as insignificant or untruthful for Dasein’s being-in-the-world. 
Consequently, a Being perfect projection acts as a mechanism against authentically 
understanding the experience of a complex and thus the fear and fleeing of a complex 
and Dasein’s inauthenticity continue to exist. Jung says “There is plenty of evidence 
to show that consciousness is very far from covering the psyche in its totality” (Jung, 
1981, p.276) and this is an important part of Jung’s writing to connect with Heidegger’s 
work on Daseinsanalysis. This is important because this statement highlights the 
problem of a Being-perfect projection since any human understanding of Being is very 
far from understanding its totality. 
 
Jung says, “This fear provokes violent resistance whenever complexes are examined, 
and considerable determination is needed to overcome it. Fear and resistance are the 
signposts that stand beside the entrance to the unconscious, and it is obvious that 
what they primarily signify is a preconceived opinion of the thing they are pointing at” 
(Jung, 1969, p.102). Therefore, since a Being perfect projection occurs from the belief 
that Dasein “has developed to the very apex of its potential” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.173) 
it conceals the entrance to an unconscious truth of Dasein, and is therefore “coupled 
with a radical closedness to other, equally human possibilities, namely, possibilities for 
imperfection, failure and, especially therefore, guilt” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.173). 
Consequently, if Dasein projects perfection there is no possibility of unconcealing this 
truth and meaning of Being because Being perfect means to be without guilt and “every 
response to the world must be guiltless, complete, beautiful and whole” (Kastrinidis, 
1988, p.173). The authentic meaning of the complex remains concealed as Dasein 
does not understand guilt, angst or conscience authentically and Dasein continues to 
encounter the world as obstinately obstructive. 
 
Thus being inauthentic towards a complex means to project a “feeling of fear” and this 
involves a “feeling of resistance [to] something repellent” (Jung, 1969, p.102). In 
addition, through this projection of fear toward the complex an inauthentic existence 
                                               
50 Cf. Binswanger’s description of a “strict attachment or bondage to a particular level or rung of human 
experience” (Binswanger, 1963, p.347). 
104  
by Dasein may involve gathering “people around who will serve as mirrors for reflecting 
the beloved image of self” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.175). This prevents an encounter or 
unconcealment of the disclosure of guilt, angst, and conscience from the experience 
of a complex. This mirrored image of wholeness, oneness, and perfection allows 
inauthentic Dasein to conceal a complex from existence. Without this mirror, it would 
mean a readiness to accept the authentic meaning of a complex. In contrast to an 
inauthentic Being perfect projection, an authentic projection involves “a readiness to 
receive whatever it is that wants to show itself, to serve as an opening for the gathering 
of Being through a calm, self-composed waiting upon or attentiveness to Being” 
(Kastrinidis, 1988, p.180) which is called anticipatory resoluteness. 
 
Inauthentic existence leads to falling prey when the truth of Being, which is temporally 
concealed by the complex, cannot be evaded. For example, Jung says, “the slightest 
remark touching the complex even remotely, immediately excites violent anger and 
painful outbreaks” (Jung, 1907, p.46). In such experiences of a complex, the possibility 
of fleeing the truth of Being and experiencing oneself as Being-whole or perfect 
evaporates. These are the very situations when inauthentic individuals have the 
possibility to learn a new authentic basis for existing. However, if an inauthentic 
understanding exists and the experience of a complex threatens the Being perfect 
illusion, the mood of Dasein can turn to “a sense of disappointment in the world which 
includes a violent rage at those elements of the world which are perceived as having 
failed to provide the palpable sense of wholeness” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.175). With this 
resistance to an authentic understanding of the experience of a complex, Dasein 
closes itself off to the truth of Being and dictates its own inauthentic truth51. Therefore, 
as long as an inauthentic understanding of complexes persists “there is a marked 
unconsciousness of any complexes, and this naturally guarantees them all the more 
freedom of action” (Jung, 1969, p.98). Consequently, if Dasein understands the 
projection of Being perfect as being authentic the result will be “a momentary and 
unconscious alteration of personality known as identification with the complex” (Jung, 
1969, p.98). 
 
As a result of my work in this section, it has become clear that Kastrinidis’s 
consideration of the existence and phenomenology of the narcissistic individual 
                                               
51 See Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.227) for an example. 
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reveals a basic structure of the phenomenology of Jung’s complex theory. I have 
phenomenologically revealed that complexes can be described as inauthentically 
absorbing an entire existence in only one of Dasein’s possibilities. This absorption 
perpetuates by inauthentically understanding angst, guilt, and conscience through a 
Being perfect projection. In the next section, I contrast this with a discussion of an 
authentic understanding of a complex. 
 
3.5 Authentic Understanding of the Experience of a Complex 
 
In this section, I outline the phenomenology and ontology of an authentic 
understanding of complexes, which makes them conscious and integrated with the 
ego. In Jung’s writing about bringing the complex into consciousness, he says if the 
ego integrates the complex there is an alteration of the ego. Jung writes “Although it 
is able to preserve its structure, the ego is ousted from its central and dominating 
position and thus finds itself in the role of a passive observer who lacks the power to 
assert his will under all circumstances” (Jung, 1969, p.224). In this section, I focus on 
explaining the phenomenology of the ego integrating an unconscious complex, which 
is the result of an authentic understanding of the experience of a complex. 
 
To begin explaining the phenomenology of an authentic understanding of complexes 
it is important to note that Heidegger says, “Being-in-the-world, amounts to a non- 
thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the 
readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. In anything ready-to-hand the world is 
always 'there'” (Heidegger, 1962, p.107). Furthermore, “An entity is discovered when 
it has been assigned or referred to something, and, referred as that entity which it is” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.115). This importantly connects to what I have said earlier about 
the world becoming obstructive when Dasein has inauthentically understood the 
experience of a complex. When Dasein encounters a complex, the world becomes 
obstructive and Dasein feels “not at home” from an experience of angst, guilt, and 
conscience. I explained the ontological meaning of these components of the 
experience of a complex as angst at not being at home in the world in the face of an 
obstructive and insignificant world. In addition, conscience calls Dasein forth to 
authentically understand the complex it has fallen prey to. The call of conscience 
discloses Dasein as being the basis or being guilty for the obstructiveness of ‘not being 
at home in the world’. Conscience points to what Dasein is guilty of and what has 
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brought the obstructiveness of the world into being. The authentic meaning of the 
experience of a complex is that Dasein is the basis for not discovering an entity for its 
assignment to being-in-the-world. This entity is undiscovered and missing from 
Dasein’s world and thus the world falls into unreadiness-to-hand, resulting in the 
experience of a complex. 
 
Heidegger also says “With any such entity there is an involvement which it has in 
something. If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in 
something” (Heidegger, 1962, p.115); “this letting something 'be' involved means 
rather that something which is already an 'entity' must be discovered in its readiness- 
to-hand, and that we must thus let the entity which has this Being be encountered. 
This 'a priori' letting-something-be-involved is the condition for the possibility of 
encountering anything ready-to-hand” (Heidegger, 1962, p.117). Thus, to discover the 
entity which is missing that brings Dasein to experience the obstructiveness of a 
complex means to let it be involved in its readiness-to-hand. As long as Dasein 
inauthentically understands the meaning of the experience of a complex, the entities, 
which are missing, cannot be involved in the readiness-to-hand and thus remain 
undiscovered and unconscious. 
 
Heidegger claims that entities have a definite place in the world, which he calls a 
“region”. He explains this by saying “When equipment for something or other has its 
place, this place defines itself as the place of this equipment-as one place out of a 
whole totality of places directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the 
context of equipment that is environmentally ready-to hand” (Heidegger, 1962, p.136). 
In addition, “Dasein, in its very Being, has this Being as an issue” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.67). Dasein discovers some regions of Being and leaves others undiscovered. 
Heidegger says the readiness-to-hand of the world belongs to any region discovered 
and “has the character of inconspicuous familiarity” (Heidegger, 1962, p.137). 
Importantly for the arguments concerning the phenomenology of complexes presented 
in this chapter, he also says, “The region itself becomes visible in a conspicuous 
manner only when one discovers the ready-to-hand circumspectively and does so in 
the deficient modes of concern” (Heidegger, 1962, p.138). Additionally, “the region of 
a place does not become accessible explicitly as such a region until one fails to find 
something in its place” (Heidegger, 1962, p.138). This allows me to explain 
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phenomenologically that when Dasein has an inauthentic understanding of the 
meaning of a complex, the region where the complex is experienced is undiscovered 
and thus remains conspicuously obstructive to being-in-the-world. Alternatively, when 
Dasein has an authentic understanding of the meaning of a complex, Dasein has the 
possibility of discovering the unconscious involvements required for Dasein to 
unconceal a truth of Being and find its authentic home in the world. Finally, it is 
important to explain that for Dasein to discover the truth of a region that is 
inauthentically undiscovered, Dasein must give entities space in the world. Thus, to 
bring the region that is conspicuously obstructive from the experience of a complex 
into being inconspicuous, means to “move things around or out of the way or 'make 
room' for them” (Heidegger, 1962, p.146). 
 
The disclosure of entities involved in the world amounts to an understanding of the 
world and in understanding a context of relations Dasein has assigned itself to an ‘in- 
order-to’ and has done so in terms of a project for being-in-the-world. By authentically 
understanding the meaning of a complex, Dasein can discover and understand a 
context of relations for being-in-the-world. In its character of projecting, understanding 
creates the ontological horizon or sight for Dasein. This sight in the project involves 
taking care of things and the considerateness of concern for-the-sake-of-which Dasein 
exists. As a result, the meaning of Dasein’s existence discloses itself as the for-the- 
sake-of-which, which Heidegger calls understanding. Dasein ‘understands’ a 
potentiality for being-in-the-world, as something being possible. As Dasein discloses 
possibilities in a factical world to itself understandingly, Dasein not only discloses its 
ownmost potentiality for the care of being but other beings are also disclosed and 
“freed for their own possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.135). Therefore, to understand a 
complex authentically also means to free other beings for their own authentic 
possibilities by letting them be involved by making room for them to be part of Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world in the region of the experience of a complex. 
 
As I have already said, Dasein’s understanding of existence projects its being-in-the- 
world upon possibilities. Dasein’s projecting of understanding its being-in-the-world 
also has the possibility of development which Heidegger calls interpretation. Dasein’s 
interpretation of being-in-the-world is the development of possibilities projected in 
understanding. This means that when Dasein authentically frees other beings for their 
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own authentic possibilities by letting them be involved by making room for them, there 
is the possibility of the development of this involvement to unconceal a truth of Being. 
In this projecting of understanding, there is a disclosure of beings to Dasein in their 
possibilities. With interpretation, Heidegger says, “innerworldly beings are discovered, 
that is, have come to be understood, we say that they have meaning” (Heidegger, 
1996, p.142). Therefore, by authentically understanding the experience of a complex, 
Dasein has the possibility to understand the meaning for the obstructiveness of the 
complex once beings are free for involvement through the developed interpretation of 
their possibilities. As a result, Dasein can be meaningful if Dasein is authentic in 
response to the experience of a complex or meaningless when Dasein has 
inauthentically understood the experience of a complex. This “means that its own 
being and the beings disclosed with that being can be appropriated in understanding 
or they can be confined to incomprehensibility” and “only what is unmeaningful can be 
absurd” (Heidegger, 1996, p.142). Consequently, Dasein can encounter the absurdity 
of the world when Dasein is alienated from a truth of Being and this absurdity is salient 
in the experience of complexes, which disclose, “not being at home” in the face of an 
obstructive world. 
 
When Dasein has been individualised by the experience of a complex and in the 
understanding of not-being-at-home-in-the-world, Dasein has the possibility to 
understand authentically a truth of Being and care for Being because the region of the 
world that is obstructive is explicit. To assimilate the complex by understanding its 
meaning through an interpretation of possibilities and to remove its obstructiveness 
from being-in-the-world, Heidegger’s work on truth is important. Heidegger says 
Being-true “means to-be-discovering” (Heidegger, 1996, p.201) and the being true 
means to let beings be seen in their unconcealment (discoveredness), taking them out 
of their concealment. As a result, the process of understanding the unconscious 
complex in Heideggerian terms means to take a being out of concealment, which 
results in a new understanding of possibilities for being-in-the-world when authentically 
discovering the truth of a being. Heidegger says, “it is [the] discoveredness of authentic 
disclosedness of Da-sein [that] the most primordial phenomenon of truth attained. 
Dasein is in the truth means the disclosedness of its ownmost being belongs to its 
existential constitution” (Heidegger, 1996, p.203). Consequently, the truth of 
discoveredness, to care for Dasein’s ownmost potentiality of being, discloses in an 
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authentic understanding of the experience of a complex. 
 
With Heidegger’s definition of truth outlined, it becomes clear that Dasein’s authentic 
project towards complexes occurs “when Da-sein discovers the truth it discloses itself 
to itself in its ownmost potentiality-of being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.204). Discovering a 
truth through an authentic understanding of Dasein’s disclosedness is in contrast to 
the untruth of falling prey, which misunderstands the ontological meaning of 
complexes. Discovering an authentic truth, which “must always first be wrested from 
beings. Beings are torn from concealment” (Heidegger, 1996, p.204), allows Dasein 
to remove the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world. This distinctive 
and authentic understanding “is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience - this reticent 
self-projection up on one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety - 
we call ‘resoluteness’” (Heidegger, 1962, p.343). Thus, an authentic understanding of 
complexes means to be resolute in the face of the experience of guilt, angst, and 
conscience when not being home in the world discloses itself by an obstinately 
obstructive world. 
 
To be resolute means to understand authentically the meaning of the experience of a 
complex. Dasein’s understanding constantly lags behind its possibilities and therefore 
is constantly responsible for the nullity of itself in its existence. Therefore, resolute 
authenticity means Dasein must understand it is the ground for the care of its being- 
in-the-world and so must acknowledge its guilt for the nullity of what it is not. The call 
of conscience discloses Dasein as being guilty for the nullity of its existence and is a 
call to care authentically for existence in the experience of a complex. As a result, to 
assimilate a complex into the understanding of consciousness, Dasein must resolutely 
face the truth of its guilt from the experience of a complex. Dasein chooses itself with 
an authentic understanding of the meaning of a complex. Understanding the meaning 
of a complex means to choose to discover a truth of Being and “becomes a readiness 
for anxiety” (Heidegger, 1962, p.342). When Dasein understandingly responds to this 
possibility of authentically understanding a complex, Dasein has a readiness for 
“projecting oneself upon one's ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.265). In summary, when Dasein understands the authentic 
meaning of a complex this is called resoluteness, and resoluteness “is interpreted 
existentially as primordial truth” (Heidegger, 1996, p.273). 
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The authentic disclosedness of resoluteness modifies the experience of a complex in 
“both the way in which the 'world' is discovered and the way in which the Dasein-with 
of Others is disclosed” (Heidegger, 1962, p.344). As a result, “The 'world' which is 
ready-to-hand does not become another one 'in its content', nor does the circle of 
Others get exchanged for a new one; but both one's Being towards the ready-to-hand 
understandingly and concernfully, and one's solicitous Being with Others, are now 
given a definite character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-Being-their-Selves” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.344). Since Dasein has authentically understood the meaning of 
a complex and Dasein has been resolute to unconceal a truth of Being, Dasein lets 
Being be free for its involvement in the ready-to-hand which removes the 
obstructiveness from being-in-the-world through an understanding of the meaning of 
a complex. By understanding the authentic meaning of a complex, Dasein “makes it 
possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' through solicitude which leaps forth and 
liberates” (Heidegger, 1962, p.344) because Dasein understands a truth of Being 
instead of inauthentically projecting Being perfect in the face of the experience of a 
complex as the world becomes unready-to-hand. 
 
The experience of a complex is always specific to circumstances and therefore 
authentically understanding the meaning of a complex “is always the resoluteness of 
some factical Dasein at a particular time” (Heidegger, 1962, p.345), which Heidegger 
calls a “situation”. Through authentically and resolutely understanding a complex, the 
untruth of the situation is appropriated through an interpretation which “discovers first 
what is factically possible” (Heidegger, 1962, p.345) for being-in-the-world. Therefore, 
this resolute projection brings Dasein to a truth of its being-in-the-world, which 
unconceals an authentic understanding of a complex because Dasein has chosen 
itself. Thus, “resolute, Dasein is revealed to itself in its current factical potentiality-for- 
Being, and in such a way that Dasein itself is this revealing and Being-revealed” 
(Heidegger, 1962, p.355). In other words, resoluteness allows Dasein to reveal the 
unconscious complex to itself to remove its obstructiveness from being-in-the-world. 
Complexes or a truth of Dasein’s Being can temporally remain unconscious “in a 
dormant condition” and Jung writes “it seems as if there were absolutely nothing in this 
hidden region” (Jung, 1981, p.279). However, the truth of Being remains even though 
Dasein inauthentically denies the truth through a Being perfect projection. By ignoring 
the authentic truth disclosed by angst, guilt, and conscience, Dasein does not 
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understand complexes as real and “Hence we are continually surprised when 
something unknown suddenly appears ‘from nowhere’” (Jung, 1981, p.279). 
Alternatively, an authentic resoluteness which understands that angst, guilt, and 
conscience reveal Dasein’s primordial truth to itself may allow Dasein to understand 
that “possibilities of future development may also come to light in this way, perhaps in 
just such an outburst of affect which sometimes radically alters the whole situation” 
(Jung, 1981, p.279). By being authentically resolute, removing a complex is possible 
when Dasein does not become absorbed in only one of its possibilities for being and 
has instead interpreted new possibilities for being-in-the-world52. 
 
3.6 Daseinsanalysis 
 
Now that I have outlined the phenomenology of complexes as well as an inauthentic 
and authentic understanding of the meaning of complexes, I will integrate this work 
into Daseinsanalytic practice. The foundation for understanding psychopathology in 
Daseinsanalysis is “whenever the fraction of carried-out-possibilities is too low in 
relation to the full range of human possibilities the face of human illness shows” 
(Kastrinidis, 1988, p.174). This means psychological illness occurs when Dasein 
“loses its freedom to take up its full inheritance as a diverse, ever evolving presence 
in the world” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.174). Therefore, it is clear that complexes require an 
authentic understanding of their meaning so Dasein has the freedom to “to take up its 
full inheritance as a diverse, ever evolving presence in the world” (Kastrinidis, 1988, 
p.174). The inauthentic characteristics of Being perfect and fleeing the meaning of a 
complex indicates Dasein’s lack of freedom to take up such basic human 
characteristics as guilt, angst, and conscience and to evolve and open new 
possibilities for understanding a truth of being-in-the-world. 
 
The achievement of authentic wholeness only occurs at the very end of one's 
existence, but by being inauthentic Dasein wants its complete future while still existing. 
As a result, Dasein cannot anticipate possibilities for growth and paradoxically, there 
is no future for someone who understands a complex inauthentically. This points 
directly to what inauthentic Dasein does not do but needs to do to authentically find a 
sense of being at home in the world. As a result, Kastrinidis’s suggestion is helpful 
when a psychotherapist encounters an analysand who inauthentically understands 
                                               
52 Which may involve the ‘withdrawal’ of possibilities (See Binswanger, 1963, p.141). 
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complexes. Kastrinidis claims the primary task of the psychotherapist is to invite the 
client to gradually “stand squarely in the face of their own humanity, their inevitable 
unwholeness and imperfection” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.182). For only with this 
understanding may inauthentic Dasein be destined to confront their unconscious 
complexes and fulfil their ownmost potential. When Jung clarifies his concept of 
individuation which he says takes place by making unconscious complexes, 
conscious, it is clear from the following description that individuation is exactly the 
opposite to a Being perfect projection. Jung writes: 
 
I note that the individuation process is confused with the coming of the ego into 
consciousness and that the ego is in consequence identified with the self, 
Individuation is then nothing but ego-centredness, the self comprises infinitely 
more than a mere ego. It is as much one's self, and all other selves, as the ego. 
Individuation does not shut one out from the world, but gathers the world to 
oneself (Jung, 1969, p.226). 
 
This sentence highlights and clarifies that individuation is the process of expanding 
consciousness by integrating unconscious complexes or in Daseinsanalytic terms, 
expanding possibilities for being-in-the-world. 
 
In summary, the task of the Daseinsanalytic relationship is for inauthentic Dasein to 
discover unrecognized possibilities disclosed in the experience of a complex and to 
allow them to find their place and come into being-in-the-world. It is, therefore, the 
psychotherapist's task to assist the inauthentic analysand to become exposed and 
imperfect in relation to the psychotherapist (analyst) and for the analysand to withstand 
the truth of existence, disclosed by resoluteness in the face of the experience of a 
complex. As a result of this assistance, inauthentic Dasein has the possibility to 
understand and to accept their inauthenticity. This leads to an authentic understanding 
of the meaning of the experience of a complex, which is necessary for complexes to 
be assimilated into the being at home in the world. This “does not shut one out from 
the world, but gathers the world to oneself” (Jung, 1969, p.226). 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has built on my arguments from the previous chapter, which further 
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illustrates the congruency between Heidegger’s and Jung’s work. Specifically, in this 
chapter, I focused on providing a phenomenological description of Jung’s complex 
theory with the use of Heidegger’s ontology. In addition, I demonstrated how a 
Daseinsanalytic description of narcissism is significantly elucidating when read with a 
phenomenological understanding of complexes. 
 
I explained that when Dasein encounters a complex the world becomes obstructive 
and Dasein feels “not at home” from an experience of angst, guilt, and conscience. 
The ontological meaning of these components of the experience of a complex is angst 
at not being at home in the world in the face of an obstructive and insignificant world. 
In addition, conscience calls Dasein forth to its authentic understanding of complexes, 
which it has fallen prey to. The call of conscience discloses Dasein as being the basis 
or being guilty for the obstructiveness of not being at home in the world. 
 
The authentic meaning of the experience of a complex reveals Dasein as being the 
basis for not discovering an entity for its assignment to being-in-the-world. This entity 
is undiscovered and missing from Dasein’s world and thus the world falls into 
unreadiness-to-hand and this results in the experience of a complex. By authentically 
understanding the experience of a complex, Dasein has the possibility to understand 
the meaning for the obstructiveness of the complex once beings are free for 
involvement through the developed interpretation of the truth of their possibilities53. 
Thus, an authentic understanding of complexes means to be resolute in the face of 
the experience of guilt, angst and conscience when ‘not-being-at-home-in-the-world’ 
discloses itself through an obstinately obstructive world. By being authentically 
resolute, a complex is removable from being-in-the-world when Dasein does not 
become absorbed in only one of its possibilities and has instead interpreted new 
possibilities for being-in-the-world. As a result, this chapter elucidates the 
Daseinsanalytic understanding of the cause of psychopathology since “whenever the 
fraction of carried out possibilities is too low in relation to the full range of human 
possibilities the face of human illness shows” (Kastrinidis, 1988, p.174). 
                                               
53 This is how the analysand can remove “falling behind in our own possibilities for open and free 
behaviour towards the world” (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.24). 
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Chapter 4: The Gay Science and the Rosarium Philosophorum 
 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, I continue the work presented in the previous chapters by integrating 
Heidegger’s writing on Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and Thus spoke Zarathustra with 
Jung’s work on the Rosarium Philosophorum. The foundations that I have presented 
in the previous chapters are essential to describing the work of the current chapter. 
The overall purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the further congruency between 
Heidegger and Jung’s work. Specifically, I will focus on providing a phenomenological 
and ontological description of Jung’s Rosarium Philosophorum with Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science. 
 
My aim in this chapter is similar to Nutall (2000) who explores the psychology of the 
Rosarium Philosophorum using two non-Jungian approaches. Although similar in its 
objective to Nutall, I will argue that the Rosarium Philosophorum can be understood 
as describing Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and thus provides added interpretation to 
the Rosarium Philosophorum, as well as contributing to Jung’s and Nutall’s 
psychological interpretation. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In The Psychology of the Transference, Jung (1966) provides a psychological 
commentary on the alchemical text, the Rosarium Philosophorum. Wiener (2009, p.81) 
claims that, “It became his model for thinking about the process of individuation, 
including a visual amplification of transference and the unfolding of an unconscious 
relationship between the patient and the analyst.” Alchemists composed the Rosarium 
Philosophorum to represent the production of the philosopher’s stone and Jung argues 
this process could also symbolise the aims of Jungian psychoanalysis, which is to 
achieve the development of personality by discovering the self through individuation. 
In The Psychology of the Transference, Jung provides a psychological commentary 
on ten woodcuts from the Rosarium Philosophorum. He explains that the Rosarium 
Philosophorum displays an incestuous love story between a King and Queen, starting 
in a circular basin containing water where the creation of the philosopher’s stone 
115  
occurs. In this chapter, I first explain each woodcut through Jung’s psychological 
interpretation and then highlight an ontological interpretation provided by Heidegger’s 
explanation of Nietzsche’s The Gay Science and Thus Spoke Zarathustra. As I have 
mentioned, my work in this chapter has similar aims to a paper by Nutall (2000) who 
argues that the Rosarium is a more general description of an object-relations theory 
of personality development and integration. 
 
4.2 The Mercurial Fountain 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Mercurial Fountain 
 
 
The title of the first woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum is the Mercurial Fountain. 
Below the title of this woodcut, Jung includes five lines from the Rosarium, which read: 
“We are the metals first nature and only source/The highest tincture of the Art is made 
through us. No fountain and no water has my like/I make both rich and poor men whole 
or sick. For deadly can I be and poisonous” (Jung, 1966, p.203). 
 
Jung claims that this first picture “goes straight to the heart of alchemical symbolism” 
because “It is a quadratic quaternity, characterized by the four stars in the four corners” 
(Jung, 1966, p.203). He explains that the alchemical transformation occurs in an 
enclosed basin with “divine water” where a fountain flows. Jung also claims that the 
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Mercurial Fountain is the “mare tenebrosum” or “the chaos” (Jung, 1966, p.203). The 
four stars in the picture represent the chaos of separate elements at the start of the 
alchemical process. Jung suggests that the alchemists understood the Mercurial 
Fountain to resemble the uterus where a foetus is grown. 
 
Jung notes that the basin is circular, which is conspicuously different to the four stars 
in the four corners of the picture, which make a square. He says the circular basin 
represents “the perfect form into which the square, as an imperfect form, must be 
changed” (Jung, 1966, p.204) through the alchemical process. The four stars also 
represent “the plural state of the man who has not yet attained inner unity, hence the 
state of bondage and disunion, of disintegration, and of being torn in different 
directions an agonizing, unredeemed state which longs for union, reconciliation, 
redemption, healing, and wholeness” (Jung, 1966, p.208). 
 
The square displayed in the first woodcut shows the stars “separate and hostile to one 
another and must therefore be united in the circle” (Jung, 1966, p.204). Jung says the 
circle of the basin of the fountain also represents “the symbol of completeness and 
perfect being, is a widespread expression for heaven, sun, and God; it also expresses 
the primordial image of man and the soul” (Jung, 1966, p.208). This picture also 
contains images of the sun and moon, “who are the indispensable acolytes and 
parents of the mystic transformation” (Jung, 1966, p.206). At the apex of the picture is 
a two-headed serpent, which is expelling fire from its mouths and Jung suggests that 
this serpent symbolises the devil. 
 
For Jung, the five lines of text below the picture of the Mercurial Fountain describe the 
water (mercury) of the art of the transformation process. He argues that the fluid 
substance of the fountain signifies the unconscious. Finally, Jung reasons “the gushing 
up and flowing back of the Mercurial Fountain within its basin completes a circle, and 
this is an essential characteristic of Mercurius because he is also the serpent that 
fertilizes, kills, and devours itself and brings itself to birth again” (Jung, 1966, p.210). 
The circular movement of the fluid substance in the fountain “perpetually replenishes 
itself by means of a spring bubbling up in its centre” (Jung, 1966, p.210). 
117  
I can now describe the ontology of the first woodcut with the use of Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche's The Gay Science of which Heidegger says the “doctrine 
contains an assertion concerning beings as a whole” (Heidegger, 1984, p.5). 
Heidegger introduces Nietzsche’s discussion of The Gay Science with Nietzsche’s 
aphorism named “The greatest burden”. 
 
The greatest burden.- What would happen if one day or night a demon were to 
steal upon you in your loneliest loneliness and say to you, ‘You will have to live 
this life-as you are living it now and have lived it in the past---once again and 
countless times more; and there will be nothing new to it, but every pain and 
every pleasure, every thought and sigh, and everything unutterably petty or grand 
in your life will have to come back to you, all in the same sequence and order-
even this spider, and that moonlight between the trees, even this moment and I 
myself. The eternal hourglass of existence turning over and over-and you with it, 
speck of dust!’ Would you not cast yourself down, gnash your teeth, and curse 
the demon who said these things? Or have you ever experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would reply to him, ‘You are a god; never have I heard 
anything more godly!’ If that thought ever came to prevail in you, it would 
transform you, such as you are, and perhaps it would mangle you. The question 
posed to each thing you do, ‘Do you will this once more and countless times 
more?’ would weigh upon your actions as the greatest burden! Or how beneficent 
would you have to become toward yourself and toward life to demand nothing 
more than this eternal sanction and seal? (Heidegger, 1984, p.19). 
 
I use this aphorism throughout this chapter as a reference to elucidate The Gay 
Science and Rosarium. The importance of The Gay Science to understand the first 
woodcut is evident when Heidegger explains that Nietzsche names The Gay Science 
to mean the “stance adopted, and the will directed, toward essential knowing” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.20). This definition reflects the first woodcut of the Rosarium, 
which says, “The highest tincture of the Art is made through us” (Jung, 1966, p.203). 
Both the woodcut and The Gay Science aim at achieving a final momentous goal from 
the process to be undertaken. 
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Heidegger notes that the German word for science is Wissenschaft, which sounds 
similar to the German word for passion, Leidenschaft. As a result, Heidegger argues 
The Gay Science is understandable as “the passion of a well-grounded mastery over 
the things that confront us and over our own way of responding to what confronts us” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.20). The Gay Science achieves a “cheerfulness that comes of a 
certain superiority, a cheerfulness that is not dashed by even the hardest and most 
terrifying matters” (Heidegger, 1984, p.21). Likewise, Jung claims the first woodcut 
shows the alchemist’s aim to master the elements presented in the picture which are 
“separate and hostile to one another and must therefore be united in the circle” (Jung, 
1966, p.204). As a result, this explains that achieving unification into a circle can take 
place through the passion of mastery over even the most terrifying elements to achieve 
a cheerfulness from their harmony and unity in a circle. It is also important to recognise 
the circular movement of the fluid substance in the fountain in this woodcut, which 
“perpetually replenishes itself by means of a spring bubbling up in its centre” (Jung, 
1966, p.210). One obvious relationship to this circular movement of the fountain and 
perpetual replenishment is found in Nietzsche’s aphorism when he says of the circular 
recurrence of life “You will have to live this life-as you are living it now and have lived 
it in the past---once again and countless times more” (Heidegger, 1984, p.20). 
 
By the end of this chapter, I demonstrate that the 10 woodcuts of the Rosarium 
Philosophorum represent Nietzsche’s philosophy in The Gay Science. As a result, the 
reader will be able to interpret individuation and personality development through the 
meaning of The Gay Science. Wiener says the first woodcut is “a symbolic 
representation of the theory and practice of analysis and, metaphorically, the 
beginning of an analysis” (Wiener, 2009, p.82). Consequently, the first woodcut and 
the ten woodcuts combined of the Rosarium Philosophorum not only represent 
Jungian psychoanalysis but also Nietzsche’s philosophy in The Gay Science. 
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4.3 King and Queen 
 
 
Figure 2: King and Queen 
 
 
Jung claims that the ‘coniunctio’, which means the union of antagonistic opposites, is 
first displayed in the second woodcut. A King and Queen approach one another for 
the purpose of interaction and this represents the ‘coniunctio’. The King and Queen 
stand respectively on the sun and moon, “thus indicating their solar and lunar nature 
in accordance with the astrological assumption of the importance of the sun's position 
for man and the moon's for woman” (Jung, 1966, p.211). 
 
The King and Queen appear distant in this woodcut because each character remains 
clothed, though this will change in the next woodcut. They engage with one another 
by holding each other’s left hand. Jung suggests that this symbolises the process 
undertaken as being contrary to convention. He also says the holding of left hands 
highlights that the process to be undertaken involves a “closely guarded secret” (Jung, 
1966, p.211). Left hand contact symbolises the “(sinister) side” of the dark, 
unconscious. Jung explains that the left hand represents the ominous and difficult task 
of confronting the unconscious. The left hand is also “the side of the heart, from which 
comes not only love but all the evil thoughts connected with it, the moral contradictions 
in human nature that are expressed most clearly in our affective life” (Jung, 1966, 
p.211). 
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The second woodcut also contains the image of a flower carried by a dove moving 
toward the King and Queen from above and Jung says this represents the Holy Ghost. 
This woodcut depicts “a human encounter where love plays the decisive part” (Jung, 
1966, p217). In addition, the conventional dress of the King and Queen suggests a 
conservative interaction between the characters at this stage of the process, as 
convention divides the King and Queen and conceals their true personality. For Jung, 
the image of the Holy Ghost suggests a meaning of incest in relation to this encounter. 
He explains that the incest of this encounter signifies unification “with one's own being, 
it means individuation or becoming a self” (Jung, 1966, p.218). 
 
Jung next highlights the equivalent psychological meaning from the transference in 
psychotherapy. In psychotherapy, there is a conventional meeting, followed by an 
unconscious projection of fantasies from the analysand. The transference of these 
fantasies onto the analyst provides practical “prima material”. Jung argues that once 
the transference occurs, the psychoanalyst needs to accept it as necessary to 
psychotherapy and to attempt to understand the meaning of it. Jung also says the 
flowers crossing in this second woodcut signify a crossing of the sexes as a man 
projects the feminine components of his personality and a woman projects the 
masculine components of her personality. Jung explains that the aim of psychotherapy 
includes helping the analysand to withdraw this projection of their personality by 
making it conscious. 
 
Psychotherapy gives the analysand an opportunity to withdraw projections in order to 
integrate their personality to a higher level. For Jung, the projections found in 
psychotherapy show a dark side to the analysand’s personality and this relates to the 
work of the “sol niger” of the alchemists. Projections are the inferior shadow aspects 
of the personality and psychotherapy brings the shadow into the light of 
consciousness. Psychotherapy can prevent a perpetual state of ‘inauthenticity’ when 
the analysand stops attributing inferior aspects of the personality to others. This aim 
of psychotherapy can lead to a heightened consciousness as the analysand’s 
personality is integrated. As projections withdraw, conventional masquerades fall 
away and “the true man comes to light. He is in very truth reborn from this 
psychological relationship, and his field of consciousness is rounded into a circle” 
(Jung, 1966, p.219). 
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I now explain the ontology of the second woodcut with Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche’s aphorism “the greatest burden”54. Heidegger writes, “A burden exerts a 
downward pull, compelling us constantly to hold ourselves erect; but it also embodies 
the danger that we will fall down, and stay down. In this way the burden is an obstacle 
that demands constant ‘hurdling,’ constant surmounting” (Heidegger, 1984, p.22). As 
a result, the ‘coniunctio’, which is represented as a King and Queen, is understandable 
as a burden and the dove with the flower descending from above signifies this 
downward pull. Jung explains that the coniunctio represents the union of opposites 
and this coincides with Heidegger’s definition of a burden, as standing up and falling 
down oppose each other. Heidegger continues to ask why is a burden important to 
understand Nietzsche’s ontology? He says Nietzsche argues humans need a burden. 
Burdens allow humans to descry what they are in their ascendancy over burdens. 
Nietzsche argues the experience of the necessity of the "greatest burden,” has, 
“allowed us to live” (Heidegger, 1984, p.23). This can also be understood to explain 
the aims of psychotherapy which give the analysand an opportunity to withdraw 
projections (their burden), to integrate their personality to a higher level. 
 
The experience of the greatest burden does not occur to “any arbitrary human being 
in his or her most arbitrary everydayness, that is to say, in the midst of all the hubbub 
that enables us to forget ourselves” (Heidegger, 1984, p.24). The greatest burden 
comes in a human being's "loneliest loneliness" (Heidegger, 1984, p.24) which does 
not mean when the human hides from other beings. Heidegger says the loneliest 
loneliness occurs when a human being is “altogether himself, standing in the most 
essential relationships of his historical existence in the midst of beings as a whole” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.24). In the loneliest loneliness, the human does not isolate itself 
from its existence with other beings. The loneliest loneliness is “that kind of 
individuation which we must grasp as authentic appropriation, in which the human self 
comes into its own” (Heidegger, 1984, p.24) as the human individuates by its 
uniqueness in its relationship with other beings. This is also reflected in Jung’s 
commentary on the second woodcut when he says as projections are withdrawn 
through psychotherapy the “field of consciousness is rounded into a circle” (Jung, 
1966, p.219) when a human being is “altogether himself, standing in the most essential 
relationships of his historical existence in the midst of beings as a whole” (Heidegger, 
                                               
54 Cf. Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.226) refers to the “burdensome nature of beginning”.  
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1984, p.24). 
Heidegger also claims that the greatest burden is a burden because it is the heaviest 
thought thinkable because it is not an isolated thought, which ignores other beings. 
The burden is heavy because this thought takes into consideration beings as a whole. 
The burden is also “the hardest to bear with respect to the thinking itself, and thus is 
the most difficult thought” (Heidegger, 1984, p.25). The greatest burden is the most 
difficult thought because it is both a “closely guarded secret” and the dark “(sinister) 
side” of the personality, which involves the ominous and difficult task of confronting 
the unconscious. 
 
4.4 The Naked Truth 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The Naked Truth 
 
 
 
The text to the third woodcut states, 
 
 
He who would be initiated into this art and secret wisdom must put away the vice 
of arrogance, must be devout, righteous, deepwitted, humane towards his 
fellows, of a cheerful countenance and a happy disposition, and respectful withal. 
Likewise he must be an observer of the eternal secrets that are revealed to him. 
My son, above all I admonish thee to fear God who seeth thine actions and in 
whom is help for the solitary, whosoever he may be (Jung, 1966, p.235) and 
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additionally: Could God but find a man of faithful understanding, He would open 
His secret to him (Jung, 1966, p.235). 
 
Jung suggests that the third woodcut focuses on the intellectual, technical and moral 
demands of the opus. The third woodcut highlights the removal of the conventional 
clothes as the King and Queen meet one another in candid openness. Jung says 
psychologically this means that the situation involves confronting reality “with no false 
veils or adornments of any kind” (Jung, 1966, p.238). This woodcut demonstrates that 
the process of individuation involves unconcealing “what was hidden under the mask 
of conventional adaptation: the shadow” (Jung, 1966, p.238). When the shadow is 
unconcealed, it can be elevated to consciousness and united with the ego, which 
provides a wholeness to personality. Wiener comments, “the king and the queen 
(patient and analyst) are undressed, seen without their respective personas” (Wiener, 
2009, p.84). By unconcealing the shadow aspects of the personality, a person 
attempts to recognise consciously their maladaptive behaviours. If the shadow is not 
recognised “Repression leads to a one-sided development if not to stagnation, and 
eventually to neurotic dissociation” (Jung, 1966, p.238). The naked truth of the 
recognition of the shadow removes its division from the ego and combines “in an 
admittedly precarious unity” (Jung, 1966, p.239). 
 
I now describe the ontology of the third woodcut by explaining Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s aphorism "lncipit tragoedia" that immediately follows the 
“greatest burden” aphorism in The Gay Science. The Gay Science consists of the 
greatest burden, which is a heavy and difficult thought to think. In addition, thinking 
about the greatest burden results in the beginning of tragedy “lncipit tragoedia” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.28). For Heidegger, understanding the tragedy of existence 
begins when thinking about the burden of The Gay Science. 
 
Heidegger claims that the scarce, the uncommon and only those who have ears for 
soundless revolutions will recognize the "Incipit tragoedia." It is also important to 
highlight that for Nietzsche tragedy belongs to aesthetics. For example, Nietzsche 
says that “Art is ‘the metaphysical activity’ of ‘life’; it defines the way in which beings 
as a whole are” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). Heidegger maintains that the highest art is 
tragic and that tragedy is the core of Being. In addition, he says terror results from 
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tragedy; however, The Gay Science does not produce fear or aim to dodge terror by 
escaping to resignation. Instead of resigning and escaping the terror of tragedy, to 
think the “greatest burden” is to affirm and say “yes” to the terrifying “in its unalterable 
affiliation with the beautiful” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). As a result, it becomes clear that 
to achieve the beauty of art one must be close to tragedy. The reference to art and its 
affirmation with tragedy is also clear in the alchemists writing which, as we have seen, 
states: “He who would be initiated into this art and secret wisdom must put away the 
vice of arrogance, must be devout, righteous, deepwitted, humane towards his fellows, 
of a cheerful countenance and a happy disposition, and respectful withal” (Jung, 1966, 
p.235). The characteristics of a Gay Science are also evident in this quote, with the 
adjectives cheerful and happy used to describe the art of alchemy. 
 
Jung explains that the removal of the conventional clothes by the King and Queen 
psychologically means confronting reality “with no false veils or adornments of any 
kind” (Jung, 1966, p.238). This can now also be understood as the acknowledgment 
that “Greatness and great heights subsist together with the depths and with what is 
terrifying; the more originally the one is willed, the more surely the other will be 
attained.” “Frightfulness is proper to greatness: let us not be deceived” (Heidegger, 
1984, p.29). As a result, revealing the shadow begins the tragedy. Nietzsche would 
call confronting the shadow in opposition to the ego "heroic" (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). 
He defines a hero as “Going out to meet one's supreme suffering and supreme hope 
alike" (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). To be a hero is to become “master over his misfortune 
and good fortune as well”. “The heroic spirits are those who in the midst of tragic horror 
say to themselves, ‘Yes’: they are hard enough to feel suffering as pleasure” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.29). As a result, the naked truth marks the hero going out to meet 
their shadow and their hope of integrating it with the ego. 
 
Consequently, the naked truth, like The Gay Science, teaches the greatest burden and 
the beginning of tragedy, is "the highest formula of affirmation that can ever be 
achieved" (Heidegger, 1984, p.30). The tragic spirit comes into being with the "lncipit 
tragoedia," but when affirming the tragedy of the thought of the greatest burden, 
Nietzsche also includes, "INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA" (Heidegger, 1984, p.30). 
Zarathustra is the first and correct thinker of The Gay Science and is the one who 
confronts the naked truth represented in the third woodcut. Nietzsche poetically 
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creates Zarathustra in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in the year following the publication of 
The Gay Science. Consequently, the concluding aphorisms of The Gay Science (The 
greatest burden and Incipit tragoedia) link to and are the beginning of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra in Zarathustra’s Prologue. Zarathustra’s affirmation of The Gay Science 
begins with his down-going and I explain this with the fourth woodcut. 
 
4.5 Immersion in the Bath 
 
 
Figure 4: Immersion in the Bath 
 
 
The basin of the Mercurial Fountain appears in the fourth woodcut. Jung explains that 
the liquid substance in the woodcut signifies the “mysterious psychic substance which 
nowadays we would call the unconscious psyche” (Jung, 1966, p.240). The woodcut 
shows that the liquid substance signifying the unconscious has made contact with the 
King and Queen and this occurs through their descent into the basin. 
 
Jung claims that since the alchemists understood the philosopher’s stone to grow like 
a child, the immersion in the unconscious signifies a return to the dark infantile state 
immersed in the amniotic fluid in the mother’s womb. The woodcut states: "This 
stinking water contains everything it needs” (Jung, 1966, p.242) which Jung relates to 
the self-sufficient tail-eating snake, Uroboros, which kills and vivifies itself. For Jung, 
the Queen and the King require a love for each other to unite and to bond through the 
soul. This unification is symbolised by a dove entering the woodcut from above and 
carrying a rose in its beak. He suggests that this unification of opposites through the 
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soul allows the personality to achieve wholeness. The woodcut also suggests that the 
immersion in the unconscious represents that “The night sea journey is a descent into 
Hades and a journey to the land of ghosts somewhere beyond this world, beyond 
consciousness, hence an immersion in the unconscious” (Jung, 1966, p.245). The pair 
holding on with both hands to two roses symbolises the affirmation of the burden and 
tragedy of The Gay Science. 
 
Unlike the first three woodcuts, where I used Nietzsche’s book The Gay Science to 
provide an ontological interpretation, I explain this woodcut with Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche's book Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Heidegger claims that 
Nietzsche poetically creates Zarathustra to display a thinker who is different to 
humanity hitherto. Zarathustra is different as he is a heroic thinker, which means 
Zarathustra affirms the greatest burden and the tragedy it brings. Nietzsche makes the 
tragedy of the burden of The Gay Science understandable through the story of 
Zarathustra. Likewise, the story of Zarathustra elucidates Jungian individuation. 
 
Heidegger claims that the creation of Zarathustra by Nietzsche occurs so that human 
beings can come to exist who will not capitulate when thinking the tragedy of the 
“greatest burden”. Zarathustra can also be understood to allow the prior human to 
transcend itself and to be “transformed-into the overman” (Heidegger, 1984, p.32) by 
assisting in an ontological interpretation of the Rosarium Philosophorum. The overman 
is an "above and beyond" (Heidegger, 1984, p.33) humanity who shows that prior 
humanity is only preliminary. Nietzsche calls the human overcome, the "last man" and 
Heidegger says the last man is the human of mediocre joy in contrast to the human 
who thinks The Gay Science. The Rosarium Philosophorum depicts overcoming the 
last man through the unification of the King and Queen (conscious/unconscious). The 
last man projects his shadow and therefore does not affirm The Gay Science. 
Consequently, “In the sphere of the last man each thing gets a little bit smaller every 
day” (Heidegger, 1984, p.33). Nietzsche’s overman recognizes the unconscious of the 
last man and overcomes him. The overman ascends beyond the last man through the 
unification of conscious and unconscious and thus highlights the last man as the last, 
as the man of olden days. Zarathustra speaks of the last man in “Zarathustra’s 
Prologue”: 
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"Now I shall speak to them of what is most contemptible, and that is the Last 
Man." 
And Zarathustra spoke thus to the people: 
"The time has come for man to stake out his goal. The time has come for man to 
sow the seed of his supreme hope. 
"His soil is still rich enough for that. But one day this soil will be poor and tame, 
and no tall tree will be able to flourish in it. 
"Woe! The time is coming when man will no longer shoot the arrow of his longing 
beyond man, and the string of his bow will have forgotten how to whir! 
"I say unto you: one must still have chaos in him to be able to give birth to a 
dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in you. 
"Woe! The time is coming when man will give birth to no more stars. Woe! The 
time of the most contemptible man is coming, the one who can no longer feel 
contempt for himself. 
"Behold, I show you the Last Man" (Heidegger, 1984, p.33). 
 
 
The last man is mentioned as the most contemptible human at the beginning of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, as Zarathustra is at the start of his journey where “he is to become 
the one who he is” (Heidegger, 1984, p.34). As a result, Zarathustra begins his journey 
to overcome the last man by affirming the tragedy and burden of The Gay Science and 
by “‘becoming beneficent toward life,’ that is, affirming life in its extreme anguish and 
in its most rollicking joy” (Heidegger, 1984, p.34). Consequently, the immersion in the 
bath represents confronting and immersing oneself with the last man through a 
descent into the unconscious soil that is still rich for the supreme hope of expanding 
consciousness. This is in contrast to avoiding an immersion in the unconscious 
through the projection of the shadow as the last man’s consciousness “gets a little bit 
smaller every day” (Heidegger, 1984, p.33). 
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4.6 The Conjunction 
 
 
Figure 5: The Conjunction 
 
 
In the fifth woodcut, Jung says the liquid substance in the basin “has closed over the 
king and queen, and they have gone back to the chaotic beginnings, the massa 
confusa” (Jung, 1966, p.246). The King now lays on top of the Queen as both of these 
characters are laying prostrate in the liquid substance. The text describes this by 
saying "Then Beya [the maternal sea] rises up over Gabricus and encloses him in her 
womb, so that nothing more of him is to be seen. And she embraced Gabricus with so 
much love that she utterly consumed him in her own nature and dissolved him into 
atoms" (Jung, 1966, p.246). 
 
Jung then points out verses from Merculinus, which suggest that the meaning of the 
conjunction is to give birth to “something that is one and united” (Jung, 1966, p.248). 
The verses state: “(White-skinned lady, lovingly joined to her ruddy-limbed husband, 
Wrapped in each other's arms in the bliss of connubial union, Merge and dissolve as 
they come to the goal of perfection: They that were two are made one, as though of 
one body)” (Jung, 1966, p.246). 
 
Jung explains that the conjunction is understandable by noting that the unification of 
the King and Queen through coitus is occurring in water, which symbolises the 
unconscious. The woodcut also shows that the uniting symbol of the dove as the Holy 
Ghost has disappeared as “the meaning of the symbol is fulfilled: the partners have 
themselves become symbolic” (Jung, 1966, p.251) of the unification of opposites. Jung 
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says this symbol of union represents the initial state of chaos, the massa confusa due 
to the integration of the unconscious with consciousness in the attempt to achieve 
oneness and a balanced wholeness. 
 
I describe the ontology of this woodcut by explaining Heidegger’s interpretation of the 
section "On the Vision and the Riddle" in Nietzsche’s Thus spoke Zarathustra. 
Heidegger explains that Zarathustra encounters a particular riddle when he affirms 
The Gay Science to become who he is and overcome the last man. The vision of the 
riddle only becomes visible "in our loneliest loneliness" when thinking of the tragic 
burden of The Gay Science. For Heidegger, to understand the riddle is to ‘leap’ to a 
“journey into the open region of what in general is concealed, into that untraveled and 
uncharted region which is the unconcealment (aletheia) of what is most concealed”. 
Additionally, “riddling ventures the truth of being as a whole” (Heidegger, 1984, p.37). 
 
The vision of the riddle can be understood by paying attention to a section where 
Zarathustra describes the riddle on a ship, on an expedition to vast "unexplored" 
oceans, which is equivalent, I think, to Jung saying the conjunction symbolises the 
unexplored massa confusa. Zarathustra tells the riddle to the crew and not to the 
passengers. Zarathustra does not tell the crew as soon as he boards the ship but waits 
for two days before speaking of the riddle, which also highlights the connection with 
the Rosarium Philosophorum, which does not present the conjunction until the fifth 
woodcut. Heidegger suggests that this happens because Zarathustra cannot speak 
about the riddle until the ship has reached open seas, and once he has determined if 
the crew are capable of listening. Similarly, the conjunction can only occur once the 
stages in the first four woodcuts are complete. Heidegger explains that Zarathustra 
elucidates the riddle by telling of “his ascent upon a mountain path at twilight” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.39). Zarathustra remarks that he has taken this journey more than 
once by saying “Not only one sun had gone down for me" (Heidegger, 1984, p.39). 
Heidegger points out that the sea and mountain heights are two essential images in 
Zarathustra’s speech. The equivalent meaning found in the conjunction is the liquid 
closing over the King and Queen like the sea, and this creates a massa confuse as 
new heights are climbed in the unconscious. 
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The climb into the unconscious is confusing because Zarathustra must repetitively 
overcome the "spirit of gravity" (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). Zarathustra’s ego is not yet 
strong enough for the climb up the mountain and the “spirit of gravity” constantly 
pushes downward as he “carries his ‘archenemy’ into the heights with him, that spirit 
is no more than a dwarf” (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). As Zarathustra climbs the mountain, 
the depths of the mountain increase and the abyss of the burden and tragedy of 
confronting the unconscious in The Gay Science becomes a confusing abyss through 
the climb. This imagery is essential to understand The Gay Science as the “Depths 
belong to heights” (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). This means that the depths of the 
unconscious belong to the heights of an expanded consciousness. For this reason, 
Heidegger focuses on this aspect of The Gay Science as Nietzsche writes, “‘Whence 
come the highest mountains?’ I once asked. Then I learned that they come out of the 
sea. The testimony is inscribed in their stone, and in the walls of their summits. From 
unfathomable depths the highest must rise to its height” (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). 
 
The vision and the riddle when confronting the confusion of the unconscious are further 
understood by noting that Heidegger writes, “In any ascent there are always way-
stations where one may estimate the way up and the way down against one another” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.40). The riddle of understanding the unconscious deals precisely 
with estimating the way up and the way down against one another. To climb is to affirm 
The Gay Science and unite with the unconscious: to descend is to deny The Gay 
Science, to affirm the last man and to project inferior aspects of the personality onto 
others. 
 
Therefore, as Zarathustra confronts the abyss of the burden and tragedy of the 
unconscious during The Gay Science, “he rises to the heights and surpasses the 
dwarf” (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). As the riddle of the conjunction comes into view on 
the climb, at a gateway Zarathustra reports “Then something happened that made me 
lighter: the dwarf, being curious, sprang from my shoulder. He squatted on a rock in 
front of me. But at the very place we stopped there was a gateway” (Heidegger, 1984, 
p.40). 
 
Zarathustra now talks about the gateway (the conjunction). Heidegger claims that this 
description of the gateway symbolises the riddle of the climb encountered by 
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Zarathustra and the dwarf. Zarathustra says at the gateway, “two long avenues meet. 
The one leads forward, the other leads back” (Heidegger, 1984, p.41). There is an 
engraving of the ‘Moment’ directly above the gateway. This ‘Moment’ can be thought 
to represent change within psychotherapy as the avenue that leads back symbolises 
the past where the unconscious is projected, compared to the avenue leading forward 
which symbolises the future where the unconscious is integrated into the personality. 
 
Heidegger explains that this vision of the gateway is a glimpse of the riddle itself, not 
of its solution (the integration of the unconscious has not occurred yet). He says, 
“When the ‘image’ becomes visible and is described, the riddle draws into sight for the 
first time. The riddle is what our riddling must aim at. Riddling commences by 
questioning” (Heidegger, 1984, p.41). Thus, Zarathustra interrogates the dwarf 
regarding the gateway and its paths. Likewise, psychotherapy aims at finding a 
solution to questions to heal the analysand of the ‘riddle’ they are encountering. 
 
Zarathustra asks, “‘if anyone were to strike out on one of these avenues, and continue 
on and on, what would happen? Do you believe, dwarf, that these ways contradict one 
another eternally?-that is to say, do the paths run away from one another eternally, 
are they contrary to one another?’" The dwarf replies with a disdainful mutter 
“Everything straight deceives. All truth is curved; time itself is a circle" (Heidegger, 
1984, p.42). Heidegger argues that the dwarf does not think the riddle is worth talking 
about because he guesses the answer to the riddle without actually understanding the 
answer. As a result, Zarathustra responds to the dwarf by stating, “You don't make 
things too easy for yourself” (Heidegger, 1984, p.42). The dwarf’s lack of 
understanding of the answer to the riddle causes Zarathustra to respond "wrathfully" 
rather than to celebrate. Consequently, Zarathustra claims that the dwarf has not 
understood the riddle and therefore the answer is not adequate, as the dwarf has made 
the answer too easy. It becomes clear from this riddle that achieving the thought of 
The Gay Science does not occur if one merely imagines the solution. Consequently, 
although the conjunction has taken place and answers to questions in psychotherapy 
are forthcoming, the unification of the unconscious and conscious does not complete 
itself at this stage of either the woodcuts or Zarathustra’s journey. 
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With his dissatisfaction with the first response, Zarathustra instantly directs a second 
question to the dwarf. However, the dwarf fails to answer the second question as it is 
posed in a much more difficult manner. Zarathustra no longer hopes to receive a reply 
from the dwarf. The difficulty with the question occurs because specific thoughts of 
The Gay Science are required and the dwarf cannot achieve this because his thinking 
does not affirm The Gay Science. This opens the way to the final five woodcuts. These 
woodcuts can be understood to represent Zarathustra’s preparation to solve the riddle 
(unify conscious/unconscious) at the gateway by achieving necessary milestones prior 
to this Event (Ereignis). 
 
4.7 Death 
 
 
Figure 6: Death 
 
 
The caption to the sixth woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum states, “here king 
and queen are lying dead/In great distress the soul is sped” (Jung, 1966, p.256). Jung 
acknowledges the theme of death in this woodcut by pointing out that the fountain 
basin now forms a coffin for the King and Queen. He writes, “after the coniunctio 
oppositorum, deathlike stillness reigns” (Jung, 1966, p.256) as the King and Queen 
are dead and have merged to form one being with two heads. 
 
A stillness occurs following the unification of opposites as the energy from the tension 
stops and “the picture represents the putrefactio, the corruption, the decay of a once 
living creature” (Jung, 1966, p.256). Jung shows that the text of the woodcut states 
"Corruptio unius generatio est alterius", which means the corruption of one is the 
genesis of the other. As a result, he interprets this to mean that the death of the 
unification of the King and Queen “is an interim stage to be followed by a new life” 
134  
(Jung, 1966, p.256). This brings Jung to understand why the corpse in the woodcut is 
a hermaphrodite because it symbolises that the start of a new life is beginning. 
 
Consequently, the descent into the unconscious appears to have reached its end. 
Although the woodcut represents an end to the descent into the unconscious, there 
are also signs that change will continue, given the image of the unification of the King 
and Queen as a hermaphrodite. Jung argues that every human possesses 
characteristics of the opposite sex in his or her unconscious. An important aim of 
psychotherapy is the conscious comprehension (unconcealment) of this projected part 
of the unconscious. This aim progressively results in the awareness of a man’s 
feminine character or a woman’s masculine character and hence self-knowledge. With 
the integration of projections, personality/consciousness vastly enlarges and this 
results in the one-sidedness of the ego diminishing. Death in the sixth woodcut 
represents this change to the ego. 
 
Accordingly, Jung says that the death in the sixth woodcut is psychologically 
explainable as the integration of the unconscious, which involves a severe lesion of 
the ego: “alchemy expresses this through the symbols of death, mutilation, or 
poisoning” (Jung, 1966, p.263). As a result, the previous ego dies from the union with 
the unconscious anima or animus and a new personality forms (represented as a 
hermaphrodite). The new personality is not a “midway between conscious and 
unconscious, it is both together. Since it transcends consciousness it can no longer 
be called ‘ego’ but must be given the name of ‘self’” (Jung, 1966, p.264). 
 
I now read the death depicted in the sixth woodcut alongside Zarathustra’s explanation 
of the vision of the riddle and the dwarf in order to continue an ontological interpretation 
of the Rosarium. I explained in woodcut five that Zarathustra becomes angry with the 
dwarf who tries and fails to solve a riddle at the gateway of the Moment. Zarathustra 
says to the dwarf that he had made the riddle too easy for himself, as he does not think 
the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science. In anger, Zarathustra directs another 
question to the dwarf, which the dwarf fails to answer (a stillness and silence of death) 
as the question surpasses the dwarf’s thinking. The dwarf is unable to answer the 
question as he does not think the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science, and 
therefore remains outside of the Moment of the gateway to the answer to the riddle. 
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The question Zarathustra asks the dwarf “requires that one adopt a stance of his own 
within the ‘Moment’ itself”; “When that requirement appears, the dwarf vanishes. 
Indeed, he vanishes on account of an event that in itself is sinister and foreboding” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.44). The riddle is difficult for the dwarf to think, consequently, 
there is no place left for the dwarf at the gateway (which is symbolic of death) since he 
does not think the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science. 
 
In the moment consisting of silence and stillness as the dwarf vanishes in the face of 
the riddle that requires the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science to be thought, 
Zarathustra says "I saw a young shepherd, writhing, choking in spasms, his face 
distorted: a thick black snake hung out of his mouth" (Heidegger, 1984, p.44). The 
snake is biting the shepherd and is not letting go as Zarathustra remembers he tries 
to pull the snake away from the shepherd. As the futility of trying to pull the snake away 
from the shepherd becomes evident, Zarathustra says "Then the cry rose out of me, 
'Bite! You must bite! Bite off the head! Bite!'" (Heidegger, 1984, p.44). 
 
We can understand this image of a snake biting the shepherd with the help of the 
woodcut on death. Jung says the death woodcut shows how the corruption of one is 
the genesis of the other. Likewise, the disappearance of the dwarf coincides with the 
genesis of the snake vision, and Zarathustra no longer sees the dwarf. He has become 
part of him, in much the same way as the King and Queen become joined. We can 
also understand the disappearance of the dwarf as “an interim stage to be followed by 
a new life” (Jung, 1966, p.256)55. Zarathustra now has a clearer view of the riddle with 
the vision of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth and the disappearance of the dwarf. 
 
As the vision of the riddle becomes clear, Heidegger writes “Questioning, riddling, and 
thinking, as they approach ever nearer the import of the riddle, themselves become 
more riddlesome, loom ever more gigantic, towering over the one who is doing the 
questioning” (Heidegger, 1984, p.44). Consequently, the sixth woodcut can be 
understood to focus on questioning, riddling and thinking, which involve the death of 
the dwarf ego as Zarathustra searches for an answer to the riddle. I return to and 
continue a discussion of the snake biting the shepherd in the last woodcut where 
                                               
55 Cf “On the meaning and function of depressive experiences during the therapeutic process” (Holzhey-
Kunz, 2014, p.282). 
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Zarathustra overcomes the dwarf ego through the unification of consciousness with 
the unconscious. This will conclude the ontological interpretation of the Rosarium 
Philosophorum. 
 
The ontology of the death woodcut can also be understood with the section titled "‘The 
Convalescent’'". In this section, Zarathustra returns to the aloneness of his cave in the 
mountains to recover after his sea expedition and this conjures similar meanings to 
the hermaphrodite lying in distress in woodcut six. However, Zarathustra is not 
completely alone, as Nietzsche explains, Zarathustra has two animals (an eagle and 
a serpent) who assist him in his recovery from the vision of the riddle on his sea 
journey. When Zarathustra is in solitude in his cave with his animals, he thinks about 
the greatest burden and tragedy of The Gay Science, which the dwarf was not capable 
of achieving at the gateway of the riddle. Consequently, Heidegger suggests that to 
think the greatest burden and the tragedy of The Gay Science involve experiencing 
the loneliest loneliness represented by Zarathustra’s cave. 
 
Heidegger also argues that Nietzsche selects Zarathustra's animals purposefully as 
an image of the meaning of The Gay Science. Zarathustra's animals are not pets and 
“are alien to all that is domestic and usual, all that is ‘familiar’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.47). 
These animals appear when Zarathustra confronts a riddle, which involves 
experiencing unfamiliar aspects of existence in his loneliest loneliness (a “closely 
guarded secret”) (Jung, 1966, p.211). To think the greatest burden and tragedy of The 
Gay Science in the loneliest loneliness does not mean to hide from life in isolation 
(which, as we will see, is important for woodcut eight). Heidegger explains that when 
the greatest burden and tragedy of The Gay Science is thought in the loneliest 
loneliness “the most hair-raising and hazardous things are loosed upon us and on our 
task, and these cannot be deflected onto other things or other people. They must 
penetrate us through and through” (Heidegger, 1984, p.47). Hence, the penetration of 
the unconscious has caused a lesion to Zarathustra’s ego, which causes him to seek 
recovery in his cave with his animals. As a result, Zarathustra’s convalescence 
highlights the process of individuation and personality development, as the previous 
ego dies from the union with the unconscious anima or animus. 
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4.8 The Ascent of the Soul 
 
 
Figure 7: The Ascent of the Soul 
 
 
Jung claims that the seventh woodcut shows one soul from the decaying 
hermaphrodite of the King and Queen rising to heaven. He says the image of one soul 
rising to heaven signifies the metamorphosis of the King and Queen, although “it is not 
yet fully developed and is still a ‘conception’ only” (Jung, 1966, p.265). For Jung, the 
soul rising to heaven “represents the idea of unity which has still to become a concrete 
fact and is at present only a potentiality” (Jung, 1966, p.265). 
 
For Jung, this woodcut represents the psychologically “dark state of disorientation” 
(Jung, 1966, p.265). This disorientation occurs after the death of the ego following its 
immersion in the unconscious. Jung claims this disorientation can last for a significant 
time and “is one of the most difficult transitions the analyst has to deal with, demanding 
the greatest patience, courage, and faith on the part of both doctor and patient” (Jung, 
1966, p.265). He explains that the alchemists state that this stage of the Rosarium 
Philosophorum “is a great sign, in the investigation of which not a few have perished” 
(Jung, 1966, p.266). Jung says the disorientation takes place as the unconscious 
submerges the ego and that some of his patients have subjectively experienced 
levitations from this disorientation. 
 
He also argues that the dead body below the soul ascending to heaven signifies a 
“residue of the past and represents the man who is no more, who is destined to decay” 
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(Jung, 1966, p.266). This woodcut assists in elucidating the direction of treatment in 
psychotherapy as Jung says the psychotherapist must hold onto his or her own 
conscious orientation in order to understand the unconscious of a disorientated 
analysand. He also indicates that this woodcut reflects the process of psychotherapy, 
which aims at strengthening consciousness by developing an understanding of the 
massa confusa of the unconscious. 
 
The soul ascending to heaven represents this process in psychotherapy. 
Understanding the unconscious allows its integration with the ego and this 
progressively results in an enlarged consciousness through an advanced perspective 
of both consciousness and the unconscious. With this elevated perspective and 
widened consciousness, “the invasion by the unconscious was rather like the flooding 
of the Nile: it increases the fertility of the land” (Jung, 1966, p.269). The ascent of the 
soul in this woodcut as a homunculus also suggests that this stage is the beginning 
formation of a wholeness to the personality/consciousness. This ascent frees the soul 
from “the prison of the mortal body” and “unites himself with the ‘upper powers’” (Jung, 
1966, p.270) of thinking in order to continue the metamorphosis. 
 
This woodcut becomes clearer in terms of Zarathustra’s journey who, at this stage, 
exists in solitude in his cave, along with his animals, as he thinks about the greatest 
burden and tragedy of The Gay Science. Zarathustra’s animals provide him with the 
force “to remain true to oneself in their proximity” (Heidegger, 1984, p.48). As 
Zarathustra endures his loneliest loneliness in his cave, “he hears the piercing cry of 
a bird. He looks inquiringly into the sky. ‘And behold! An eagle soared through the air 
in vast circles, and a serpent hung suspended from him, not as his prey but as though 
she were his friend: for she had coiled about his neck’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.214). This 
vision of an eagle and serpent soaring high in the sky reflects the ascent of the soul 
from the decaying hermaphrodite of the joined King and Queen (Zarathustra) rising to 
heaven. 
 
Zarathustra’s eagle soars in vast circles high in the air with the serpent hanging 
suspended from the eagle curled around his throat. As the eagle circles in its flight, it 
simultaneously rises skyward and holds itself there in the heights. Zarathustra’s eagle 
represents the proudest animal, which lives always in the heights, and lives for the 
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heights. Alternatively, the serpent represents the most astute animal, which suggests 
its mastery of knowledge. The “idea of unity which has still to become a concrete fact 
and is at present only a potentiality” (Jung, 1966, p.265) of the King and Queen occurs 
as Zarathustra’s serpent thinking overcomes and soars above the dwarf like an eagle 
to discover the idea of the solution to the riddle. 
 
Heidegger explains that Zarathustra's two animals belong together and that they are 
out to “seek someone of their own kind, one who matches their standards, someone 
who can hold out with them in loneliness” (Heidegger, 1984, p.214), from the thought 
of the greatest burden and the tragedy of The Gay Science. Zarathustra’s animals are 
searching to find if Zarathustra can think the greatest burden and the tragedy of The 
Gay Science. They “want to know whether he is becoming the one he is, whether in 
his Becoming he finds his Being” (Heidegger, 1984, p.214). The animals represent an 
aim of psychotherapy, which attempts to find an understanding of the unconscious, 
allowing the integration of the unconscious with the ego, progressively resulting in an 
enlarged/widened consciousness. The Becoming of the invasion of the unconscious 
allows Zarathustra an elevated perspective and widened consciousness to find his 
Being. 
 
During the convalescence of Zarathustra’s solitude, “he leaps from his bed and cries 
out like a madman, gesturing frantically, ‘as though someone were still lying in his bed 
and refused to get up’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.50). Zarathustra is angry and rages to 
wake up what is lying in his bed to ensure it will stay alerted in the future. Zarathustra 
is trying to wake his thinking to the “upper powers” (Jung, 1966, p.270) of The Gay 
Science which “although it lies with him, still remains a stranger to Zarathustra” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.50). Zarathustra has not yet thought the greatest burden or the 
tragedy of The Gay Science and therefore he has not overcome the thinking of the 
dwarf. Zarathustra is trying to wake up his thinking to The Gay Science through the 
ascent of the soul, which “unites himself with the ‘upper powers’” (Jung, 1966, p.270) 
in order to solve the riddle at the gateway. 
 
Heidegger adds that the thought of The Gay Science “lies beside him in bed, has not 
yet become one with him, is not yet incorporated in him and hence is not yet something 
truly thought” (Heidegger, 1984, p.50). The thought of The Gay Science shows itself 
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to Zarathustra and now he must confront and incorporate it into his thinking. 
Zarathustra calls the thought a "sluggish worm” in comparison to the “serpent who 
‘wrings’ his way to the heights, soaring there in vast circles, vigilant in friendship” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.50). When Zarathustra confronts the thought of The Gay Science 
his animals are fearful: “they do not flee in consternation, however, but come nearer” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.50). 
 
4.9 Purification 
 
 
Figure 8: Purification 
 
 
The caption to the eighth woodcut states, “Here falls the heavenly dew, to lave/The 
soiled black body in the grave” (Jung, 1966, p.271). For Jung, the falling dew from a 
cloud in this picture is a sign of a new birth occurring. The dew whitens the 
hermaphrodite corpse and signifies a sunrise, light or illumination that succeeds the 
preceding blackness. Once the soul has gone to heaven, the falling dew indicates that 
the ego is revitalizing from a newfound light. Jung says the dew in the picture is 
equivalent to divine water (aqua permanens), which symbolises enlightenment 
through the understanding of the meaning of the unconscious. Likewise, Wiener (2009, 
p.89) writes, “Woodcut 8 conveys some movement and a time of change. The falling 
dew on the couple is helping to wash away the darkness, suggesting possible new 
insights about unconscious aspects of patient, analyst, or their relationship”. The 
unification of opposites (conscious and unconscious) has produced light, out of the 
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darkness of the unconscious. Through this light from the unification of conscious and 
unconscious, the meaning of their combination becomes clear. 
 
Jung equates this to a psychological situation “when people imagine that they have 
reached the goal of the work once the unconscious contents have been made 
conscious and theoretically appreciated” (Jung, 1966, p.276). Although this stage 
represents part of the goal of psychotherapy by making the unconscious, conscious, 
the emotional and affective relationship to the unconscious has yet to be achieved; 
“life is bound to suffer” (Jung, 1966, p.277) if this is not fulfilled. Jung notes that the 
alchemists recognise that their work requires intellectual work but also love and 
emotion. The emotional and feeling relationship to the meaning of the unconscious 
must complete for the personality to reach a wholeness. Jung says psychotherapy is 
familiar with the difficulties for this stage of personality development. For example, he 
(Jung, 1966, p.277) reports that some patients only try to understand the unconscious 
intellectually “and want to skip the purely practical stage.” Jung says that many patients 
believe that investing in an emotional relationship with the meaning of the unconscious 
is strange, and consequently they do not achieve a complete realization of the whole 
of their personality. 
 
I now demonstrate the purification stage of the Rosarium Philosophorum in relation to 
Nietzsche’s Thus spoke Zarathustra. I establish this by showing that once Zarathustra 
confronts the thought of The Gay Science in the form of a “sluggish worm”; he passes 
through a purification in his loneliest loneliness. As Zarathustra confronts the thought 
of The Gay Science, he purifies his thinking with the meaning of the unification of 
conscious and unconscious. This allows Zarathustra to become what he is and 
confesses that he is “the advocate of life, the advocate of suffering, the advocate of 
the circle” (Heidegger, 1984). Zarathustra understands that to think The Gay Science 
is to be an advocate of living, suffering, and circling. This meaningful and purifying 
insight into the thought of The Gay Science occurs “when they are gathered in the light 
of day, that is, when they are thought in their unity by Zarathustra's supreme ‘Yes’” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.50). 
 
When Zarathustra affirms the greatest burden and tragedy of The Gay Science, he 
shouts, “‘Hail me!’ Yet his ‘Hail me!’ is at the same time a ‘Woe is me!’ - for his is the 
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victory that overcomes even itself as its greatest danger” (Heidegger, 1984, p.50). 
Although Zarathustra now thinks the thought of The Gay Science, he has not solved 
the riddle of the gateway. As a result, Zarathustra still has work to become who he is. 
He has not achieved the emotional and affective relationship to the unconscious that 
Jung describes. Therefore, Zarathustra continues to remain in his solitude “for seven 
days and seven nights. But his animals did not abandon him, neither by day nor by 
night” (Heidegger, 1984, p.51). During this time, Zarathustra’s eagle soars away to 
retrieve nourishment and further purification to bring back to Zarathustra. 
 
Zarathustra reveals his purification from new insights regarding the meaning of the 
unconscious as his eagle brings him "yellow and red berries" (Heidegger, 1984, p.51). 
For Heidegger the colours of these berries represent Zarathustra’s thinking. The red 
symbolises the “deepest falsehood, error, and semblance” and the yellow symbolises 
“supreme passion, of incandescent creation” (Heidegger, 1984, p.51). Through the 
light of purification, from the nourishment provided by Zarathustra’s animals, the 
unification of conscious and unconscious occurs and the meaning of their combination 
becomes clear. Heidegger claims that the colours of the berries “display the essential 
structure of will to power itself, inasmuch as truth as that which fixates and art as 
creation constitute the conditions of the possibility of will to power” (Heidegger, 1984, 
p.51). 
 
Zarathustra’s purification continues and after seven days "the animals felt that the time 
had come to talk with him" (Heidegger, 1984, p.51). Zarathustra has now incorporated 
the thought of The Gay Science and so his animals think he is ready to “express 
himself about his most difficult thought” (Heidegger, 1984, p.51). For Zarathustra to 
express himself about the thought of The Gay Science, he must return to solving the 
riddle at the gateway. As a result, his animals tell him that the world outside the cave 
is like a garden that wants him to visit. The animals tell Zarathustra this because they 
recognise his new understanding of the meaning of The Gay Science. As a result, 
Zarathustra’s animals suggest that the world awaiting him can purify him and that “it 
must therefore be a pleasure to proceed to this newly constituted world, since all things 
are bathed in the light of the new insight and want to be integrated into the new 
dispensation” (Heidegger, 1984, p.52). The animals believe that Zarathustra will be 
purified by venturing into the world with the thought of The Gay Science incorporated 
143  
into his thinking, as the world which validates his insight can “heal the one who up to 
now has been a seeker, they cure him of the disease of inquiry” (Heidegger, 1984, 
p.52). Heidegger says this is the meaning when Zarathustra’s animals say, "All things 
yearn for you .... All things want to be doctors to you!" (Heidegger, 1984, p.52). This 
reflects Jung advocating the necessity of the practical stage in 
psychotherapy/personality development. 
 
Although the garden of the world can heal and purify Zarathustra from his seeking to 
the answer of the riddle, Heidegger points out that ‘garden’ does not mean a “haven 
for the flight from being” (Heidegger, 1984, p.52). Heidegger acknowledges a note by 
Nietzsche that gives us an insight into the meaning of the garden for Nietzsche. This 
note elucidates the importance of solitude when interpreting the Rosarium: “Solitude 
for a time necessary, in order that the creature be totally permeated --cured and hard. 
New form of community, asserting itself in a warlike manner. Otherwise the spirit grows 
soft. No ‘gardens’ and no sheer ‘evasion in the face of the masses.’ War (but without 
gunpowder!) between different thoughts! and their armies!” (Heidegger, 1984, p.52). 
 
For Zarathustra to solve the riddle, he must overcome and surpass the dwarf who, as 
we have seen, was incapable of this task. However, both the dwarf and Zarathustra 
answer the question of the riddle at the gateway in the same way by saying that the 
avenues do not contradict each other because time is a circle. Although the meaning 
of the unification of the conscious and unconscious has become clear to Zarathustra, 
he must still overcome "the smallest gap" (Heidegger, 1984, p.53) between himself 
and the dwarf to solve the riddle. This gap between the dwarf and Zarathustra lays in 
the different emotional and affective relationship to the vision of the shepherd who “has 
to bite off the head of the black snake” (Heidegger, 1984, p.55). 
 
The dwarf vanishes or acts as a spectator when this threatening image arises, while 
Zarathustra does not flee or watch the snake that chokes the shepherd. This 
demonstrates the critical difference between the dwarf and Zarathustra. This is what 
the dwarf fails to understand when confronted with the riddle at the gateway. The dwarf 
does not understand that a practical and emotional feeling relationship to the meaning 
of the unconscious must be complete in order to solve the riddle. The personality of 
the last man does not reach a wholeness because he makes the interpretation of the 
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riddle too easy for himself by not understanding what Zarathustra means when he 
says the two avenues "affront one another", when the black snake is confronted in the 
gateway. Since the dwarf vanishes or merely observes the black snake in the 
shepherd’s mouth, he thinks the two paths at the ‘Moment’, the future and past, do not 
collide but calmly follow one another. As a result, the practical stage of solving the 
riddle through unifying consciousness with the unconscious only occurs when an 
emotional and affective relationship is established. The dwarf misses this stage of 
solving the riddle of unifying conscious/unconscious as the two avenues collide with 
each other by failing to apply practically the intellectual insight with an emotional 
relationship to the riddle. 
 
As a result, it becomes clear that solving the riddle in the ‘Moment’ can only occur if 
one does not flee the threatening image of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth during 
the practical stage of the unification of the unconscious with consciousness. To solve 
the riddle in this way is to experience a collision between past and future in the 
gateway, as what was unconscious in the past becomes conscious. The collision 
between past and future at the gateway only occurs to those who think the burden and 
tragedy of The Gay Science. This occurs to “one who does not remain a spectator but 
who is himself the Moment, performing actions directed toward the future and at the 
same time accepting and affirming the past, by no means letting it drop” (Heidegger, 
1984, p.56). To solve the riddle is to overcome the dwarf in response to the image of 
the snake in the shepherd’s mouth and to let “what runs counter to itself come to 
collision” (Heidegger, 1984, p.57) in order to fulfil an emotional and affective 
relationship to the unconscious. Consequently, Zarathustra knows that to solve the 
riddle means to stand in the gateway of the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science, 
in contrast to the dwarf who “keeps to the outside, perches on the periphery” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.57). As a result, it is now clear that the ‘Moment’ is the collision of 
future and past where overcoming the thinking of the dwarf solves the riddle of the 
unification of the unconscious and conscious. 
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4.10 The Return of the Soul 
 
 
Figure 9: The Return of the Soul 
 
 
In the ninth woodcut, the soul returns from heaven and is diving into the dead King 
and Queen to bring them back to life. Wiener (2009, p.90) writes that this is “a stage 
full of promise, where opposites seem about to come together, producing further 
insights and withdrawal of projections”. The two birds at the bottom left of the picture 
represent the hermaphrodite forming wings because of the alchemical procedure that 
has taken place. Jung suggests that the appearance of the difference in the winged 
and wingless birds means that although the hermaphrodite appears to be united and 
coming to life, the encounter of opposites has not been completely resolved. 
 
As a result, this woodcut involves resolving the after-effects (contamination) of the 
integration of the unconscious with the conscious. Therefore, this picture suggests that 
before the opposites can complete their wholeness, “the rational man, in order to live 
in this world, has to make a distinction between ‘himself’ and what we might call the 
‘eternal man’” (Jung, 1966, p.291). This requires the ego to purify all the superfluous 
elements of the unconscious. Jung explains that this is achievable through the 
practical application of the insights from psychotherapy into the outside world, which 
also provides additional meaning to the appearance of two people (King and Queen) 
in the Rosarium Philosophorum. 
146  
Jung says purifying the ego occurs from the interaction with the unconscious and that 
this is achievable through human relationships in day-to-day life. He says the practical 
application of the intellectual discoveries in psychotherapy provide further "insight into 
one's mistakes" which “are not really seen at all, only the idea of them” (Jung, 1966, 
p.292) in psychotherapy. Highlighting one’s mistakes can occur by applying the 
insights from psychotherapy to everyday relationships, as these mistakes are “noticed 
by the other person as well as by oneself. Then and then only can they really be felt 
and their true nature recognized” (Jung, 1966, p.292). Therefore, as the practical 
application of the findings in psychotherapy is lived in everyday experience, the ego 
moves toward a complete wholeness by extracting the superfluous elements of the 
unconscious through the removal of projections making the anima/animus 
progressively more conscious. 
 
I now demonstrate the return of the soul in the Rosarium Philosophorum in Nietzsche’s 
Thus spoke Zarathustra. Now that Zarathustra understands the answer to the riddle, 
his animals "do not let him talk anymore" (Heidegger, 1984, p.57). Zarathustra now 
understands and accepts the greatest burden and the tragedy of The Gay Science “by 
achieving the insight that such adversity is necessary” (Heidegger, 1984, p.58) and is, 
therefore, ready to leave his cave (which Jung also recommends). When Zarathustra 
hears these words of his animals "he lay still" and “communed with his soul” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.60). Zarathustra is silent inasmuch as he is communing with his 
soul alone, because he has found what defines him; he has become the one who he 
is. He has also overcome outrage and repugnance by learning that the necessity of 
the abyss and burden of the tragedy belongs to the heights. In the silence of 
Zarathustra's solitude, he has found his loneliest loneliness and his animals "cautiously 
steal away" (Heidegger, 1984, p.60) which means the eagle's pride and serpent's 
discernment are now incorporated as qualities of Zarathustra’s being. As Zarathustra 
finds himself, represented in his communion with his soul, his animals vanish as the 
dwarf did at the gateway. His animals disappear, as he is now conscious of the qualities 
that these animals possess in his own personality because they have been integrated 
and withdrawn from projection. 
 
Consequently, Zarathustra has become a hero as he withdraws his projections; he is 
one who goes out to meet his supreme suffering and supreme hope at the same time. 
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Now that Zarathustra has understood "the greatest burden" and the "Incipit tragfreudia” 
of The Gay Science, he is ready to leave his cave and stand firm in the ‘Moment’ as 
he applies his new understanding to the riddle at the gateway. Zarathustra knows he 
needs to leave his cave to solve the riddle, which provides further "insight into one's 
mistakes" as “Then and then only can they really be felt and their true nature 
recognized” (Jung, 1966, p.292). With this insight Zarathustra understands “that ‘life 
itself,’ being as a whole, conditions ‘pain,’ ‘destruction,’ and all agony; and that none 
of these things constitutes an ‘objection to this life’”. Zarathustra has overcome the 
usual view of tragedy, which sees tragedy as “decline, cessation and despair” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.61). Zarathustra opposes evading tragedy and understands that 
solving riddles in life can only take place by leaving his cave and affirming the burden 
and tragedy of The Gay Science, which allows the unconscious to unify with 
consciousness in the ‘Moment’ at the gateway. 
 
4.11 The New Birth 
 
 
Figure 10: The New Birth 
 
 
Jung uses the title of the “New Birth” for his final psychological interpretation of the 
woodcuts from the Rosarium Philosophorum. This picture shows an apotheosis of the 
Rebis (a divine hermaphrodite) where the right side of the body is male and the left is 
female. The Rebis is standing for the first time since the third woodcut. The Rebis has 
wings, which Jung ascribes to the spirituality of this being, and the Rebis is standing 
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on the moon, which could signify conquering the darkness of the unconscious. The 
Rebis is holding in one hand, a cup containing three snakeheads and the Rebis grasps 
one snake with the other hand. 
 
Jung suggests that the raven in the picture to the left of the Rebis symbolises the devil 
and the Rebis with wings suggest that the unification of opposites is complete, as the 
wingless bird has disappeared. A tree with 13 heads on its branches appears to the 
right of the Rebis and Jung claims this signifies the development of consciousness 
unifying with the unconscious over time. He says it is appropriate to understand 
personality development with this monstrous and horrific image because it highlights 
“the outcome of certain psychological facts fundamental to alchemy” (Jung, 1966, 
p.313). The symbol of the Rebis is the goal of alchemy, which represents an 
expression of a wholeness that “resolves all opposition and puts an end to conflict” 
(Jung, 1966, p.317), which Jung also found when his analysands drew patterns of 
circles during personality development. 
 
I now complete my interpretation of the set of woodcuts by demonstrating the 
relevance of Zarathustra solving the riddle of the gateway by confronting the snake 
biting the shepherd in the sixth woodcut. In the subsequent woodcuts, I explained that 
Zarathustra comes to understand that solving the riddle at the gateway can only occur 
by remaining with the threatening image of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth and by 
practically applying an emotional relationship to intellectual insights about the riddle. 
Solving the riddle of the unification of consciousness with the unconscious only occurs 
to those who think the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science. This occurs to “one 
who does not remain a spectator but who is himself the Moment, performing actions 
directed toward the future and at the same time accepting and affirming the past, by 
no means letting it drop” (Heidegger, 1984, p.56). To solve the riddle of unification is 
to overcome the dwarf in response to the image of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth 
and to let “what runs counter to itself come to collision” (Heidegger, 1984). Therefore, 
Zarathustra knows that to solve the riddle means to stand in the gateway of the burden 
and tragedy of The Gay Science, in contrast to the dwarf who “keeps to the outside, 
perches on the periphery” (Heidegger, 1984, p.56). The ‘Moment’ is the collision of 
future and past to solve the riddle as unconscious and consciousness form harmony, 
thus eliminating the burden and tragedy of the riddle. 
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Earlier I explained that Zarathustra presents two questions to the dwarf regarding the 
riddle of the gateway. The dwarf is not able to answer the question accurately because 
the dwarf fears the burden and tragedy when thinking The Gay Science. Even 
Zarathustra fears this thought but is determined to affirm its necessity to solve the 
riddle of the gateway. As Zarathustra advances toward solving the riddle, his thoughts 
flash back to the shepherd with a snake biting his mouth. Zarathustra’s thoughts see 
a “human being lying prostrate on the ground-not erect and standing. ‘I saw a young 
shepherd, writhing, choking in spasms, his face distorted; a thick black snake hung 
out of his mouth’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.179). 
 
Heidegger explains that these images thought by Zarathustra are a counter image of 
the serpent as his friend, as this image symbolises that nihilism has bitten the 
shepherd in his sleep and will not let go. The shepherd was not vigilant because he 
did not understand The Gay Science, which allowed the snake to bite. Zarathustra 
attempts to help the shepherd by trying to pull it out but does not succeed. Heidegger 
says this means “that nihilism cannot be overcome from the outside”. It is important to 
recognise that nihilism in the story of Zarathustra is equivalent to Jung’s understanding 
of the unconscious, which is without meaning until the unification of opposites is 
complete. As a result, the meaninglessness of the unconscious prior to the unification 
of opposites “cannot be overcome from the outside” (Heidegger, 1984, p.179) and 
requires The Gay Science to be affirmed at the gateway. 
 
Zarathustra realises that overcoming the meaninglessness of the unconscious by 
pulling the snake does not work and therefore shouts at the shepherd "Bite! You must 
bite!" (Heidegger, 1984, p.179). Consequently, Heidegger says the meaning of this is 
that only those threatened by the snake of nihilism can remove it, which emphasizes 
the need for the analysand’s independence in the practical application of the insights 
from psychotherapy56. Heidegger says only those threatened by the snake can remove 
its danger by biting “off the head of the black snake” (Heidegger, 1984, p.179). In other 
words, the nihilism of the unconscious can only be overcome “if we grapple with the 
very head of it; only if the ideals which it posits and from which it derives fall prey to 
‘criticism’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). Heidegger summarises by saying overcoming 
nihilism (through the unification of the unconscious with consciousness) only occurs 
                                               
56 Cf ‘mineness’ (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.243) 
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when “each of us - must bite into the matter for himself or herself; for if we leave it to 
another to tug at the darkling need that is our own, all will be futile” (Heidegger, 1984, 
p.180). Subsequently, Heidegger explains the shepherd did as Zarathustra’s cry urged 
him to, he “bit with a good bite! He spewed out the snake's head, spat it far away, and 
leapt to his feet. No longer a shepherd, no longer human, but as one transformed, 
illuminated-- one who laughed!” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). 
 
As a result, at the end of the series of explanations throughout this chapter, and with 
this image of the standing, laughing and illuminated shepherd, the meaning of The 
Gay Science can be comprehensively understood. With this image of the shepherd, 
the Rosarium Philosophorum, individuation and Jungian psychoanalysis, as well as 
The Gay Science, are understandable as the “bite that is to overcome nihilism” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.180)57. Therefore, the unification of consciousness with the 
unconscious through The Gay Science is only truly complete when “the black snake 
has penetrated the gorge and its head has been bitten off” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). 
The solution to the riddle of the unification of the unconscious with consciousness to 
achieve individuation at the gateway occurs through The Gay Science as that bite to 
overcome nihilism. 
 
In conclusion, the answer to the riddle in the gateway of the ‘Moment’, which brings 
individuation through the unification of the unconscious with consciousness, is 
unthinkable before the bite has occurred. Heidegger says, “the gateway of the moment 
is that decision in which prior history, the history of nihilism, is brought to confrontation 
and forthwith overcome” (Heidegger, 1984, p.182). Therefore, The Gay Science is a 
conquering thought, where an individual’s prior history of the nihilism of the 
unconscious confronts consciousness and overcomes it through its meaningful 
unification. By overcoming the nihilism of the unconscious, the symbol of the Rebis is 
achieved which represents an expression of a wholeness that “resolves all opposition 
and puts an end to conflict” (Jung, 1966, p.317). When this meaningful unification 
occurs, the life of the person who thinks The Gay Science, “slips into the ring of 
existence, indeed in such a way as to help achieve the ring, help decide it” (Heidegger, 
1984, p. 183). 
                                               
57 Holzhey-Kunz (2014, p.268) work can extend the meaning of this when she refers to recognising “a 
painful disillusionment”  
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Chapter 5: Retrieving and Projecting Jung’s Transcendent Function with 
Complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to retrieve the work presented in chapters 2, 3 and 4 on 
the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum to project a 
new meaning of the phenomenology and ontology of Jung’s transcendent function. I 
explain each theme presented in chapters 3 and 4 in connection to the ontology of the 
transcendent function presented in chapter 2. I can hermeneutically retrieve (return to 
with new insights) the transcendent function because the chapters on complexes and 
the Rosarium Philosophorum have unconcealed new possibilities that were not 
available in chapter 2. By retrieving the transcendent function in this way, I explain 
more detail of the phenomenological and ontological meaning of the transcendent 
function, which includes the chapters in this thesis on complexes and the Rosarium 
Philosophorum. After finishing this chapter, the reader should have gained more 
detailed and specific descriptions of Jung’s transcendent function because I highlight 
further aspects of its phenomenology and ontology. This allows me to explain the 
transcendent function with Nietzsche’s Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same in chapter 6. 
 
5.1 Retrieving and Projecting the Transcendent Function 
 
Now that I have provided a phenomenological and ontological explanation of 
complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum, I can retrieve and project a deeper 
explanation and description of the transcendent function that I presented in chapter 2. 
In the second chapter, I said that it is important that prior to working through the three 
stages of the Heideggerian interpretation of the transcendent function that a 
psychotherapist has helped the analysand to understand and accept why authentic 
anticipatory resoluteness is important to assist in surpassing psychopathology. I now 
explain and make this understood further by reading the chapters on complexes and 
the Rosarium Philosophorum along with this argument. 
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Following the arguments that I developed in the third chapter on complexes, 
psychopathology is explainable with ontology and phenomenology in more detail. The 
complexes of psychopathology are understandable as being phenomenologically 
disclosed when Dasein’s world is conspicuously experienced as unready-to-hand and 
“not-being-at-home”. In the experience of a complex, angst, conscience and guilt are 
salient to Dasein in a moment of conspicuous obstructiveness and obstinacy, which 
results in the ready-to-hand losing its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. I explained 
the ontological meaning of the experience of a complex as angst at not being at home 
in the world in the face of an obstructive and insignificant world. 
 
When Dasein experiences a complex, its authentic meaning is explicable as Dasein is 
the basis for not discovering an entity for assignment or reference in Dasein’s world. 
This entity is undiscovered and missing from Dasein’s world and thus the world falls 
into unreadiness-to-hand, resulting in the experience of a complex. In addition, the 
experience of a complex includes the experience of conscience calling Dasein forth to 
discover the entity, which is missing from the ready-to-hand. The call of conscience 
discloses Dasein as being the basis or being guilty for the obstructiveness of ‘not being 
at home in the world’, and the obstructiveness of the region of the world discloses to 
Dasein that for which Dasein is guilty. 
 
When Dasein has authentically understood the experience of a complex and has been 
resolute to unconceal a truth of Being, Dasein lets the meaning of possibilities be free 
for involvement in the ready-to-hand, which can remove the obstructiveness of a 
complex from being-in-the-world. Achieving this occurs as the temporality of 
resoluteness has, with relation to its present, the character of a ‘moment of vision’. In 
this moment of vision, a meaning of Dasein’s for the sake of which can be discovered. 
The ‘moment of vision’ allows Dasein to discover missing possibilities from the ready- 
to-hand and the meaning of a complex, which can remove its obstructiveness from 
being-in-the-world as Dasein projects itself into the future. 
 
As a result, prior to discovering the possibilities missing from Dasein’s ready-to-hand 
and the meaning of the obstructiveness of a complex, the analysand will need to be 
committed to anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness is an “authentic 
disclosedness attested in Da-sein itself by its conscience - the reticent projecting 
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oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty which is ready for Angst” and to “project upon 
itself this being guilty that Da-sein is as long as it is” (Heidegger, 1996, p.273). In other 
words, anticipatory resoluteness requires the “stance adopted, and the will directed, 
toward essential knowing” (Heidegger, 1984, p.20) of the Gay Science which is 
highlighted in the first woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum. The Mercurial 
Fountain of the first woodcut represents “the chaos” of Dasein’s guilty mood and a 
complex from having-been. The square which is displayed in this woodcut shows the 
stars “separate and hostile to one another and must therefore be united in the circle” 
(Jung, 1966, p.204) through the three stages of the transcendent function. The 
importance of anticipatory resoluteness for the transcendent function gives Dasein the 
possibility to discover the missing possibilities from the ready-to-hand and the meaning 
of a complex. This removes its obstructiveness from being-in-the-world through the 
passion of mastery over even the most terrifying elements to achieve a cheerfulness 
from the harmony of unifying the ego with the unconscious complex (The Gay 
Science). 
 
5.2 Stage 1: Evoking the Unconscious 
 
In the second chapter, I argued that the first stage of a Heideggerian explanation of 
the transcendent function involves acquiring the meaning of the unconscious, which is 
troubling the analysand. For Jung, “First and foremost, we need the unconscious 
material” (Jung, 1971, p.283). There is a representation of the unknown meaning of 
the unconscious in the first woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum where there are 
four stars in the picture, which also symbolize the chaos of separate elements at the 
start of the alchemical process. This can also be explained phenomenologically as 
retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood from a complex from having-been. Dasein has 
a guilty attunement because Dasein has fallen prey and obstructed its openness and 
freedom to listen to the call of conscience. 
 
Jung suggests a technique called active imagination for conjuring the unconscious, 
where the symptom (guilty mood) provides a start to the transcendent function, “The 
patient would like to know what it is all for and how to gain relief. In the intensity of the 
emotional disturbance itself lies the value, the energy which he should have at his 
disposal in order to remedy the state of reduced adaptation” (Jung, 1971, p.289). 
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Acquiring the meaning of the unconscious guilty mood has become clearer, now, in 
the light of my third chapter on complexes. The meaning of the unconscious guilty 
mood can be acquired when Dasein projects an understanding into having-been to 
discover regions of being-in-the-world which are conspicuously experienced as 
obstructive, unready-to-hand and “not-being-at-home”. 
 
In the experience of a complex, angst, conscience and guilt are salient in a moment of 
conspicuous obstructiveness and obstinacy, which results in the ready-to-hand losing 
its readiness-to-hand in a certain way. Importantly, the positive nature of the 
experience of a complex can bring Dasein face to face with concealed authentic 
possibilities of existence, which have the potential to appropriate the unready-to-hand 
and the obstructive world in an act of individuation with the transcendent function. The 
representation of the meaning of the unconscious complex and the missing 
possibilities from the ready-to-hand is also evident in the first woodcut of the Rosarium 
Philosophorum as the fluid substance in the mercurial fountain. This supports Wiener’s 
(2009) interpretation, which claims that the first woodcut is “a symbolic representation 
of the theory and practice of analysis and, metaphorically, the beginning of an analysis” 
(Wiener, 2009, p.82). 
 
Additionally, for Miller, “The goal is not to eliminate the symptom but rather to dive into 
the energy locked inside of it. The core of active imagination is finding a way into the 
symptom or emotional state. Only then can the symptom be seen constructively, as 
being involved in pulling one in a purposeful way” (Miller, 2004, p.23). Jung instructs 
“He must make himself as conscious as possible of the mood he is in, sinking himself 
in it without reserve and noting down on paper all the fantasies and other associations 
that come up” (Jung, 1971, p.289). In chapter 2, I translated this into phenomenological 
language by explaining that Dasein’s attunement to the world through a mood 
discloses how Dasein is or how Dasein is coming along in its being- in-the world. 
However, Dasein’s disclosure through attunement “does not, as such, mean to be 
known” (Heidegger, 1996, p.127) and therefore disclosedness equates to evoking the 
unconscious. Heidegger says that when Dasein is as it is in its being there, attunement 
discloses its thrown (individuated) being into the world: “Thrownness means Dasein is 
in a world in a definite way and this comes from its past and being with a factical world 
with finite possibilities available” (Heidegger, 1996, p.203). 
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Consequently, the aim of the transcendent function is to retrieve the possible meaning 
of the mood from Dasein’s having-been. It is important to retrieve the meaning of this 
mood as it allows Dasein to discover the guilt Dasein experiences for falling prey to a 
complex, which closes off Dasein to possibilities for being-in-the-world, and to listen to 
the call of conscience. 
 
My chapter 3 on complexes also reflects this. In that chapter, I have argued that for 
Dasein to discover the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and the 
authentic meaning of a complex requires resoluteness for Dasein to assimilate an 
understanding of a complex into being-in-the-world. Resoluteness involves 
authentically understanding the call of conscience that discloses Dasein in the angst 
and guilt of its individuated being-in-the-world, thus providing the direction for Dasein 
to develop an authentic care for being-in-the-world. As a result of this authentic 
understanding of being-in-the-world, the unconcealment of a primordial truth can be 
appropriated by resolutely encountering, discovering and retrieving missing 
possibilities from the readiness-to-hand and the meaning of a complex58. This removes 
the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world, providing Dasein with the 
understanding to care authentically for being-in-the-world. 
 
To dive into Dasein’s guilty mood or the energy of the symptom also means to dive 
into “the greatest burden” of the Gay Science that I have discussed in chapter 4. 
Heidegger writes, “A burden exerts a downward pull, compelling us constantly to hold 
ourselves erect; but it also embodies the danger that we will fall down, and stay down. 
In this way, the burden is an obstacle that demands constant "hurdling," constant 
surmounting” (Heidegger, 1984, p.22). As a result, in chapter 4, I explained the 
‘coniunctio’, which is represented as a King and Queen, as a burden whose downward 
pull is signified by the dove with the flower descending from above. Jung says the 
coniunctio represents the union of opposites and this coincides with Heidegger’s 
definition of a burden, as standing up and falling down oppose each other. Burdens 
allow humans to descry what they are in their ascendancy over burdens, and 
Nietzsche says the experience of the necessity of the "greatest burden,” has, “allowed 
us to live” (Heidegger, 1984, p.23). 
                                               
58 This is supported by Binswanger when he says we “must conceive both mental disease and neurosis 
as a disturbance of koinonia, of the functional unity of Dasein’s ontolgocal potentialities” (1963, p.217). 
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This also explains stage 1 of the transcendent function, which provides the analysand 
the opportunity to withdraw projections (their burden) by discovering the meaning of a 
guilty mood, to remove the obstructiveness of a complex and integrate their 
personality/consciousness to a higher level. The greatest burden is the most difficult 
thought because it is a “closely guarded secret” and is the dark “(sinister) side” (Jung, 
1966, p.211) of the personality. It involves the ominous and difficult task of confronting 
the meaning of a guilty mood from having-been (the unconscious) to retrieve missing 
possibilities from the readiness-to-hand in order to remove the obstructiveness of a 
complex from being-in-the-world. 
 
The coniunctio of the ego diving into the energy of the guilty mood of a complex from 
having-been (King and Queen) is “the greatest burden” of the Gay Science. The King 
and Queen who are clothed in the second woodcut also represent that the meaning of 
the unconscious complex, which is experienced as a guilty mood from having-been, is 
yet to be revealed. Furthermore, the left hand contact represents the emotional 
investment and that “love plays the decisive part” for this task to discover the meaning 
of the guilty mood from a complex from having-been. The masculine and feminine 
characters in the second woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum also suggest the 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and that the meaning of the 
unconscious complex involve discovering a masculine understanding for a female and 
feminine understanding for a male. 
 
When Jung tells us that the person must make their mood as conscious as possible, 
this means that Dasein is required to retrieve and to develop an interpretation of the 
meaning of their thrown being-in-the-world. Additionally, Dasein must retrieve the 
guilty mood from having-been from the ‘greatest burden’ of a complex which has been 
created from closing off to possibilities. This means that the burden of a complex which 
is disclosed through a guilty mood should be understood in relation to how Dasein’s 
concern for being-in-the-world projects ways of taking care for the world and the ways 
Dasein conceals what has been relinquished to ‘the they’ to care for. When Dasein 
falls prey to the burden of a complex, Dasein encounters angst, guilt and the call of 
conscience, which can lead “Da-sein to individuate its ownmost being-in-the-world”; 
“Attunement as understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.176). 
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Importantly, with this experience of angst, guilt and the call of conscience from the 
‘coniunctio’ of the ego encountering the obstructiveness of a complex, Dasein can 
retrieve the missing (unconscious) possibilities of the readiness-to-hand that were 
concealed by not understanding the meaning of a complex and falling prey to ‘the 
they’. Consequently, the transcendent function requires anticipatory resoluteness and 
a love for the ‘greatest burden’. This involves a readiness for angst when a complex is 
experienced, so that Dasein’s falling prey from ‘having-been’ and the meaning of the 
disclosive guilty mood can be retrieved and brought into a conscious synthesis. 
 
Anticipatory resoluteness, in the transcendent function, allows Dasein to project 
possibilities and retrieve the meaning of the guilty (burdensome) mood from falling 
prey to a complex, with the psychotherapist’s help. When Dasein has been 
individuated by its awareness of a complex from having-been through the experience 
of guilt, angst and the call of conscience, Dasein can project and retrieve possibilities 
of the meaning of the guilty mood because its thrownness has not been forgotten. This 
assists Dasein to remove “life-denying patterns and conflicts” (Brenner, 1988, p.150) 
of complexes from being-in-the-world. 
 
The first stage of the transcendent function can also be understood ontologically when 
Nietzsche says “Art is ‘the metaphysical activity’ of ‘life’; it defines the way in which 
beings as a whole are” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). The fourth chapter of my thesis 
highlights the fact that Heidegger says the highest art is tragic and that tragedy is the 
core of Being. In addition, Heidegger claims that tragedy involves terror, but adhering 
to The Gay Science does result in fear or avoidance of terror. What this means for the 
transcendent function is that, instead of fearing or avoiding the terror and tragedy of 
the experience of a guilty mood and the obstructiveness of a complex, to think the 
“greatest burden” is to affirm and say “yes” to the terrifying guilty mood “in its 
unalterable affiliation with the beautiful” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). 
 
Therefore, it becomes clear that to achieve the beauty of the art of uncovering and 
retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood from a complex from having been, one must 
affiliate with the tragedy of the greatest burden. Consequently, the removal of the 
conventional clothes by the King and Queen in the naked truth woodcut, which Jung 
says can be psychologically interpreted as representing a confrontation with reality, 
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“with no false veils or adornments of any kind” (Jung, 1966, p.238), can also be 
understood as the acknowledgment that: “Greatness and great heights subsist 
together with the depths and with what is terrifying; the more originally the one is willed, 
the more surely the other will be attained and ‘Frightfulness is proper to greatness: let 
us not be deceived’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). 
 
As a result, the tragedy of the transcendent function begins when the ego affirms the 
tragedy to dive into discovering the meaning of a guilty mood from falling prey to a 
complex from having-been as the shadow is revealed and, Nietzsche would call this 
"heroic." Nietzsche defines a hero as “Going out to meet one's supreme suffering and 
supreme hope alike" (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). To be a hero is to become “master over 
his misfortune and good fortune as well”. He writes: “The heroic spirits are those who 
in the midst of tragic horror say to themselves, ‘Yes’: they are hard enough to feel 
suffering as pleasure” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). As a result, the ‘coniunctio’ and the 
naked truth in the Rosarium Philosophorum marks the art, resoluteness and love of 
the hero going out to meet and discover the meaning of a guilty mood from having- 
been. The hero of the transcendent function confronts the shadow of their burdensome 
complex in the hope of retrieving and discovering its unconscious meaning in order to 
unify it with the ego. The resoluteness and affirmation of the burden and tragedy to 
uncover and retrieve the meaning of an unconscious complex and a guilty mood from 
having-been, “is the beginning of the transcendent function, i.e., of the collaboration of 
conscious and unconscious data” (Miller, 2004, p.24). 
 
I now elucidate the first stage of the transcendent function through Nietzsche’s poetic 
character, Zarathustra. Heidegger claims Nietzsche created Zarathustra to 
demonstrate a person who affirms the greatest burden and the tragedy of the Gay 
Science. Zarathustra is important for the transcendent function because he highlights 
transcendence through the unification of opposites by being “transformed-into the 
overman” (Heidegger, 1984, p.32). The overman is an "above and beyond" 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.33) humanity hitherto who shows that prior humanity has only 
been preliminary. Zarathustra demonstrates a person diving into the guilty mood from 
having-been of a burdensome and tragic complex to discover and retrieve the 
meaning. Nietzsche says the name of the human overcome by the overman is the "last 
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man" and for Heidegger this last man is the human of mediocre joy in contrast to the 
overman who understands The Gay Science. 
 
The transcendent function allows overcoming of the last man by resolutely removing 
the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world. The last man does not dive 
into discovering the meaning of a guilty mood of a complex from having-been and 
instead projects his shadow and therefore does not affirm The Gay Science or the 
transcendent function. Consequently, “In the sphere of the last man each thing gets a 
little bit smaller every day” (Heidegger, 1984, p.33)59. Nietzsche’s overman recognizes 
and affirms the burden and tragedy of the guilty mood from having-been of the last 
man and overcomes him by retrieving the meaning and removing the complex through 
the transcendent function. 
 
The fourth woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum, the immersion in the bath, 
provides another angle to understand the overman and the last man in relation to the 
transcendent function. This woodcut can be understood to represent confronting and 
immersing oneself with the “mysterious psychic substance which nowadays we would 
call the unconscious psyche” (Jung, 1966, p.240) of the guilty mood from having-been 
of the last man in the first stage of the transcendent function. This woodcut signifies a 
return to the dark infantile state immersed in the amniotic fluid in the mother’s womb 
where there is an immersion with the last man, as Dasein retrieves and discovers the 
meaning of a guilty mood of a complex from having been. 
 
Once the task of resolutely affirming the burden and tragedy involved in unconcealing 
and retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood of an unconscious complex from having- 
been is established, the meaning of a guilty mood from falling prey from having-been 
can be discovered and retrieved through Jung’s aesthetic and understanding 
formulations. Jung discusses how one deals with the unconscious and he identifies 
“two main tendencies” that emerge: the “way of creative formulation” and the “way of 
understanding”. Jung says, “we could say that aesthetic formulation needs 
understanding of the meaning, and understanding needs aesthetic formulation. The 
two supplement each other to form the transcendent function” (Jung, 1971, p.293). 
This active formulation allows Dasein to authentically retrieve and creatively interpret 
                                               
59 Cf. Lola from Binswanger (1963, p.286, p.288). 
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possibilities for the meaning of its guilty mood from having-been. This active 
formulation allows Dasein to retrieve the regions or situations where the 
obstructiveness and unreadiness-to-hand of complexes from having-been are 
encountered from being-in-the-world. This can lead Dasein to unconceal and retrieve 
how Dasein has closed itself to possibilities and the call of conscience by falling prey 
to understanding its world inauthentically through ‘the they’. When the obstructiveness 
and unreadiness-to-hand of complexes from having-been are discovered, the way of 
creativity and understanding provide Dasein new possibilities for uncovering the 
meaning of a guilty mood of a complex from having-been. 
 
When possibilities are undiscovered and missing from Dasein’s readiness-to-hand, 
Dasein experiences the world as the obstructiveness of a complex. However, through 
the transcendent function, Dasein can develop an interpretation and retrieve an 
understanding of the meaning of the guilty mood from falling prey to a complex from 
having-been, by projecting possibilities concerning the meaning for the guilty mood. 
The development of interpretation occurs through the forward and backward 
movement of the hermeneutic circle. This hermeneutic interpretation of the mood- 
affects involves the development of possibilities for the meaning of the mood projected 
in understanding. In the projecting of understanding, beings can be disclosed and 
retrieved in ‘how’ they have affected Dasein’s guilty mood. This meaning of a guilty 
mood can be discovered in the logos through a projection and retrieval of possibilities 
which allows an understanding of innerworldly beings projected toward a totality of 
significance of referential relations to be understood. With this interpretation of the 
meaning of Dasein‘s guilty mood “innerworldly beings are discovered, that is, have 
been assimilated to consciousness, we say that they have meaning” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.142). 
 
I now conclude the explanation of the first stage of the transcendent function by 
describing the active formulation through my findings in chapter 4. The active 
formulation is represented in the fifth woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum (the 
conjuction) as the liquid substance in the basin closes “over the king and queen, and 
they have gone back to the chaotic beginnings, the massa confusa” (Jung, 1966, 
p.246). The woodcut shows that the uniting symbol of the dove as the Holy Ghost has 
disappeared as “the meaning of the symbol is fulfilled: the partners have themselves 
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become symbolic” (Jung, 1966, p.251) of the unification of opposites. Likewise, the 
active formulation of the transcendent function cannot occur until a unification takes 
place where the ego of the hero affirms resoluteness to go out to meet the guilty mood 
from having-been of the shadow of their burdensome and tragic complex. The hero is 
resolute in the hope of discovering and retrieving its unconscious meaning to integrate 
it with the ego. The active formulation of the transcendent function is only the start of 
unifying the complex with the ego. This is also shown in the conjunction woodcut which 
is represented as the initial state of chaos, the massa confusa which takes place when 
Dasein attempts to discover and retrieve the unconscious meaning of a guilty mood of 
a complex from having-been. 
 
The importance of the development of the meaning of the guilty mood from a complex 
from having-been is evident for the transcendent function and individuation. This is 
clear when Jung says the active formulation is a “Constructive treatment of the 
unconscious, that is, the question of meaning and purpose, paves the way for the 
patient’s insight into that process which I call the transcendent function” (Jung, 1971, 
p.280). As a result, it has now become clear that the aim of the transcendent function, 
which I have interpreted with Heidegger’s writing, is to unconceal the meaning of 
Dasein’s guilty mood from the obstructiveness of a complex. This is achievable 
through the development of an interpretation of possibilities when innerworldly beings 
are projected toward and retrieved from a totality of significance in referential relations 
as being-in-the-world. When Dasein has discovered the meaning of a guilty mood of 
a complex from having-been in stage 1 of the transcendent function, Dasein can 
remove the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world when Dasein has 
retrieved the missing possibilities from the readiness-to-hand as Dasein projects itself 
into the future in stages 2 and 3. When a guilty mood from having-been and the 
obstructiveness of a complex have been removed from being-in-the-world, Dasein has 
transcended the incomprehensibility and un-meaningful absurdities from falling prey 
by listening to ‘the they’. 
 
5.3 Stage 2: Bringing the Ego together with the Unconscious 
 
Jung explains the next step of the transcendent function by saying “Once the 
unconscious content has been given form and the meaning of the formulation is 
understood, the question arises as to how the ego will relate to this position, and how 
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the ego and the unconscious are to come to terms. This is the second and more 
important stage of the procedure, the bringing together of opposites for the production 
of a third: the transcendent function” (Jung, 1971, p.295). When the meaning of a guilty 
mood from having-been is retrieved and discovered from stage 1, Dasein can bring 
the ego together with the guilty mood of the (unconscious) complex. When Dasein 
discovers and retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood from falling prey, Dasein is called 
forth to individuate “to its ownmost being-in-the-world, which as understanding, 
projects itself essentially upon possibilities” (Heidegger, 1996, p.176). Dasein can 
project itself upon these new possibilities to bring the ego together with the guilty mood 
of a complex from having-been and this part of the transcendent function reflects the 
conjunction woodcut in the Rosarium and the section "On the Vision and the Riddle" 
in Nietzsche’s Thus spoke Zarathustra. Bringing the ego together with the guilty mood 
of a complex from having-been can be understood through the story of Zarathustra 
who encounters a riddle when he resolutely affirms The Gay Science to become who 
he is and overcome the last man. This means Zarathustra is resolute to remove the 
guilty mood of the complex from being-in-the-world by bringing it together with its 
opposite, the ego. 
 
Jung also describes the interaction between the ego and the unconscious in detail. He 
says “It is exactly as if a dialogue were taking place between two human beings with 
equal rights, each of whom gives the other credit for a valid argument and considers it 
worth while to modify the conflicting standpoints by means of thorough comparison 
and discussion or else to distinguish them clearly from one another” (Jung, 1971, 
p.297). This interaction of the ego and the meaning of the guilty mood of a complex 
can also be understood metaphorically when Zarathustra describes the riddle of the 
Gay Science on a ship, on an expedition to vast "unexplored" oceans, which is 
equivalent to Jung saying the conjunction symbolises the unexplored massa confusa. 
The interaction between the opposing psychic contents of the ego and the meaning of 
the guilty mood of a complex creates a tension of energy for “the transcendent function 
of the opposites” (Miller, 2004, p.28). The opposing psychic contents, which are also 
represented as the overman and the last man, creates a tension of energy because 
Dasein has not found a solution to the riddle or discovered the unconscious 
involvements and missing possibilities from the readiness-to-hand. This is required for 
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Dasein to unify the meaning of the guilty mood of a complex with the ego to unconceal 
a truth of Being and find its authentic home in the world. 
 
Jung says the transcendent function requires these opposites, as “There is no energy 
unless there is a tension of opposites” (Jung, 1992, p.53). This increased psychic 
tension and energy can be ontologically explained in Heidegger’s terms as the 
disclosure of angst, guilt, and conscience which indicates Dasein as attuned to the 
presence of a tension of opposites, when Dasein retrieves the meaning of a guilty 
mood from the obstructiveness of a complex from having-been. The opposition that 
creates angst, guilt and the call of conscience arises from the untruth of the inauthentic 
understanding of the last-man compared to the truth of the authentic understanding of 
the overman when Dasein retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood of a complex from 
having-been from stage 1. 
 
Additionally, the representation of psychic tension between the ego and the meaning 
of the guilty mood of a complex occurs in the story of Zarathustra when he explains 
the riddle as an “ascent upon a mountain path at twilight” (Heidegger, 1984, p.39). 
Heidegger points out that the sea and mountain heights are two essential images to 
take note of from Zarathustra’s speech and there is an equivalent meaning found in 
the conjunction woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum, which shows the liquid of 
the meaning of the guilty mood of a complex closing over the King and Queen like the 
sea. This creates a massa confusa as new heights are climbed to bring the ego 
together with the complex (unconscious). The climb to unify the complex together with 
the ego is confusing because Zarathustra must repetitively overcome the "spirit of 
gravity" (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). Zarathustra’s ego is not yet strong enough to unify 
with the complex or the climb up the mountain and is constantly pushed downward by 
the “spirit of gravity”, as he “carries his ‘archenemy’ into the heights with him, that spirit 
is no more than a dwarf” (Heidegger, 1984, p.40). This symbolises the psychic tension 
created by bringing the ego together with the complex. This can be explained further 
by recognising that as Zarathustra climbs the mountain to overcome his ego and unify 
it with a complex, he experiences angst, guilt and the call of conscience as the 
overman overcomes the last man (a dwarf) through the second stage of the 
transcendent function. 
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Jung implicitly describes the riddle that Zarathustra encounters when he says that the 
ability to resolve the riddle of the opposition between the ego (inauthentic 
understanding) and the unconscious (authentic understanding) requires both 
intrapsychic and interpersonal skills. Jung says that the transcendent function involves 
a person being able to validate perspectives other than their own and without this 
ability to weigh the complex (unconscious) and ego (conscious) equally, social 
relationships will be impeded. This is clear when Jung says, “Everyone who proposes 
to come to terms with himself must reckon with this basic problem. For, to the degree 
that he does not admit the validity of the other person, he denies the ‘other’ within 
himself the right to exist—and vice versa. The capacity for inner dialogue is a 
touchstone for outer objectivity” (Jung, 1971, p.297). 
 
I can explain this better by returning to the story of Zarathustra who now talks about a 
gateway (the conjunction) on his climb up the mountain. Heidegger says the 
description of the gateway by Zarathustra symbolises the riddle that Zarathustra is 
trying to resolve. Consequently, the gateway is comprehensible as representing the 
riddle of unifying the ego together with the meaning of the guilty mood of a complex. 
At the gateway Zarathustra says, “two long avenues meet. The one leads forward, the 
other leads back” (Heidegger, 1984, p.41) and directly above the gateway is engraved 
the "Moment”. This ‘Moment’ can be thought to represent the goal of the transcendent 
function, as the avenue that leads back symbolises the past where Dasein is guilty for 
falling prey and the complex is projected compared to the avenue leading forward 
which symbolises the future where the obstructiveness of a complex is removed from 
being-in-the-world. This occurs because Dasein retrieves the missing possibilities from 
the readiness-to-hand, which allows the complex to unify with the ego in order to widen 
consciousness and the personality. 
 
For Jung, the desired outcome from the interaction of opposites (ego and unconscious 
complex) is a new perspective to resolve the psychological tension of the analysand: 
 
The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the transcendent 
function of opposites. The confrontation of the two positions generates a tension 
charged with energy and creates a living, third thing—not a logical stillbirth in 
accordance with the principle tertium non datur but a movement out of the 
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suspension between opposites, a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a 
new situation (Jung, 1971, p.298). 
 
As a result, the sixth woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum, which is titled, death, 
can elucidate this part of the transcendent function further. Jung explains the death 
theme of this woodcut by pointing out that the fountain basin now forms a coffin for the 
King and Queen. Jung also highlights that “after the coniunctio oppositorum, deathlike 
stillness reigns” (Jung, 1966, p.256) and that the woodcut represents the corruption of 
one is the genesis of the other. A stillness occurs following the unification of opposites 
as the energy from the tension stops. This is shown in the story of Zarathustra where 
a stillness of death reigns as the last man (dwarf) fails to resolve the riddle at the 
gateway. The dwarf does not affirm the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science and 
therefore stands outside of the ‘Moment’ of the gateway, which results in him being 
unable to solve the riddle. The dwarf disappears when he cannot resolve the riddle 
and this represents the deathlike stillness as the ego combines with the meaning of 
the guilty mood from a complex, which ends the life of the inauthentic understanding 
of the dwarf ego, which can no longer exist if they are to unify. The shuttling to and fro 
of arguments of the riddle “leads to a new level of being, a new situation” (Jung, 1971, 
p.298) which results in Zarathustra saying “I saw a young shepherd, writhing, choking 
in spasms, his face distorted: a thick black snake hung out of his mouth" (Heidegger, 
1984, p.44). The genesis of this vision of a snake arises from the death of the 
inauthentic understanding of the dwarf ego, which vanishes from the gateway, and this 
signifies “a new situation”. The death of the inauthentic understanding of the dwarf ego 
through its disappearance is understandable as “an interim stage to be followed by a 
new life” (Jung, 1966, p.256). Zarathustra now has a clearer view of the riddle of the 
transcendent function with the death of the dwarf ego when it unifies with the meaning 
of the guilty mood of the complex. The vision of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth 
represents this new stage. 
 
This new situation or perspective arises out of the confrontation of the ego with the 
meaning of the guilty mood of a complex and results in a new shuttling to and fro of 
arguments between the ego (inauthentic understanding) and complex (authentic 
understanding) to unify their opposites. The transcendent function retrieves, projects 
and creates a new, third viewpoint to unify the ego with the meaning of the guilty mood 
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of a complex and this takes place from Dasein’s anticipatory resoluteness to establish 
an authentic resolution to establish a constancy of the self out of falling prey to ‘the 
they’. When Dasein unifies the opposites of the ego and the complex through the 
transcendent function, Dasein retrieves possibilities that have been missing from the 
readiness-to-hand and this allows Dasein to listen to the call of conscience by “letting 
oneself be summoned out of one's lostness in the they” (Heidegger, 1996, p.275). 
 
The new situation which arises from the death of the dwarf inauthentic ego and the 
subsequent new shuttling to and fro of arguments between the ego and complex to 
unify their opposites can now be explained in light of the seventh woodcut (the ascent 
of the soul). For Jung, the seventh woodcut shows one soul from the decaying 
hermaphrodite of the King and Queen rising to heaven. He claims that the image of 
one soul rising to heaven signifies the metamorphosis of the King and Queen although 
“it is not yet fully developed and is still a ‘conception’ only” (Jung, 1966, p.265). Jung 
suggests that the soul rising to heaven only “represents the idea of unity which has 
still to become a concrete fact and is at present only a potentiality” (Jung, 1966, p.265). 
As a result, this provides insight into the new shuttling to and fro of arguments between 
the ego and complex to unify their opposites which transpire from the death of the 
dwarf inauthentic ego and is symbolised by the disappearance of the dwarf at the 
gateway of the riddle. At this stage of the transcendent function, the idea of the unity 
of the ego and complex is emerging. This idea emerges from the death of the dwarf 
inauthentic ego and the new shuttling to and fro of arguments between the ego and 
complex from a new understanding of the meaning of the complex and the possibilities 
that are missing from the readiness-to-hand. 
 
This stage of the transcendent function occurs in the story of Zarathustra when he has 
returned to the solitude of his cave after the disappearance of the dwarf at the gateway 
of the riddle. As Zarathustra recovers in his cave, “he hears the piercing cry of a bird. 
He looks inquiringly into the sky. ‘And behold! An eagle soared through the air in vast 
circles, and a serpent hung suspended from him, not as his prey but as though she 
were his friend: for she had coiled about his neck’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.214). This 
vision of an eagle and serpent soaring high in the sky reflects the ascent of the soul 
from the decaying hermaphrodite of the King and Queen (Zarathustra) rising to 
heaven. Heidegger claims that Zarathustra’s eagle represents the proudest animal, 
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which lives always in the heights, and lives for the heights. Alternatively, the serpent 
represents the most astute animal, which suggests its mastery of knowledge. 
 
The “idea of unity which has still to become a concrete fact and is at present only a 
potentiality” (Jung, 1966, p.265) of the ego and the complex occurs as Zarathustra’s 
serpent thinking overcomes and soars above the dwarf inauthentic ego like an eagle 
as he discovers and retrieves the idea of the solution to the riddle. Heidegger says 
Zarathustra's animals “want to know whether he is becoming the one he is, whether in 
his Becoming he finds his Being” (Heidegger, 1984, p.214). These animals represent 
the aim of the transcendent function, which attempts to retrieve and find an 
understanding of the unconscious complex, which allows the unconscious complex to 
integrate with the ego, and results in a widened consciousness. The Becoming of the 
invasion of the meaning of the guilty mood of a complex provides Zarathustra an 
elevated perspective and widened consciousness to find his Being through the 
transcendent function. Zarathustra’s soul ascends through the eagle and serpent to 
discover and retrieve possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand as a solution to 
the riddle of unifying the complex with the ego. Zarathustra retrieves possibilities 
missing from the readiness-to-hand by understanding the riddle in terms of possibilities 
which gives Zarathustra "sight" and this ascent of Zarathustra’s soul, when bringing 
the ego together with the complex, involves interpretation which is “the working-out of 
possibilities projected in understanding” (Heidegger, 2000, p.189). 
 
Although there has been significant progress from the start of the transcendent 
function up to now, the goal of the transcendent function is not complete. This is 
represented in Zarathustra’s story as “he leaps from his bed and cries out like a 
madman, gesturing frantically, ‘as though someone were still lying in his bed and 
refused to get up’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.50). Zarathustra is angry and rages to wake 
up what is lying in his bed and to ensure it will stay alert in the future. Zarathustra is 
trying to wake up his thinking to “unites himself with the ‘upper powers’” (Jung, 1966, 
p.270) to retrieve the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to unify the ego 
with the guilty mood of complex for the transcendent function to take place and for the 
riddle at the gateway to be solved. 
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Zarathustra “unites himself with the ‘upper powers’" to retrieve possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand when Dasein develops an understanding through the 
interpretation of a projection of possibilities in anticipatory resoluteness as Dasein 
listens to the call of conscience to unify the ego with the complex. Dasein discovers 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand by listening to the call of conscience 
through an “authentic having-been retrieve” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311). When Dasein 
resolutely projects possibilities for being-in-the-world to listen to the call of conscience, 
Dasein can retrieve possibilities from the readiness-to-hand from having been which 
have been concealed and this allows an authentic understanding (unconscious) to be 
unified with an inauthentic understanding (ego) which is prescribed by ‘the they‘. This 
unification opens Dasein to new possibilities to listen to the call of conscience and 
avoid falling prey. Through this interpretation and retrieval of possibilities of the 
readiness-to-hand and the meaning of a complex, Dasein understands how to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex from Dasein’s future being-in-the-world. 
 
The final part of the second stage of the transcendent function symbolises itself in the 
eighth woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum, which is titled purification. Purification 
arrives as both the complex and ego have equal say in the dialogue of the 
transcendent function of opposites, and solutions to their unification become clear 
when Dasein retrieves and unconceals possibilities missing from the readiness-to- 
hand. This resolution between the ego and complex requires reciprocity and mutual 
settlement for authenticity to be achieved since: 
 
Even resolutions are dependent upon the ‘they’ and its world. Understanding this 
is one of the things that resolution discloses, resoluteness first gives to Dasein 
its authentic transparency. In resoluteness, Da-sein is concerned with its 
ownmost potentiality-of-being that, as thrown, can project itself only upon 
definite, factical possibilities. Resolution does not escape from ‘reality’, but first 
discovers what is factically possible in such a way that it grasps it as it is possible, 
as one's ownmost potentiality-of-being in the they (Heidegger, 1996, p.275). 
 
For Jung, the falling dew from a cloud in the eighth woodcut is a sign of a new birth 
occurring. Once the soul has gone to heaven, the falling dew indicates a resolution to 
the unification of the ego with the meaning of the guilty mood of a complex revitalizing 
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from a newfound light from the retrieval of possibilities missing from the readiness-to- 
hand. The dew in the picture symbolises the retrieval of possibilities and enlightenment 
through the understanding of resolving the conflict of opposites between the ego and 
complex. Through this retrieval of possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and 
light from the dialogue between the ego and the complex, the meaning of their 
unification becomes clear. Zarathustra’s purification regarding the solution to the riddle 
occurs when he retrieves possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, as his eagle 
brings him "yellow and red berries". Heidegger claims that the colour of these berries 
represent Zarathustra’s thinking as the red symbolises the “deepest falsehood, error, 
and semblance” and the yellow symbolises “supreme passion, of incandescent 
creation” (Heidegger, 1984, p.51). Through the light of purification from the 
nourishment provided by Zarathustra’s animals, Zarathustra understands how to solve 
the riddle of the transcendent function in order to unify the ego and the unconscious 
complex. For Zarathustra to solve the riddle he must overcome and surpass the dwarf 
inauthentic ego, who is incapable of this task. This gap between the dwarf inauthentic 
ego and Zarathustra’s authentic ego lays in the different emotional and affective 
relationship to the guilty mood of a complex and the vision of the shepherd who “has 
to bite off the head of the black snake” (Heidegger, 1984, p.55). As a result, the 
practical stage of solving the riddle by retrieving missing possibilities from the 
readiness-to-hand to unify the ego with the complex occurs when an emotional and 
affective relationship is established. Zarathustra knows he needs to leave his cave to 
retrieve possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to solve the riddle which 
provides further "insight into one's mistakes" as “Then and then only can they really 
be felt and their true nature recognized” (Jung, 1966, p.292). 
 
It has now become clear that the riddle in the Moment at the gateway can only be 
solved by not fleeing the threatening image of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth (a 
guilty mood from having-been) during the practical stage of the unification of the ego 
with the complex. To solve the riddle is to overcome the dwarfed inauthentic ego in 
response to the experience of the guilty mood of a complex and the image of the snake 
in the shepherd’s mouth to fulfil an emotional and affective relationship to the complex 
through resoluteness. Consequently, Zarathustra knows that to retrieve possibilities 
missing from the readiness-to-hand to solve the riddle of the unification of a complex 
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with the ego means to not “skip the purely practical stage” (Jung, 1966, p.277) which 
is the main focus of stage three of the transcendent function. 
 
5.4 Stage 3: The Transcendent Function 
 
The representation of the concluding parts of Heidegger’s interpretation of 
Zarathustra’s story and stage 3 of the transcendent function are in the ninth woodcut 
of the Rosarium, the return of the soul, where the soul returns from heaven and is 
diving into the dead King and Queen to bring them back to life. Likewise, Zarathustra’s 
soul returns from the ascent of his eagle and snake, which provided him purifying 
answers to retrieve possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to solve the riddle 
of overcoming the dwarf inauthentic ego and unifying the ego with the guilty mood from 
a complex. Zarathustra understands that solving riddles in life can only take place 
through leaving his cave and resolutely affirming the burden and tragedy of The Gay 
Science, which allows the guilty mood of a complex to unify with the ego in the 
‘Moment’ at the gateway. 
 
This last stage of an ontological explanation of the transcendent function involves 
highlighting how Zarathustra solves the riddle of the gateway by resolutely confronting 
the guilty mood of a complex from having-been. A snake biting the shepherd 
represents this and I briefly discussed this in the second stage of the transcendent 
function. I explained that Zarathustra comes to understand that the riddle at the 
gateway (unifying the ego with the complex) can only be solved by not fleeing from the 
threatening image of the snake in the shepherd’s mouth (a guilty mood) and by 
practically applying intellectual insights with an emotional relationship to the riddle. 
This is signified in the ninth woodcut where there are two birds at the bottom left of the 
picture and these birds represent the King and Queen. The King and Queen transform 
into a hermaphrodite and form wings because of what has taken place in the previous 
eight woodcuts. This picture of wings forming enlightens the third stage of the 
transcendent function as this stage represents Zarathustra leaving his cave to fly over 
the complex (its removal from being-in-the-world). This occurs when Dasein retrieves 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to unify the ego with the complex and 
this solves the riddle at the gateway. 
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Jung suggests that the difference between the winged and wingless birds in the ninth 
woodcut indicates that although the hermaphrodite in the woodcut appears to have 
united the opposites of the King and Queen and appears to be coming to life, the 
encounter of opposites has not been completely resolved. This final part of the retrieval 
of possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, which unifies the ego with the 
complex, occurs in stage three of the transcendent function. 
 
The ninth woodcut signifies resolving the after-effects (contamination) of the 
integration of the meaning of the guilty mood (unconscious complex) with 
consciousness (ego) and this is part of the third stage of the transcendent function. 
This picture suggests that before the opposites can complete their unification through 
the transcendent function, “the rational man, in order to live in this world, has to make 
a distinction between ‘himself’ and what we might call the ‘eternal man’” (Jung, 1966, 
p.291). Consequently, this involves the ego purifying all the superfluous elements of 
the meaning of the guilty mood (unconscious complex). Jung explains that this is 
attainable by practically applying the insights from psychotherapy to the realities of 
everyday life. 
 
For Jung, the purification of the ego is achievable from the interaction with the 
obstructiveness of the unconscious (complex) through human relationships in day-to- 
day life. This practical application of the intellectual discoveries in psychotherapy 
provides further "insight into one's mistakes" which in psychotherapy “are not really 
seen at all, only the idea of them” (Jung, 1966, p.291). By applying the insights from 
psychotherapy to encounters with the obstructiveness of a complex in everyday 
relationships, one’s mistakes and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand are 
acutely salient as they are “noticed by the other person as well as by oneself. Then 
and then only can they really be felt and their true nature recognized” (Jung, 1966, 
p.292). 
 
By understanding the practical application of the findings in psychotherapy in the 
everyday experience of the obstructiveness of a complex, the ego can retrieve more 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and move toward a complete 
unification and wholeness. This occurs by extracting superfluous elements of the 
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meaning of the guilty mood (unconscious complex) by removing projections to allow 
the anima/animus to be more conscious to the ego. 
 
I now explain this part of the transcendent function with reference to the journey of 
Zarathustra. Zarathustra becomes a hero as he withdraws his projections and by 
resolutely going out to meet his supreme suffering (a complex) and supreme hope 
(unification with the ego) at the same time. He is resolute and ready to leave his cave 
to retrieve possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and encounter the 
obstructiveness of the complex through everyday experiences. This allows him to 
stand firm in the ‘Moment’ as he applies his new understanding to unify the ego with 
the complex to the riddle at the gateway. 
 
Solving the riddle of the unification of consciousness (ego) with the unconscious 
(complex) through the transcendent function only occurs to those who are resolute 
and who think the burden and tragedy of The Gay Science. This involves “one who 
does not remain a spectator but who is himself the Moment, performing actions 
directed toward the future and at the same time accepting and affirming the past, by 
no means letting it drop” (Heidegger, 1984, p.56). To retrieve possibilities missing from 
the readiness-to-hand and to solve the riddle of unification is to overcome the dwarf 
inauthentic ego in response to the guilty mood from having-been and the image of the 
snake in the shepherd’s mouth and to let “what runs counter to itself come to collision” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.56). The ‘Moment’ at the gateway is the collision of future and 
past where the transcendent function takes place through the retrieval of possibilities 
missing from the readiness-to-hand. Solving the riddle occurs when the unconscious 
(complex) and conscious (ego) unify and form a harmony. With this, the burden, 
tragedy and guilty mood of the obstructiveness of the riddle no longer exist. 
 
For a successful explanation of this ‘Moment’ and the ontology of the transcendent 
function, it is important to understand them in the light of Heidegger’s analysis of 
temporality. Heidegger identifies the importance of the future in authentic temporality 
because “authentic temporality temporalizes itself out of the authentic future” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.302). Jung’s claim that, “The unconscious is continually active, 
combining its material in ways which serve the future” (Jung, 1971, p.293), presents 
this same argument. Furthermore, Heidegger says, “Temporality does not temporalize 
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itself constantly out of the authentic future. However, this inconstancy does not mean 
that temporality at times lacks the future, but rather that the temporalizing of the future 
is changeable” (Heidegger, 1996, p.310). For this reason, falling prey to a complex 
and alienating the call of conscience is comprehensible in terms of how temporality is 
temporalized, which allows further explanation of the ontology of the transcendent 
function. 
 
The crucial connection between Jung and Heidegger for the transcendent function to 
be explained ontologically has now arisen and could not have been described or 
acknowledged properly if the preceding discussion had not first been presented. This 
crucial connection concerns Heidegger’s notion of ‘the moment’ (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.311) and Jung’s transcendent function. Heidegger explains that ‘the moment’ is the 
authentic present within Dasein’s temporality in comparison to the inauthentic present 
which Heidegger calls ‘making present’. Heidegger explains that ‘the moment’ 
temporalizes itself out of the authentic future. 
 
What this means for Jung‘s transcendent function is that ‘the Moment’ of the unification 
of opposites (ego and complex) occurs when Dasein temporalizes its being-in-the- 
world out of an authentic future and retrieves missing possibilities from the ready-to- 
hand from having-been. This is evident when Heidegger writes “a resolute holding 
oneself free for taking back, is the authentic resoluteness to retrieve itself” and to 
“Retrieve is explicit handing down, that is, going back to the possibilities of the Da-sein 
that has been there” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311). Furthermore, “Authentic coming- 
toward-itself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming back to the 
ownmost self thrown into its individuation”. This means that through anticipatory 
resoluteness a projection of Dasein’s authentic possibilities for care within its thrown 
being-in-the-world-with ‘the they‘, results in the insight into Dasein’s “ownmost self 
thrown into its individuation” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311). This insight is discovered in 
‘the Moment’ of a retrieval missing possibilities from the ready-to-hand from having- 
been which unifies opposites (ego and complex). 
 
As a result, Heidegger’s ‘moment’ provides an ontological explanation for Jung’s 
transcendent function, which as Jung explains, aims to provide meaning and purpose 
from the individuation process toward “the revelation of the essential man” (Miller, 
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2004, p.58). This claim that Heidegger can provide an ontological explanation of the 
transcendent function can be made and supported because Heidegger says that in 
‘the moment’, Dasein receives a sense of its fatefully “authentic historical constancy 
of the self” (Heidegger, 1996, p.377). Dasein’s anticipatory resoluteness establishes a 
unity and constancy of Dasein through a projection of possibilities, which is a “retrieve 
of possibilities that have-been”. With this, “Da-sein brings itself back ‘immediately,’ that 
is, temporally and ecstatically, to what has already been before it”. By doing this 
Dasein establishes a constancy of itself through a “retrieve which is futurally in the 
process of having-been”. Therefore, “Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence 
to its own self” (Heidegger, 1996, p.357) when Dasein projects possibilities which 
retrieve the meaning of missing possibilities of the ready-to-hand from having-been. 
When Dasein is resolute and listens to the call of conscience to retrieve missing 
possibilities from the readiness-to-hand, the dwarf ego (inauthentic understanding) 
unifies with the unconscious (authentic understanding) of Zarathustra. This occurs as 
the “temporality of authentic historicity, as the Moment that anticipates and retrieves, 
undoes the making present of the today and the habituation to the conventionalities of 
the they” (Heidegger, 1996, p.357). 
 
In this way, Heidegger can be understood to explain the unity of opposites between 
falling prey to the unreadiness-to-hand of inauthentic understanding and an authentic 
understanding, which listens to the call of conscience by retrieving and discovering 
missing possibilities from the readiness-to-hand. When this unity of opposites occurs 
“The existence of the Moment temporalizes itself as fatefully whole, stretching along 
in the sense of the authentic, historical constancy of the self” (Heidegger, 1996, p.377). 
This ‘Moment’ of an authentically fateful, historical constancy of the self, results in the 
“growth of personality [and] is synonymous with an increase of self-consciousness” 
(Jung, 1954, p.184) because Dasein has understood and retrieves missing 
possibilities from the readiness-to-hand to remove the obstructiveness of a complex 
from being-in-the-world. Dasein does this by “Resolutely coming back to itself, it is 
open in retrieve for the ‘monumental’ possibilities of human existence” (Heidegger, 
2000, p.448). 
 
As Zarathustra advances toward solving the riddle of the unification of ego and 
complex in the ‘Moment’ of the transcendent function, Zarathustra's thoughts flash 
175  
back to the shepherd with a snake biting his mouth (guilty mood). Zarathustra 
experiences the guilty mood as he sees a “human being lying prostrate on the ground- 
not erect and standing. ‘I saw a young shepherd, writhing, choking in spasms, his face 
distorted; a thick black snake hung out of his mouth’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.44). As we 
have seen in the previous chapter, Heidegger explains that these images thought by 
Zarathustra represent that nihilism has bitten the shepherd in his sleep and will not let 
go. The shepherd was not vigilant because he did not understand the meaning of the 
complex, which allowed the snake to bite as a guilty mood and obstruct his being-in- 
the-world. Zarathustra attempts to help the shepherd by trying to pull the snake out but 
does not succeed. Heidegger claims this means, “that nihilism cannot be overcome from 
the outside” (Heidegger, 1984, p.179). For the meaning between the story of 
Zarathustra to be translated to the transcendent function, it is important to recognise 
that nihilism is represented by Jung as the unconscious (complex) which is without 
meaning until its unification with the ego is complete. As a result, the meaninglessness 
of the unconscious (complex) prior to the unification of opposites “cannot be overcome 
from the outside”. Understanding the complex requires the transcendent function. 
Zarathustra realises that overcoming the meaninglessness of the unconscious 
(complex) by pulling the snake does not work and therefore shouts at the shepherd 
"Bite! You must bite!" (Heidegger, 1984, p.179). Consequently, Heidegger says the 
meaning of this is that only those who are themselves under threat by the snakes of 
nihilism (a guilty mood from a complex) can remove it, which emphasizes the need for 
the analysand’s independence to retrieve possibilities missing from the readiness-to- 
hand and in the practical application of the insights from psychotherapy. Heidegger 
says only those threatened by the snake can remove its danger by biting “off the head 
of the black snake”. In other words, the nihilism of a guilty mood and the 
obstructiveness of an unconscious (complex) can only be overcome “if we grapple with 
the very head of it; only if the ideals which it posits and from which it derives fall prey 
to ‘criticism’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). 
 
With this image of the shepherd from the story of Zarathustra, the transcendent 
function can be understood as the “bite that is to overcome nihilism” (Heidegger, 1984, 
p.180) of the obstructiveness of a complex from having-been. As a result, the 
unification of consciousness (ego) with the unconscious (complex) through the 
transcendent function is only truly achieved when the guilty mood of a complex from 
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having-been or “the black snake has penetrated the gorge and its head has been bitten 
off” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). The solution to the riddle of the unification of the 
unconscious (complex) with consciousness (ego) to achieve individuation at the 
gateway occurs through the transcendent function as that bite to overcome nihilism 
and the guilty mood of a complex from having-been. Furthermore, the transcendent 
function is a conquering thought, where an individual’s prior history of the nihilism of 
the obstructiveness of a complex and a guilty mood confronts consciousness and 
overcomes this through its meaningful unification. By overcoming the nihilism of a 
guilty mood and the unconscious (complex), the symbol of the Rebis in the tenth 
woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum is achieved, which represents an expression 
of a wholeness that “resolves all opposition and puts an end to conflict” (Jung, 1966, 
p.317). The tenth woodcut represents the removal of the obstructiveness of a complex 
from being-in-the-world by retrieving missing possibilities from the readiness-to-hand. 
The wings on the Rebis, and the Rebis holding snakes, signify that a complex (snake) 
has been conquered, and this gives the Rebis wings to fly over what had been 
previously obstructive. The shepherd in the story of Zarathustra achieves this rebirth 
through the transcendent function as Heidegger explains the shepherd did as 
Zarathustra’s cry urged him to do, “bite with a good bite! He spewed out the snake's 
head, spat it far away, and leapt to his feet. No longer a shepherd, no longer human, 
but as one transformed, illuminated-- one who laughed!” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). 
 
When Dasein has an authentic understanding of the experience of the obstructiveness 
of a complex, Dasein has the possibility of discovering and retrieving the unconscious. 
Discovering missing possibilities from the readiness-to-hand allow Dasein to 
unconceal a truth of Being to find its authentic home in the world. Discovering missing 
possibilities allows Dasein to unconceal the meaning of a complex. Therefore, 
“authentic having-been retrieve” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311) occurs when Dasein 
develops an interpretation of the meaning of a guilty mood of a complex from having- 
been. This allows a discovery of possibilities for being-in-the-world to be retrieved 
hermeneutically and unconcealed phenomenologically when Dasein understands how 
to be open to the call of conscience in a world with others. Thus, when Dasein projects 
possibilities for being-in-the-world, Dasein can unify the ego with a complex from an 
interpretation and retrieval of the meaning of a complex and the possibilities that are 
missing from the readiness-to-hand. 
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This is in contrast to a lack of individuation that is associated with inauthenticity where 
there is no ‘having-been retrieve’. This occurs when Dasein has not been resolute to 
project possibilities to discover the meaning of a guilty mood and to be open to the call 
of conscience, as “Da-sein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-of- 
being” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311). Therefore, within the present where psychotherapy 
takes place, a futural projection of possibilities can allow Dasein to be open to listening 
to the call of conscience when an insight of Dasein’s “ownmost self thrown into its 
individuation” (Heidegger, 1996, p.311) is retrieved from having-been in ‘the moment’ 
of the unification of opposites (ego and complex). As a result, the individuation of the 
self through the transcendent function can be ontologically explained as grounded in 
temporality and historicity as the authentic constancy of the self is established in the 
ecstatic unity of the future, having-been, and present of ‘the moment’ in the unification 
of opposites (authentic/inauthentic understanding). 
 
What this means for the transcendent function is that Dasein can remove the 
obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world by unifying the ego with a 
complex from an interpretation and retrieval of the meaning of possibilities that are 
missing from the readiness-to-hand. Thus, the transcendent function unifies the ego 
with a complex to remove its obstructiveness from being-in-the-world when Dasein 
temporalizes itself through the “ecstatical unity in the raptures of the future, of what 
has been, and of the Present” (Heidegger, 2000, p.401). Through the ecstatical unity 
of the future, past and present, Dasein removes the guilty mood from having-been and 
the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world in ‘the moment’ of the 
transcendent function through an “authentic having-been retrieve” (Heidegger, 1996, 
p.311) of possibilities that are missing from Dasein’s readiness-to-hand. Dasein’s 
‘authentic having-been retrieve’ of possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand 
occurs from developing an interpretation of the meaning of an unconscious guilty mood 
from the obstructiveness of a complex having-been (stage 1) and unifying it with the ego 
when possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand are retrieved in stage 2 and 3 of 
the transcendent function. As a result, since the transcendent function removes the 
obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world and the transcendent function is 
dependent on temporality “Temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care” 
and “Dasein's totality of Being as care means: ahead-of- itself-already being-in (a 
world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the 
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world)” (Heidegger, 2000, p.375). The transcendent function removes the guilty mood 
from having-been and the obstructiveness of a complex through its unification with the 
ego and is grounded in the temporal unity of the horizonal schemata of future, present, 
and having-been. 
 
Finally, the transcendent function is successful when a person can authentically 
recognise the facticity of their existence that involves other worldly beings and that the 
possibilities inherent in these beings “is not under the control of Da-sein. Only ‘what’, 
‘in which direction’, ‘to what extent’, and ‘how’ it actually discovers and discloses 
beings is a matter of freedom, although always within the limits of its thrownness” 
(Heidegger, 1996, p.334). The transcendent function allows a person to determine 
which direction, to what extent, and how these beings are encountered so Dasein can 
be authentically open to the call of conscience and avoid a guilty mood from having- 
been and falling prey to a complex from the inauthentic understanding prescribed by 
‘the they’. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has retrieved the arguments that I presented in chapters 2, 
3 and 4 on the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum 
to project a new meaning of the phenomenology and ontology of the transcendent 
function. My work in this chapter enables each theme presented in the previous 
chapters to each be understood in connection with the other, and in connection to the 
ontology of the transcendent function that I presented in chapter 2. I have 
demonstrated the method of the transcendent function by hermeneutically retrieving 
the work completed in chapter 2 on the transcendent function, because the chapters 
on complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum have projected and unconcealed new 
possibilities that were not available in chapter 2. By retrieving an explanation of the 
transcendent function from chapter 2, in this way, this chapter provides a more 
comprehensive elucidation of the phenomenology and ontology of the transcendent 
function by hermeneutically incorporating possibilities unconcealed in chapters 3 and 
4. Finally, this chapter provides a transition to allow chapter 6 to make a final projection 
in this thesis in order to unconceal more of the meaning of the transcendent function. 
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To this end, we now turn to Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Will to Power 
and the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. 
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Chapter 6: Jung’s Transcendent Function as Nietzsche’s Will to Power and 
Eternal Recurrence of the Same 
 
Abstract 
 
In this penultimate chapter, I retrieve and project the transcendent function with 
Heidegger’s writing for the final time in this thesis. I retrieve the arguments from 
chapter 5, which explains the transcendent function with my work from chapters 3 and 
4 on complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum. In addition to this retrieval, I retrieve 
Heidegger’s interpretation on Nietzsche’s Will to Power to project a new ontological 
meaning to explain the transcendent function. By the end of this chapter, the reader 
should gain a more detailed and specific description of Jung’s transcendent function 
because further aspects of the phenomenology and ontology have been highlighted 
which include understanding the transcendent function as the Will to Power. As a 
result, this chapter elucidates Patricia Dixon’s statement that “Jung formalizes and 
gives a name (‘transcendent function’) to a process that is implicit throughout 
Nietzsche's work and basic to his philosophy” (Dixon, 1988, p.3). 
 
6.1 Will to Power as a Valuation of Life’s Preservation and Enhancement 
 
In his book The Will to Power as Knowledge, Heidegger explains that the “Will to Power 
is the ‘principle of a new valuation’” (Heidegger, 1987, p.15). He notes the word value 
is essential for Nietzsche, and that this is evident in the subtitle to his book the Will to 
Power "Attempt at a Revaluation of All Values" (Heidegger, 1987, p.15). According to 
Heidegger, value for Nietzsche means, “a condition of life's being ‘alive’” (Heidegger, 
1987, p.15). For something to be valuable means for life to be alive, this is not "self-
preservation" “but rather in a self-transcending enhancement” (Heidegger, 1987, 
p.15). In this chapter, I demonstrate that my ontological explanation of Jung’s 
transcendent function meets this definition of value because the transcendent function 
enhances life by removing a guilty mood and obstructive complexes from Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world. Furthermore, if the transcendent function is valuable, because it 
enhances life, the transcendent function is also comprehensible as the Will to Power. 
By combining Jung and Nietzsche with Heidegger in this way, my work provides new 
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support to Dixon’s claim that, “It is held that the basic tenets of Jungian psychology 
illustrate and verify Nietzsche's message” (Dixon, 1988, p.3). 
 
For Nietzsche, only values that are an enhancement to life are valuable because life’s 
enhancement is the essence of life. Accordingly, the Will to Power expresses the 
essence of life, which “supports, furthers, and awakens the enhancement of life” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.16). Heidegger states that enhancement occurs “in and through” 
life and “is an over-beyond-itself” (Heidegger, 1987, p.16). Consequently, “this means 
that in enhancement life projects higher possibilities of itself before itself and directs 
itself forward into something not yet attained, something first to be achieved” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.16). Therefore, this suggests that the transcendent function would 
be “an over-beyond-itself” as Dasein “directs itself forward into something not yet 
attained”. This occurs as Dasein resolutely retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to allow an obstructive complex to 
unify with the ego. Furthermore, making the unconscious conscious is an 
enhancement to life as Dasein opens itself to higher possibilities to care for being-in- 
the-world. 
 
To enhance life with the Will to Power implies “a looking ahead and through to the 
scope of something higher, a ‘perspective’” (Heidegger, 1987, p.16). Therefore, 
valuation for the Will to Power means to determine the perspective that enhances life. 
As a result, the transcendent function can also be explained as aiming to unify the ego 
with the unconscious (complex) by “looking ahead and through to the scope of 
something higher”. Dasein retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities 
missing from the readiness-to-hand to solve the riddle of the gateway by discovering 
the perspective that enhances life through the removal of the obstructiveness of a 
complex in this “looking ahead”. For Nietzsche, the Will to Power is the principle of a 
new valuation and Heidegger argues that this means the Will to Power determines 
new values for the enhancement of life. What this means for the transcendent function 
is that Dasein must retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand to apply a new understanding of values to being-in-the- 
world to project higher possibilities by removing the obstructiveness of a complex. 
Nietzsche claims the essence of life is enhancement. Consequently, he demotes 
values that aim at preservation as they hinder and deny the complete essence of life. 
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Without resolutely taking the “stance adopted, and the will directed, toward essential 
knowing” (Heidegger, 1984, p.20) of the Gay Science, Dasein cannot retrieve the 
meaning of a guilty mood or possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to remove 
a complex from being-in-the-world. When this fails to occur, Dasein does not enhance 
life or look “ahead and through to the scope of something higher”. When Dasein is 
inauthentic and does not overcome the last man or dwarf ego, Dasein denies and 
hinders the essence of life. 
 
Therefore, if Dasein understands life as merely preservation, and does not remove the 
obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world, then the past values of life 
would require a “revaluation of all values" through a "new valuation" (Heidegger, 1987, 
p.17) in order to posit values in accordance with life’s essence as enhancement. This 
revaluation of values occurs in the ‘Moment’ of the gateway (discussed in chapter 4 & 
5) where the avenue that leads back symbolises the past where Dasein is guilty for 
falling prey, and a complex has been projected, compared to the avenue leading 
forward, which symbolises the future where the obstructiveness of a complex is 
removed from being-in-the-world. Dasein’s “new valuation” involves retrieving the 
meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand which 
allows the complex to unify with the ego in an attempt to widen consciousness and the 
personality. As this chapter progresses, it will become clearer how values of life’s 
enhancement are achieved with the Will to Power and how this applies to the 
transcendent function. 
 
6.2 Knowledge and Truth as Will to Power 
 
To understand the meaning of the Will to Power it is important to note that Nietzsche 
states that, "This world is Will to Power-and nothing besides! And you yourselves are 
this Will to Power-and nothing besides!" (Heidegger, 1987, p.18). Because of this, 
Heidegger concludes that Nietzsche’s “determination of beings as a whole, reads: Life 
is Will to Power” (Heidegger, 1987, p.18). Consequently, Heidegger states that if Will 
to Power determines beings or life as a whole it must be present in every area of 
beings (e.g. science, art, “and in knowledge in general” [Heidegger, 1987, p.19]). 
Through an interrogation of these beings, the Will to Power can become discernible. 
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If knowledge and truth are examples of the Will to Power, it is important to ask what 
knowledge and truth are to Nietzsche. Heidegger claims that for Nietzsche truth is an 
"illusion". However, if truth is an illusion and the highest value is life enhancement, 
truth cannot be the highest value of life. There must be a higher value in life, which 
provides life its enhancement, and Nietzsche’s thinking reflects this when he says, "art 
is worth more than truth" (Heidegger, 1987, p.25). Nietzsche claims that art is a higher 
value than truth because it values vitality and the possibilities of its enhancement for 
life; "We have art in order not to perish from the truth" (Heidegger, 1987, p.25). At the 
beginning of this chapter, I established that the transcendent function shares the same 
characteristics of the Will to Power because it enhances life. I have now pointed out 
that Heidegger explains that for Nietzsche art has a higher value than truth because it 
enhances life; as a result, this allows the transcendent function to be examined and 
understood as art. I return to an explanation of the transcendent function as art later 
in this chapter, after first clarifying the meaning of truth in relation to the transcendent 
function. 
 
To understand the Will to Power as art, Heidegger says the meaning of knowledge 
and truth for Nietzsche needs clarification. He claims knowledge is definable as 
holding what is true and that, consequently, truth is fundamental to knowledge. He 
reflects on what Nietzsche says about truth, that “truth is an ‘illusion’” (Heidegger, 
1987, p.25). Heidegger interrogates the meaning of truth as an illusion by citing two 
passages by Nietzsche: "Truth is the kind of error without which a certain kind of living 
being could not live" (Heidegger, 1987, p.32) and, additionally, "The estimation of 
value 'I believe that such and such is so' as the essence of 'truth'" (Heidegger, 1987, 
p.34). Heidegger thinks that Nietzsche writes truth in inverted commas because, the 
kind of truth he has in mind here, is truth as traditionally conceived in philosophy and 
everyday thinking, i.e. “correctness of representation” (Heidegger, 1987, p.34). 
Heidegger explains that truth has been traditionally conceived as homoiosis: “the 
suitability of the content of representation with regard to the beings encountered” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.35). It is precisely this definition of truth, which Nietzsche names 
as an illusion. 
 
Nietzsche also claims that truth is in its essence an "estimation of value" (Heidegger, 
1987, p.35) an estimation which has the character of belief: "I believe that such and 
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such is so". Given this, Heidegger explains that to believe is to “hold such and such as 
being thus and thus” (Heidegger, 1987, p.36) in representation. With this explanation 
of truth as an estimation of value, a further facet of Nietzsche’s idea of truth becomes 
clear. Nietzsche adds to his idea of truth as an estimation of value with the following: 
"In estimations of value are expressed conditions of preservation and growth" 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.35). As a result, Nietzsche’s idea of truth is also dependent on 
the values of life’s preservation and growth. Therefore, holding-to-be- true beliefs of 
truth are value-estimations of life’s preservation and growth. Consequently, 
Nietzsche's definition of knowledge is the process of grasping the truth, which I have 
explained involves holding-to-be-true value-estimations of life’s preservation and 
growth (enhancement). This is important for Jung’s transcendent function because this 
highlights the fact that Dasein makes holding-to-be-true beliefs for life’s preservation 
and growth. However, if Dasein does not look “ahead and through to the scope of 
something higher” Dasein has failed to value art higher than truth. By valuing truth 
higher than art, Dasein denies the essence of life by not retrieving the meaning of a 
guilty mood or the possibilities missing from the readiness- to-hand in order to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world60. 
 
6.3 Reason and Categories 
 
It is now important to explain how it is possible to make holding-to-be-true value 
estimations. For Heidegger, reason makes holding-to-be-true value estimations 
possible. Reason apprehends “beings as beings, takes hold of them in various 
respects: now as constituted thus and thus, that is, with respect to their constitution 
(quality, poion), now as thus and thus extended or in size (quantity, poson), now as 
thus and thus related to others (relation, pros ti)” (Heidegger, 1987, p.49). These are 
the categories of reason, which allow the constitution of beings in holding-to-be-true 
value estimations. Consequently, it is important to recognise the role reason plays in 
the transcendent function, because the categories of reason determine what a being 
is. Reason determines Dasein’s ability to retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood as well 
as the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand in order to remove the 
obstructiveness of a complex when it unifies with the ego. 
                                               
60 This is what Binswanger refers to as “’narrowing’, ‘constricting’ or ‘flattening’ of world” (Binswanger, 
1963, p.111). See also p.112.  
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When Nietzsche refers to reason in relation to value estimation, he writes, "Trust in 
reason and its categories, in dialectic, thus the value-estimation of logic, proves only 
their usefulness for life, proved by experience-not their 'truth'” (Heidegger, 1987, p.50). 
For Nietzsche, reason’s knowledge of beings does not prove its truth, but rather its 
usefulness for life as value estimations for life’s preservation and growth. As a result, 
the categories of reason are important for Dasein to retrieve the meaning of a guilty 
mood as well as the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand in order to 
remove the obstructiveness of a complex when it unifies with the ego. However, the 
meaning of a guilty mood and the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand do 
not prove their truth, only their preservation, enhancement and “usefulness for life”. 
Although Nietzsche has claimed that truth is not the highest value for life, he says that 
truth as holding-to-be-true value estimations of life’s preservation and growth is a 
"precondition for every living thing and its life" (Heidegger, 1987, p.54). Truth must be 
present so what is alive can live and can stay alive. Thus, Nietzsche’s idea of truth 
results in the understanding that truth is a necessary value for life. However I will go 
onto demonstrate that truth is not the highest value for life or for the transcendent 
function, as it does not allow the obstructiveness of a complex to be removed from 
being-in-the-world. 
 
6.4 True and Apparent worlds 
 
Heidegger explains why Nietzsche values art higher than truth by referring to the 
distinction between true and apparent worlds in the history of western philosophy. He 
explains that philosophy has traditionally conceived the true world as what is true and 
the apparent world as what is untrue. Heidegger claims that the difference between 
the true and apparent worlds equates with what exists and what does not exist. For 
Heidegger, something exists when it is “present and has constant stability in this 
presence” (Heidegger, 1987, p.59). Something is true in the true world because it “can 
never be removed, what stands fast and resists any attack, survives any accident. The 
beingness of beings signifies permanent presence” (Heidegger, 1987, p.60). 
Heidegger believes that, what is true in the true world allows one to gain a foothold as 
“one can always and truly hold on to … what is stable and does not withdraw” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.60). Alternatively, the apparent world is what does not exist, what 
changes and what is not permanent or stable. The true and apparent worlds receive 
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definition from their value and Heidegger says the true world has been traditionally 
preferred as the higher value to the apparent world. Later in this chapter, I will show 
that the distinction between the true and apparent worlds is important in explaining the 
transcendent function as the Will to Power. 
 
Heidegger explains that the values of the true and apparent worlds are determined by 
what is valuable and, as I have mentioned earlier, for Nietzsche something is valuable 
based on its preservation and enhancement of life. According to Heidegger, the true 
world which is fixed, permanent and stable, is thought to be a value for life because it 
is “necessary for securing the constancy of life itself” (Heidegger, 1987, p.63). 
However, if the world were perpetually inconstant and changing, the true world would 
freeze the changing world: “measured against what is becoming, such fixating would 
be inappropriate and merely a distortion” (Heidegger, 1987, p.64). Thus, the true world 
of unchanging permanency would not be true, as it would not incorporate the becoming 
of the world. Consequently, the definition of ‘truth’ based on the true world (that which 
is permanent) would then be an error or "illusion" as it would restrict to fix the truth of 
beings. With this explained, Nietzsche’s statement, that “truth is an illusion”, becomes 
understandable and this highlights its importance for the transcendent function. The 
transcendent function as art and Will to Power allows Dasein to enhance life and look 
“ahead and through to the scope of something higher” by removing the error and 
illusion of the fixed, unchanging and obstructive understanding of a complex by unifying 
the ego with “what is becoming” and changing. 
 
For Nietzsche, the world is “‘in truth’! - a ‘becoming’ world”. There is nothing in ‘being’” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.65) and consequently by affirming that the world exists as 
becoming Nietzsche establishes becoming as a value. Heidegger claims that for 
Nietzsche the changing world of becoming is the highest value. Consequently, truth 
(as what is permanent and fixed) is not the highest value for life’s preservation and 
enhancement. For Nietzsche, it is more important "To transform the belief 'it is thus 
and thus' into the will 'it shall become thus and thus'" (Heidegger, 1987, p.65). Truth is 
not the highest value for life because “it denies life's vitality, its will to self- 
transcendence and becoming” (Heidegger, 1987, p.66). The transcendent function 
values the world as becoming, and art as higher than the true world, since it does not 
deny “life's vitality, its will to self-transcendence”. Jung’s transcendent function 
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adheres to the world as becoming and art because it aims to remove the 
obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world by retrieving the meaning of a 
guilty mood and the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, which it could 
not do if it valued what is fixed and unchanging. 
 
6.5 Schematising 
 
Heidegger continues to analyse Nietzsche’s idea of knowledge and truth; he states 
that knowing implies self-knowing and given that man represents beings, man is set 
“out in the open region of this relation. Thus it also sustains his being human” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.68). This is evident in the transcendent function as Dasein’s 
readiness-to-hand determines Dasein encountering the obstructiveness of a complex. 
The relation of knowledge (understanding) of beings to a human’s self-knowledge 
makes the human what he or she is and “vibrates throughout our basic posture” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.69) of the readiness-to-hand. Consequently, the understanding 
and possibilities of the readiness-to-hand determine a human’s relationship to life. 
Hence Nietzsche says truth is “Not 'to know' but to schematize - to impose upon chaos 
as much regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require" (Heidegger, 
1987, p.70). Dasein’s schematizing of possibilities of the readiness-to-hand 
determines life’s preservation and enhancement. Therefore, the transcendent function 
can preserve and enhance life. The transcendent function allows Dasein to resolutely 
schematise “regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require” on the chaos 
of the obstructiveness of a complex by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to unify the unconscious (complex) 
with consciousness (ego). 
 
Holding-to-be-true value estimations of life’s preservation and enhancement occurs 
through reason and representing according to categories and their schemata. As 
Heidegger points out, Nietzsche explains that the representing of value estimations of 
life occurs through schematizing by imposing “upon chaos as much regularity and as 
many forms as our practical needs require." Therefore, schematizing provides the 
readiness-to-hand regularity and forms of value estimations of life on the "chaos" of 
the obstructiveness of a complex for practical needs. Thus, knowledge is 
comprehensible as schematizing to remove the obstructiveness of a complex for 
practical life-needs. Encountering the chaos and obstructiveness of a complex is the 
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reason for schematizing for practical life needs. 
 
Heidegger also believes that chaos includes “the jumbled, the tangled, the pell-mell. 
Chaos means not only what is unordered but also entanglement in confusion, the 
jumble of something in shambles” (Heidegger, 1987, p.77). The chaos of a complex is 
dynamic, and the order of the chaos of a complex is unknown, “whose law we do not 
descry straightaway” (Heidegger, 1987, p.80). Therefore, the chaos of a complex is 
the covered, misunderstood abundance of the becoming and flowing of the world. The 
transcendent function allows Dasein to schematise resolutely chaos in order to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world so as to preserve and 
enhance life as Dasein opens itself to the call of conscience. When Dasein is 
inauthentic and does not retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood or possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand, Dasein encounters the misunderstood obstructiveness of 
the chaos of a complex. When Dasein resolutely retrieves the meaning of a guilty 
mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, Dasein has understood 
and uncovered the order and law of the chaos to remove the obstructiveness of a 
complex from being-in-the-world. 
 
For, Nietzsche art is the highest value for life’s preservation and enhancement 
because it resolutely incorporates the flowing of chaos into life. Art is the highest value 
for life’s preservation and enhancement because “it does not copy what is at hand”. 
Instead, “art transfigures life, moves it into higher, as yet unlived, possibilities” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.81). Art is the highest value for life’s preservation and 
enhancement because it resolutely awakens life and makes it alert; "only through 
magic does life remain awake" (Heidegger, 1987, p.81). Jung’s transcendent function 
represents art as the highest value for life’s preservation and enhancement. The 
transcendent function as art does what truth fails to do, i.e. to transfigure life. The 
transcendent function as art resolutely incorporates the becoming world of chaos, 
where chaos is the experience of the obstructiveness of a complex. Jung’s 
transcendent function as art resolutely incorporates the chaos of becoming into life.
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By retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-
to-hand, the transcendent function lifts truth to new possibilities for life’s preservation 
and enhancement as the obstructiveness of a complex is removed from being-in-the-
world. Therefore, art is worth more than truth because it removes the obstructiveness 
of a complex from being-in-the-world. This occurs by resolutely incorporating chaos into 
life by creatively mastering that which appears at first as confusion and entanglement, 
and by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the 
readiness-to-hand. 
 
6.6 Life, Chaos, and Horizons 
 
Schematizing regulates forms on the obstructive chaos of a complex by retrieving the 
meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand as a 
practical need for life’s preservation and enhancement. Furthermore, Heidegger states 
that every living being “is surrounded, oppressed, and penetrated by chaos, the 
unmastered, overpowering element that tears everything away in its stream”. 
Additionally, he claims that “it might seem that precisely the vitality of life as this pure 
streaming of drives and pulsions, proclivities and inclinations, needs and demands, 
impressions and views, wishes and commands pulls and sucks the living itself into its 
own stream, there to exhaust its surge and flow. Life would then be sheer dissolution 
and annihilation” (Heidegger, 1987, p.85). However, life annihilated by chaos would 
no longer be chaos because chaos is dependent on life precisely to be chaos. As a 
result, in the flow of chaos, life does not “submit to the urgent onslaught” (Heidegger, 
1987, p.85) because life stands fast in it, in order for life to urge from the chaos and 
for life to urge beyond itself. 
 
Chaos as “A burden exerts a downward pull, compelling us constantly to hold 
ourselves erect; but it also embodies the danger that we will fall down, and stay down. 
In this way, the burden is an obstacle that demands constant ‘hurdling’, constant 
surmounting” (Heidegger, 1984, p.22). However, the burden of chaos allows humans 
to descry what they are in their ascendancy over burdens, and - as we know - 
Nietzsche says the experience of the necessity of the ‘greatest burden’, has “allowed 
us to live” (Heidegger, 1984, p.23). Thus, the obstructiveness of the chaos of a 
complex allows life to exist by schematising the readiness-to-hand and this regulates 
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forms on the chaos of a complex to urge life’s permanence and stability in order to be 
able to exist within chaos. For a living being to exist in the chaos of a complex, it must 
regulate its stability through the schematizing of the readiness-to-hand. What 
Nietzsche means by practical need is the securing of stable forms on chaos through 
schematising in order for the human being to exist and with this; the meaning of the 
transcendent function becomes more transparent. Jung’s transcendent function 
resolutely preserves and enhances Dasein’s stability within chaos by regulating forms 
and removing the obstructiveness of a complex through schematizing. This retrieves 
the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand in 
order to unify the ego with the unconscious (complex). 
 
A representation of the schematising of chaos can be found in the naked truth woodcut 
of the Rosarium Philosophorum where conventional clothes are removed from the 
King and Queen. As we have seen, Jung suggests that this woodcut can be 
psychologically interpreted as representing a confrontation with reality, “with no false 
veils or adornments of any kind” (Jung, 1966, p.238). This is the tragedy of the 
transcendent function where the ego affirms the tragedy to schematize chaos in order 
to discover the meaning of a guilty mood from falling prey to a complex to reveal the 
shadow. Nietzsche would call this "heroic." Nietzsche defines a hero as someone 
"Going out to meet one's supreme suffering and supreme hope alike"(Heidegger, 
1984, p.29). To be a hero is to become “master over his misfortune and good fortune 
as well”. He writes "The heroic spirits are those who in the midst of tragic horror say to 
themselves, ‘Yes’: they are hard enough to feel suffering as pleasure” (Heidegger, 
1984, p.29). Consequently, the ‘coniunctio’ and the naked truth in the Rosarium 
Philosophorum marks the art, resoluteness and love of the hero going out to meet and 
retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to- 
hand in order to unify the ego with the unconscious (complex). The hero of the 
transcendent function confronts the chaos of the shadow of their burdensome complex 
in the hope of retrieving and discovering its unconscious meaning to unify it with the 
ego. 
 
For Heidegger, a horizon belongs to schematizing in order to secure a stable form on 
chaos. He argues that a horizon stabilises a view of chaos in a form that is both 
constant and translucent. Consequently, the horizon of schematising shows what is 
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unfixed in the chaos, in contrast to what is fixed from the schematizing of the 
readiness-to-hand. Therefore, the transcendent function involves schematizing the 
chaos of a “closely guarded secret”, which is the dark “(sinister) side” Jung, 1966, 
p.211) of the personality. Achieving this occurs through a horizon, which provides 
Dasein a view of the chaos of a complex to be stabilised through its unification with 
the ego. The horizon of schematising allows Dasein to resolutely encounter the 
obstructiveness of a complex and to retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand by presenting the chaos as what is 
unfixed in the horizon. 
 
Jung’s transcendent function also allows Dasein to retrieve the meaning of a guilty 
mood and the possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand by schematizing an 
assignment of reasons, concepts and categories depending on the practical need of 
the stabilisation of the chaos of the complex. The horizon forms “according to the 
essential state and essential elevation of the living being” (Heidegger, 1987, p.89). For 
Heidegger, the "essential state" is the horizon (understanding of the readiness-to- 
hand) of possibilities that the human being has schematised in relation to the chaos. 
The horizon determines that “the scope of decisive possibilities is opened and, with it, 
the realm of decisions through which arises the incisive sense for what is important” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.89). The schematising of the horizon “contains directives and 
rules in accordance with which what throngs toward us is caught and secured” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.92), and this is attainable when Dasein retrieves the meaning of 
a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand in order to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex. 
 
To explain the schematising of chaos further, Heidegger also cites a note from 
Nietzsche’s work, which states, "The development of reason is adjustment, invention, 
in order to make similar, identical-the same process that every sense impression goes 
through!" (Heidegger, 1987, p.94). This note explains that the development of the 
schematising of chaos occurs through the creation of the identity of something 
encountered in the chaos. Heidegger argues that discovering the identity of something 
in chaos does not occur by first ascertaining the characteristics of it. Instead, 
something in chaos is only approachable, conceivable and its characteristics 
ascertained after knowing its identity. As a result, the identity of something is not 
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“something to be found at hand” (Heidegger, 1987, p.95). Dasein creates the identity 
of a thing before encountering it and Heidegger claims that “this creative character” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.95), is the essence of schematising. Therefore, the horizon of 
schematising creates the categories of a thing “poetically”, and this creativity of 
schematising “first clears for what is encountered that free place from which and upon 
which it can appear as something constant, as an object” (Heidegger, 1987, p.98). 
This further elucidates the ontology of the transcendent function by suggesting that 
the removal of the obstructiveness of a complex by regulating a stable form on chaos 
occurs through Dasein’s creative and poetic schematising. This means that Dasein 
must artistically and creatively discover and retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand which “first clears for what is 
encountered that free place from which and upon which it can appear as something 
constant, as an object”. 
 
6.7 Law of Contradiction 
 
Now that I have explained the schematizing of the transcendent function, it is important 
to point out that Nietzsche says "The categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they 
are conditions of life for us: as Euclidean space is a conditioned 'truth'” (Heidegger, 
1987, p.101). Heidegger points out that for Nietzsche the human way of existing 
involves "The subjective compulsion by which we are unable to contradict here is a 
biological compulsion...." (Heidegger, 1987, p.102). In this statement, Heidegger 
recognises that Nietzsche considers that the law of the avoidance of contradiction is a 
conditioned truth due to a biological compulsion. This is important for Jung’s 
transcendent function as it allows me to better explain ‘the moment’ of the unification 
of the ego and the complex. 
 
Heidegger argues that this conditioned compulsion for non-contradiction occurs so 
that humans avoid confusion from chaos and stabilise its torrent by imposing a form 
on it. This highlights the important role the law of contradiction plays in the stabilisation 
of the chaos of a complex for the transcendent function. Jung’s transcendent function 
is the Will to Power, which resolutely preserves and enhances the stability of life in the 
chaos of the obstructiveness of a complex through valuations. Dasein enhances the 
stability of life in chaos by resolutely “looking ahead and through to the scope of 
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something higher, a ‘perspective’” in order to remove the obstructiveness of a complex 
from being-in-the-world. As a result, this explains that the transcendent function 
determines the perspective that avoids contradiction and confusion in its enhancement 
of life by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the 
readiness-to-hand in order to stabilise chaos and remove the obstructiveness of a 
complex from being-in-the-world. This part of the transcendent Function reflects the 
conjunction woodcut in the Rosarium Philosophorum and the section "On the Vision 
and the Riddle" in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Jung’s transcendent function 
involves solving a riddle by determining the perspective that avoids contradiction and 
confusion in its enhancement of life by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand in order to stabilise chaos and remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world. The riddle of determining 
the perspective that avoids contradiction for the enhancement of life is the riddle of the 
Gay Science, and Zarathustra’s journey represents this when he undertakes in an 
expedition to vast "unexplored" oceans. 
 
Heidegger quotes Aristotle to express the meaning of the law of contradiction for 
Nietzsche: "That the same thing come to be present and not come to be present at the 
same time is impossible in the same and with respect to the same" (Heidegger, 1987, 
p.103). For Heidegger, it is important to recognise that the law of contradiction provides 
a measure of what is possible to belong to life in advance of encountering it. Heidegger 
claims that the law of contradiction states that a being exits only in the “absence of 
contradiction” (Heidegger, 1987, p.112). Consequently, the creative and poetic 
schematising of chaos to retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand in order to remove the obstructiveness of a complex needs 
to be understood as determined by the law of contradiction. The meaning of a guilty 
mood is subject to the absence of contradiction as well as to the possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand, which allow the enhancement of life by the stabilisation of 
chaos through the removal of the obstructiveness of a complex. The ego and 
unconscious (complex) unify in ‘the Moment’ when Dasein retrieves the meaning of a 
guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, which entail no 
contradiction. 
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The law of contradiction allows Dasein to retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand by stabilising the chaos of a complex 
with the transcendent function. Although it is possible for Dasein to stabilise the chaos 
of a complex through the law of contradiction and schematising, it is possible to 
contradict the schematising of the meaning of a guilty mood or the possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand. Consequently, if Dasein’s schematising contradicts itself, 
something schematised as being present will not be present. When this happens the 
chaos of a complex has not been stabilised or removed from being-in-the-world: 
“through contradictory assertions, which man can freely make about the same thing, 
he displaces himself from his essence into nonessence; he dissolves his relation to 
beings as such” (Heidegger, 1987, p.112). 
 
Therefore, Dasein can fall prey to the obstructiveness of a complex when Dasein’s 
understanding is inauthentic because it is contradictory. This explains that the 
ontological meaning of Dasein’s guilty mood occurs because Dasein has contradicted 
itself in its schematising of chaos, which results in Dasein falling prey to the 
obstructiveness of a complex. Dasein’s guilty mood for contradicting its schematising 
of chaos, and falling prey to the obstructiveness of a complex, is represented in 
Zarathustra’s story when his thoughts flash back to a shepherd with a snake biting his 
mouth. Heidegger explains that falling into contradiction and nonessence is uncanny 
for humans. This is because the human being can see it as harmless, “in that business 
and pleasure go on just as before, in that it doesn't seem so important at all what and 
how one thinks; until one day the catastrophe” (Heidegger, 1987, p.112) when Dasein 
experiences the nihilism of the obstructiveness of a complex. The image of the snake 
in the shepherd’s mouth in Zarathustra’s story represents the catastrophe of Dasein 
inauthentically contradicting itself in the schematising and stabilisation of chaos. 
 
Heidegger also claims that the law of contradiction is a ‘command’ and that this 
‘command’ can guide Dasein in the transcendent function to know what can and 
cannot exist in the retrieval of the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand. Therefore, the schematising of Jung’s transcendent 
function involves the law of contradiction in order to stabilise the chaos of a complex 
through a command. Consequently, this shows that the schematising of the 
transcendent function stabilises the existence of Dasein within chaos by removing the 
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obstructiveness of a complex. The transcendent function as Will to Power commands 
the preservation and enhancement of life through the command of the law of 
contradiction. Furthermore, knowledge and truth acquired through the schematising of 
the transcendent function stabilises life in chaos and is therefore a necessary value for 
life. However, knowledge and truth are not the highest value for life because art allows 
Dasein to stabilise chaos in the first place. Art does this by retrieving the meaning of a 
guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand in order to remove the 
obstructiveness of a complex. The world is “‘in truth’! - a ‘becoming’ world” (Heidegger, 
1987, p.65) and therefore "We have art in order not to perish from the truth" 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.25) in the chaos of the obstructiveness of a complex. 
 
6.8 Revaluing Values 
 
Although knowledge and truth stabilise the chaos of a complex and are therefore 
necessary values for life’s preservation, art is a higher value because it accomplishes 
the transfiguration of life to higher possibilities of preservation and enhancement by 
retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness- 
to-hand. The transcendent function allows the last man to be overcome who does not 
hold art as the highest value. Alternatively, the overman holds art as a higher value 
than truth and affirms the tragedy to schematize the chaos in order to discover the 
meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand. By 
holding truth as a higher value than art, the last man does not affirm the tragedy to 
schematize the chaos and instead projects his shadow. Consequently, “In the sphere 
of the last man each thing gets a little bit smaller every day” (Heidegger, 1984, p.33). 
 
By valuing art higher than truth, Heidegger highlights the fact that Nietzsche inverts 
Platonism by holding the apparent world of becoming (art) as a higher value than the 
true world of being (truth). Knowledge and truth stabilise chaos but miss the world of 
becoming, whereas art opens up possibilities by incorporating the world of becoming. 
Consequently, because truth and knowledge miss the becoming world it becomes the 
apparent world and art becomes the true world because it incorporates the becoming 
world into life. As a result, Heidegger says “we can say that the true world is the world 
of becoming; the apparent world is the stable and constant world” (Heidegger, 1987, 
p.124). Jung’s transcendent function also inverts Platonism as it also holds the world 
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of art and becoming as a higher value than the world of truth and being. The 
transcendent function as art opens up the world of becoming and possibilities to 
remove the obstructiveness of a complex by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood 
and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand by unifying it with the truth and 
knowledge of the ego. 
 
Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism demotes truth to a lower value for life because it 
does not incorporate the world as becoming; as such, it is ‘a kind of error’ - "Truth is 
the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live" (Heidegger, 
1987, p.125). Alternatively, art rises to a higher value because it incorporates the world 
of becoming through the transfiguration of truth. Consequently, the meaning of the 
transcendent function becomes clearer as it artistically incorporates the becoming 
world, transfigures and retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and missing possibilities 
of the knowledge of the readiness-to-hand in order to remove the obstructiveness of a 
complex from being-in-the-world. 
 
6.9 Abolishing the True and Apparent Worlds 
 
Although Nietzsche has inverted Platonism, he has retained the distinction between 
the true and apparent worlds. However, this distinction does not last long as Heidegger 
explains how Nietzsche abolishes this distinction in order to transform the meaning of 
truth. Nietzsche knows that because art transfigures life to higher possibilities it must 
also fix and stabilise chaos and thus can become error, although it is an error where 
“higher possibilities of life blaze and shine” (Heidegger, 1987, p.127). As a result, 
although the stabilization of chaos allows life to exist, it is a kind of error because 
stabilisation halts the becoming world. Therefore, the stabilisation of life in chaos is 
“the kind of error without which a certain kind of living being could not live”. 
Consequently, Nietzsche concludes that truth is an illusion and there is no truth 
because the stabilisation of the chaos does not incorporate the becoming world and 
therefore misses the truth of the becoming world. 
 
With this insight into the problem of truth, the distinction of the true world and apparent 
world cannot exist if truth is always a kind of error. The true world cannot be the true 
world because the stabilisation of chaos misses the truth of the becoming world. 
197  
Furthermore, if there is no true world, the apparent world fails to exist because it is 
only apparent in relation to what is true. Thus, with the abolition of the true and 
apparent world, Heidegger explains that Nietzsche’s values no longer measure, adapt 
or estimate in relation to the true or apparent world. All that remains for the 
schematising of chaos after this transformation of the meaning of truth is the law of 
contradiction as a command for what can exist through the “absence of contradiction”. 
 
For Heidegger, “metaphysics is grounded on the distinction of the suprasensuous 
world as true in opposition to the sensuous one as apparent”. Additionally, he writes, 
“The immoralist removes himself from the ‘moral’ distinction that grounds all 
metaphysics; he is the denier of the distinction between true and apparent worlds and 
the hierarchy of values posited in it” (Heidegger, 1987, p.133). Heidegger highlights 
the fact that Nietzsche is an advocate of the immoralist who removes his thinking from 
the true and apparent worlds when he says: 
 
The princes of Europe should indeed consider carefully whether they can do 
without our support. We immoralists - we are today the only power that needs no 
allies in order to achieve victory; thus we are by far the strongest of the strong. 
We do not even need to tell lies; what other power can dispense with that? A 
powerful seduction fights on our behalf, perhaps the most powerful there is - the 
seduction of truth. – ‘Truth’? Who has put this word in my mouth? But I repudiate 
it; but I disdain this proud word; no, we do not need even this; we would come to 
power and victory even without truth. The spell that fights on our behalf, the eye 
of Venus that charms and blinds even our opponents, is the magic of the extreme, 
the seduction that everything extreme exercises; we immoralists - we are the 
ones at the outermost point (Heidegger, 1987, p.132). 
 
In this passage, Nietzsche explains how to make values for life’s preservation and 
enhancement after the abolition of the true and apparent worlds. For Nietzsche, the 
immoralists who remove themselves from this valuation are the most powerful and do 
not need allies, because "truth" fights for them. Those who remove their thinking from 
the true and apparent worlds are "the outermost ones," and “immoralists" because 
they do not subscribe to such a metaphysics. By not subscribing to the true and 
apparent worlds, they do not copy the standards posited by this distinction. Instead, 
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the outermost ones use "justice" as a standard for values. It will become clear in the 
following section that the transcendent function adheres to justice as a standard for 
values. Jung’s transcendent function involves the thinking of an “immoralist” who 
removes his thinking from the true and apparent worlds and instead uses the law of 
contradiction to achieve justice to remove the obstructiveness of a complex from 
being-in-the-world. The transcendent function is powerful and does not need allies 
because “truth” fights for the immoralist who stands “at the outermost point” of ‘the 
they’ for life’s preservation and enhancement. 
 
6.10 Justice 
 
Heidegger says that the thought of justice is crucial as it reveals the fundamental 
meaning of the Will to Power for Nietzsche. Justice will therefore reveal a fundamental 
meaning of the transcendent function. Justice is thinking which values both life’s 
preservation and enhancement. Truth as the securing of chaos is necessary for life’s 
preservation, however, art is a higher value because it preserves and enhances life. 
Art enhances life because it transfigures forms and “creates possibilities for the self- 
surpassing of life at any given point of limitation” (Heidegger, 1987, p.140). Truth 
fixates chaos and therefore does not surpass itself. However, truth is a necessary 
value for life as it allows beings to exist and allows art to surpass truth to enhance the 
possibilities for life. 
 
Consequently, art and knowledge (truth) require each other as they both aim to 
embrace and guide human life within chaos. Therefore, the transcendent function 
assimilates the chaos of an obstructive complex by knowledge and art through the 
“transfiguration that commands and poetizes, establishes perspectival horizons, and 
fixates” (Heidegger, 1987, p.140). In this statement regarding justice and the 
transcendent function, it becomes clear that Nietzsche places values on the law of 
contradiction, which commands, instead of placing values on the true or apparent 
worlds as a guide. Heidegger points out that the law of contradiction guides justice to 
preserve and enhance life when he says, “holding-to be-true receives its measure from 
commanding and homoiosis as assimilation to chaos” (Heidegger, 1987, p.140). As  a 
result, the principle of non-contradiction in the schematising of the chaos of the 
obstructiveness of a complex is the measure and guides justice and the transcendent 
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function to preserve and enhance life. Heidegger explains that Nietzsche’s thought of 
justice, which is guided by the law of contradiction, can be best understood as 
schematising which “is the unified nexus of what is right - ‘right,’ rectus, is the ‘exact,’ 
the suitable, what makes sense, what fits-the nexus of what points in the right direction 
and what conforms to that direction” (Heidegger, 1987, p.141). 
 
6.11 Justice as Constructive, Exclusive, Annihilative Thinking 
 
Heidegger also refers to a note by Nietzsche titled "The ways of freedom", from 1884, 
to explain justice as Will to Power and with this I will elucidate the transcendent 
function. The note reads "Justice as a constructive, exclusive, annihilative mode of 
thought, arising from estimations of value: supreme representative of life itself” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.142). Heidegger recognises that when Nietzsche claims that 
justice is a ‘mode of thought’, he wants to emphasize that it is a particular mode of 
thinking. Justice is a particular mode of thinking for the transcendent function and this 
thinking involves “poetizing and commanding” and "arising from estimations of value" 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.142). Justice retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand by schematizing a horizon for life’s 
preservation and enhancement and the removal of the chaos of the obstructiveness 
of a complex. 
 
Heidegger explains that the Will to Power as justice is thinking which has three 
distinctive characteristics, described by Nietzsche consecutively and in order 
(constructive, exclusive, annihilative). These correspond to the stages of Jung’s 
transcendent function. Justice and the transcendent function are "constructive", which 
means that through schematising, justice, and the transcendent function build and 
retrieve what has not or does not yet exist within the chaos of the obstructiveness of a 
complex. Heidegger explains that constructive thinking does not copy something 
existing. Therefore, justice and the transcendent function are artistically creative and 
poetic in the schematising of a horizon, which retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood 
and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand. Through the law of contradiction, 
the constructive thinking of justice and the transcendent function creatively commands 
a “setting up and erecting, rising to the heights-more precisely, first gaining a height, 
securing it, and thus positing a ‘right direction’” (Heidegger, 1987, p.144) in order to 
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retrieve the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to- 
hand. Constructive thinking founds itself on the ground of the readiness-to-hand and 
opens a new outlook onto the chaos of the obstructiveness of a complex, and this view 
is what orders the construction and retrieval of the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand from the outset. Justice and the 
transcendent function retrieve and look for the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, which cannot be contradicted. This 
commands the schematising construction of the chaos to remove the obstructiveness 
of a complex for life’s preservation and enhancement. 
 
Justice and the transcendent function also involve “exclusive” thinking which highlights 
that constructive thinking does not work in a void. Constructive thinking is exclusive 
because it “moves within something that obtrudes and intrudes as something 
ostensibly definitive, something that would not only like to hinder construction but make 
it unnecessary” (Heidegger, 1987, p.144). Thus, constructive thinking retrieves the 
meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and 
“moves within” the obstructiveness of a complex, which “would not only like to hinder 
construction but make it unnecessary” (Heidegger, 1987). Justice and the 
transcendent function are exclusive when constructive thinking makes “incisive 
decisions about measures and heights” (Heidegger, 1987, p.144). Thus, constructive 
thinking is exclusive when decisions are made to select and schematize forms which 
are absent from contradiction. This retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to construct heights to remove the 
obstructiveness of a complex through the stabilisation of chaos. 
 
Finally, justice and the transcendent function are "annihilative" thinking, which involves 
erasing the chaos and obstructiveness of a complex from past constructions, which 
“had secured the permanence of life” (Heidegger, 1987, p.144). The elimination and 
removal of past constructions clear fixations that obstruct the new construction on the 
chaos of a complex. Heidegger explains, “Annihilation offers security against the 
pressure of all conditions of decline” (Heidegger, 1987, p.242) from the 
obstructiveness of a complex and therefore the transcendent function as “constructing 
(as a creating) embraces destruction” (Heidegger, 1987, p.242). Annihilation offers a 
new situation, which arises from the death of the dwarf inauthentic ego. As a result, 
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justice and the transcendent function as the Will to Power have the characteristics of 
thinking which constructs, excludes, and annihilates and through this way of thinking, 
make value-estimations to remove the obstructiveness of a complex for life’s 
preservation and enhancement. As Heidegger says, “the vitality of life consists in 
nothing other than that thinking which constructs, excludes, and annihilates” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.145). Jung’s transcendent function achieves this vitality of life’s 
preservation and enhancement by constructing, excluding, and annihilating to retrieve 
the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand 
which schematize and stabilise the obstructiveness and chaos of a complex. 
 
6.12 Justice and Power 
 
Together the three characteristics of thinking for justice and the transcendent function 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of Nietzsche’s Will to Power. 
The Will to Power and the transcendent function are comprehensible through justice 
because constructive thinking “surpasses itself, separates itself from itself, and brings 
what is fixated under and behind itself” (Heidegger, 1987, p.146) in order to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex. Consequently, the constructive thinking of the 
retrieval of the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness- 
to-hand of the transcendent function is a “self-surpassing, a becoming master of 
oneself from having climbed and opened a higher height. We call such self-surpassing 
heightening overpowering. It is the essence of power” (Heidegger, 1987, p.146). 
Jung’s transcendent function is “a becoming master of oneself” through “self- 
surpassing heightening overpowering” when the obstructiveness of a complex is 
removed from being-in-the-world in ‘the moment’ of its unification with its opposite, the 
ego. The self-surpassing heightening overpowering of the transcendent function is the 
“bite that is to overcome nihilism” and this is only truly achieved when the guilty mood 
of a complex from having-been or “the black snake has penetrated the gorge and its 
head has been bitten off” (Heidegger, 1984, p.180). 
 
Heidegger explains justice further in relation to the Will to Power by bringing our 
attention to another note by Nietzsche: "Justice, as the function of a panoramic power 
that looks beyond the narrow perspectives of good and evil, and thus has a broader 
horizon of advantage-the intention to preserve something that is more than this or that 
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person" (Heidegger, 1987, p.147). Heidegger recognises that when Nietzsche speaks 
of power he does not mean “‘one’ among and beside others, but that one power yet to 
be named that empowers beyond all others; the one that, corresponding to the 
designation "supreme representative," is the supreme power” (Heidegger, 1987, 
p.147). Additionally, when Heidegger says that Nietzsche states panoramic power 
looks beyond narrow perspectives, he explains that panoramic power means to open 
up perspectives in the chaos of valuation for life’s preservation and enhancement. 
Consequently, justice and the transcendent function open up perspectives to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex by looking beyond the narrow perspectives of good 
and evil and by doing this, panoramic power surpasses and excludes the 
obstructiveness of the perspectives of ‘morality’ of the true and apparent worlds, which 
does not value art higher than truth. Although previous perspectives of the readiness- 
to-hand are surpassed through the panoramic power of justice and the transcendent 
function, these previous perspectives of the readiness-to-hand are necessary and 
important for the construction of life’s preservation and enhancement as they 
determine if new constructions surpass and remove the obstructiveness of a complex 
from old constructions. 
 
6.13 The Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence of the Same 
 
Heidegger claims that justice, which is thinking that constructs, excludes and 
annihilates, is the function and the execution of the Will to Power. My work in this 
chapter argues that justice and the transcendent function are thinking that commands 
values, which schematise life’s preservation and enhancement. Heidegger states that 
in this commanding of justice, “‘the innermost conviction of superiority’ is what is 
decisive” (Heidegger, 1987, p.152). For him, justice that commands life’s preservation 
and enhancement makes the human being “superior with regard to oneself” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.152). Consequently, the meaning of the Will to Power and the 
transcendent function is to command values which schematise the chaos of the 
obstructiveness of a complex which makes the human superior to oneself by ‘excelling’ 
or ‘overpowering’ (Heidegger, 1987, p.153) life’s preservation and enhancement. By 
overcoming the nihilism of a guilty mood and the unconscious (complex), Dasein 
achieves the symbol of the Rebis in the tenth woodcut of the Rosarium Philosophorum. 
The Rebis represents an expression of a wholeness that “resolves all opposition and 
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puts an end to conflict” (Jung, 1966, p.317), making the human being “superior with 
regard to oneself”. 
 
Furthermore, Nietzsche contends that the Will to Power is the "enhancement of power" 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.153) which means that life is permanently enhanced through the 
preservation of becoming (or preserving enhancement). What this means is the Will 
to Power and the transcendent function are both truth (being) and art (becoming) 
thought together, and Heidegger highlights this with reference to one of Nietzsche’s 
notes from 1888: “To stamp Becoming with the character of Being-that is the supreme 
Will to Power” (Heidegger, 1987, p.156). This note demonstrates that the meaning of 
the Will to Power and the transcendent function involves the permanentizing Becoming 
of the removal of the obstructiveness of a complex into Being to achieve life’s 
preservation and enhancement. The meaning of Jung’s transcendent function as Will 
to Power is to preserve the art of Becoming and the enhancement of life from the 
removal of the obstructiveness of a complex as truth and Being of the readiness-to- 
hand. 
 
Heidegger refines the meaning of the Will to Power further when he observes that 
Nietzsche “thinks the Will to Power in an essential unity with ‘the eternal recurrence of 
the same’” (Heidegger, 1987, p.171). Consequently, for the Will to Power and the 
transcendent function to be overpowering they must also be the eternal recurrence of 
the same to remove the obstructiveness of a complex, achieve overpowering and the 
preservation and enhancement of life. The eternal recurrence of the same explains 
how the Will to Power and the transcendent function can constantly overpower the 
obstructiveness of a complex, to make art’s enhancement of life permanent as truth. 
 
Heidegger claims that Nietzsche’s statement "To stamp Becoming with the character 
of Being-that is the supreme Will to Power" means to “shape Becoming as being in 
such a way that as becoming it is preserved, has subsistence, in a word, is” 
(Heidegger, 1984, p.202). This means the Will to Power and the transcendent function, 
which removes the obstructiveness of a complex by retrieving the meaning of a guilty 
mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, is the eternal recurrence 
of the same. The eternal recurrence of the same makes the Will to Power and the 
transcendent function what it is by securing life’s enhancement by removing “eternally” 
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the obstructiveness of a complex in the constancy and permanency of truth. Dasein 
achieves the eternal recurrence of the same and Will to Power in the ‘Moment’ at the 
gateway in Zarathustra’s story. The avenue of the gateway that leads back symbolises 
the past where Dasein is guilty for falling prey, (where the complex is projected) 
compared to the avenue leading forward, symbolising the future (where the 
obstructiveness of a complex is removed from being-in-the-world). 
 
The Will to Power and the transcendent function look for values for life’s preservation 
and enhancement. If enhancement were to come to rest, they would not fulfil their 
essence as overpowering from the removal of the obstructiveness of a complex. Thus, 
the Will to Power and the transcendent function (as enhancing and overpowering) 
schematize and remove the obstructiveness and chaos of a complex to “essentially 
goes back into itself” (Heidegger, 1987, p.210) for life’s preservation and enhancement 
as the eternal recurrence of the same. Jung’s transcendent function and Nietzsche’s 
Will to Power make Becoming eternal in Being by surpassing the obstructiveness of a 
complex. This occurs by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities 
missing from the readiness-to-hand in the schematising chaos if the thinking that 
constructs excludes and annihilates makes life’s enhancement permanent through the 
eternal recurrence of the same. 
 
Finally, the Will to Power and the transcendent function overpowers through 
perspectives “in a way that previews and ‘sees through’” and this perspectival vista 
looks toward ‘conditions of preservation/enhancement’. The “‘viewpoints’ are values 
that are posited in such ‘seeing’ and they must be reckoned on and reckoned with” 
(Heidegger, 1987, p.197). These viewpoints determine the retrieval of possibilities 
missing from the readiness-to-hand. The removal of the obstructiveness of a complex 
to preserve and enhance life, provides the ways and means, hence the values, under 
which the world-which is essentially "chaos," is to be schematised and ordered by the 
readiness-to-hand with the transcendent function. It is clear that art is the value that is 
decisive to the Will to Power and the transcendent function as it provides overpowering 
to preserve life’s enhancement permanently from the removal of the obstructiveness 
of a complex through the eternal recurrence of the same. This is why Nietzsche calls 
art “‘the metaphysical activity’ of ‘life’” (Heidegger, 1984, p.29). Consequently, 
Nietzsche’s statement that "art is worth more than truth" is demystified because art, 
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as a transfiguration of the chaos and obstructiveness of a complex, unconceals and 
retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing for life’s enhancement, 
by overpowering the truth of the readiness-to-hand. 
 
6.14 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how gaining a deeper understanding of both Jung’s and 
Nietzsche’s work occurs by using Heidegger’s philosophy as a bridge to integrate their 
respective insights. Specifically, this involved showing the relationship between the 
transcendent function, complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum to Nietzsche’s 
Will to Power and Eternal Recurrence of the Same. In conclusion, my work using 
Heidegger’s philosophy in this chapter enhances and supports Patricia Dixon’s 
statement that when the transcendent function: 
 
is applied to Nietzsche's life and work, it becomes the Ariadne Thread that can 
guide through the labyrinth of apparent confusion and contradiction in Nietzsche 
toward a new understanding of his thought. It should be noted that this 
application is not an attempt to retroactively impose Jung's concept on 
Nietzsche's thought, but to clearly demonstrate that the same fundamental idea 
exists in Nietzsche; that it is adumbrated in Nietzsche's first book and 
progressively developed throughout his works. It is probable that, out of common 
interests (Nietzsche, a philosopher interested in psychology; Jung, a 
psychologist interested in philosophical issues) and a common preoccupation 
with man's spiritual life, they arrived at the same conclusions separately. 
Although uncredited and apparently unrecognized by Jung, there is an 
extraordinary and uncanny reflection of Nietzsche's thought in Jung's psychology 
(Dixon, 1988, p.4). 
 
I examine the reasons for this perculiar uncredited influence of Nietzsche’s ideas in 
Jung’s work in the following conclusion to my thesis. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Abstract 
 
In this conclusion, I summarise the contributions my thesis provides to both Jungian 
and Heideggerian literature. Specifically, I demonstrate that my thesis has been able 
to phenomenologically and ontologically explain and translate Jung’s psychological 
ideas on the transcendent function, complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum. My 
research elucidates the ontology of these ideas and unifies them to demonstrate that 
they form a part of a deeper explanation of the transcendent function. Furthermore, 
my work carries forward the tradition of Daseinsanalysis to include Jung’s psychology 
and I highlight how the work achieved in my thesis can contribute to the field of 
Daseinsanalysis. Additionally, I explore how my dissertation contributes to the small 
amount of research that has investigated the relationship between Heidegger and 
Jung, as well as elucidating the ambiguous relationship between Nietzsche and Jung. 
Finally, since the core and unifying concept of my thesis is the transcendent function, 
I integrate other research on the transcendent function, demonstrating how my 
findings can contribute to future research. 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In this final chapter, I summarise the findings and contributions my thesis offers to 
philosophy and psychoanalysis. I provide a summary that includes an explanation of 
some of the implications resulting from my research as well as my recommendations 
for future research. My conclusion illustrates that I have successfully achieved the 
objectives of my thesis and I demonstrate this by highlighting some of my findings. I 
also emphasize the implications of my findings for the theory and practice of Jungian 
psychology and Daseinsanalysis. 
 
I explain the importance and significance of the investigation of my thesis by referring 
to past research in this area and by highlighting the gaps in this field that my thesis 
addresses. Firstly, I show that my thesis carries Boss’s and Heidegger’s work forward 
by verifying and elucidating Jung’s psychological concepts with Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Secondly, I demonstrate that the findings from my research can be applied 
to the undeveloped area of Daseinsanalysis by adding Jung’s ideas to Boss’s and 
Heidegger’s work on Freud’s writing. Thirdly, I show how the findings in my thesis can 
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combine and complement other research that has used Heidegger’s philosophy to 
elucidate Jung’s work. I also show how my findings can combine with research that 
has investigated the relationship between Jung and Nietzsche. Finally, I demonstrate 
that my research augments secondary research on Jung’s transcendent function. I 
show that my findings can develop existing theories and understanding of the 
transcendent function and develop the application of this knowledge to psychotherapy. 
 
The aim of my thesis has been to re-interpret Jung’s psychoanalytic concepts in the 
“purified light of Heidegger’s phenomenology”. The Zollikon seminars organised by 
Boss focused on critiquing the psychoanalytic theory of Freud and consequently a 
Heideggerian critique of Jung’s theory did not occur. Consequently, the aim of my work 
has been to inspire psychotherapy by opening up a new view of Jungian psychology. 
My research contributes to the writings of Boss and Daseinsanalysis by continuing and 
carrying forward a Heideggerian critique of psychoanalysis. My writing fills a gap in 
this area of investigation by focusing on Carl Jung’s writing and adds to Boss’s 
interpretation of Freud to form a more comprehensive “regional ontology of psychiatry”. 
Furthermore, I extend the work initiated by Boss by translating Carl Jung’s 
psychoanalytical findings into the "language of description of phenomena" and as 
“particular modes of being in the world, which make them possible” (Loparic, 1999, 
p.14). Boss has outlined a regional ontology of psychiatry for Freud’s concepts 
including projection, identification, regression and repression, however, Jung’s work 
has not received the same attention. Therefore, I focused on a phenomenological 
explanation of three aspects of Jung’s writing: the transcendent function, complexes, 
and the Rosarium Philosophorum to expand the regional ontology of Daseinsanalysis. 
 
7.2 Jung and Heidegger 
 
A number of authors have recognised that Heidegger and Jung would have found “a 
brother in spirit” (Knowles, 2002, p.6)” if they had engaged with each other’s work. For 
example, Knowles notes that it is a surprise that an “engagement and dialogue never 
occurred between Heidegger and Jung” (Knowles, 2002, p.6). Combining the work of 
these thinkers has been the focus of my thesis. My thesis provides a better 
understanding of the interaction between philosophy and psychology and adds to the 
literature to investigate if “Jung and Heidegger were saying the Same differently” 
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(Knowles, 2002, p.245)61. 
 
Knowles has reviewed the literature comparing Jung and Heidegger and provided a 
summary of this research in the appendix of her thesis, which has been “presented in 
the hope that they may be useful in guiding further research” (Knowles, 2002, p.369). 
She points out that there has not been much work achieved in this area. Only a few 
researchers have written dissertations many years in the past on Jung and Heidegger. 
Brooke (Brooke, 1991) published a book over twenty-five years ago and he is the only 
person to date to write a book on Jung and Heidegger. Knowles’s literature review 
highlights the scarcity of research in this area as well as the lack of published work 
available to a wide audience. I have evaluated this existing research in my thesis and 
determined the areas that have not been investigated in the relationship between 
Heidegger and Jung, and this has formed the basis of my doctoral inquiry. 
 
My thesis develops Jung’s work by explaining his ideas with the help of 
phenomenology and ontology in order to provide connections and consistency 
between his ideas. Haule explains that a phenomenological destruction of Jung‘s 
writing is required because “there is a good deal of inconsistency in Analytical 
Psychology. Jung's jack-of-all-concepts way of thinking brings together a great variety 
of ill-fitting models and concepts which may at first approach be rather misleading” 
(Haule, 1973, p.59). Haule recommends that it is important to discover a consistent 
idea to assemble and unify Jung‘s “unsystematic thought” and “congeries of 
heterogeneous models” (Haule, 1973, p.59). To achieve this Haule suggests 
searching for an "unthought element" (Haule, 1973, p.59) in Jung's writing to bring his 
work together. By finding this unifying element, his work can be explained consistently 
and the interrelationship of different concepts can be understood. I have identified the 
inconsistency in Jung’s work where he has used a variety of concepts and where there 
is no explanation of their interrelationship. Hence, the aim of my thesis has been to 
discover a “unifying element” which is “unthought” by Jung in order to provide his work 
with a consistent concept. It turns out that this involves the interrelation of the 
transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum. I have been able 
to achieve this by explaining the interrelationship between these areas of Jungian 
                                               
61 This statement may be an exaggeration. My thesis shows similarities and that Jung’s work is grounded 
in Heidegger’s ontology but not that Jung and Heidegger were saying the same thing differently.  
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psychology with Heidegger’s philosophy. This provides a newfound consistency and 
an enhanced explanation of Jung’s psychology as exemplifying Nietzsche's Will to 
Power as interpreted by Heidegger. 
 
7.3 Jung and Theoretical Daseinsanalysis 
 
My thesis also demonstrates a Daseinsanalytic interpretation of Jung’s 
psychoanalysis. The phenomenological loyalty to lived experience principally 
distinguishes Daseinsanalysis from psychoanalysis where psychoanalysis explains 
human behaviour through “forces” or “dynamics” behind the experience. The 
distinction between the natural scientific view of human behaviour in psychoanalysis 
and the phenomenological view in Daseinsanalysis is evident when Freud states, “We 
do not seek merely to describe and classify phenomena but to comprehend them as 
indications of a play of forces in the mind, as expressions of tendencies striving 
towards a goal, which work together or against one another. In this conception, the 
trends we merely infer are more prominent than the phenomena we perceive” (Freud, 
1920, p. 60). 
 
Boss emphasizes that Daseinsanalysis constructs theories in psychology by 
remaining with what is perceived from the first-person experience and with what does 
“not get lost in ‘scientific’ abstractions, derivations, explanations, and calculations 
estranged from the immediate reality of the given phenomena” (Boss, 1963, p.30)62. 
Daseinsanalysis avoids the “dangerous scientific tendency to flee from the 
immediately given phenomena” (Boss, 1963, p.59) and unverified assumptions which 
construct abstractions “behind” direct experience. I adhere to the Daseinsanalytic 
method in my thesis and I explain the human behaviour described in Jung’s writing 
through phenomena that are directly encountered and able to be verified through 
immediate lived experience. As a result, the work in my thesis “is positive” (Boss, 1963, 
p.59) because I explain Jung’s ideas through lived experience rather than from “distant 
and abstract positions” (Boss, 1963, p.59)63. 
 
Heidegger’s philosophy allows Daseinsanalysis to gain access to the lived first person 
experience and explain behaviour which natural science cannot reach. Jung adheres 
                                               
62 See Boss (1957, p.117) for his criticism of the abstract and hypothetical nature of Jungian archetypes.  
63 Boss attempted to apply this to Jungian interpretations of dreams. See Boss (1957, p.118). 
210  
to natural scientific explanations that result in “conclusions that are alien to the actual 
appearance of our objects of study, with abstractions that depart from what can 
actually be seen” (Boss, 1977, p.84). Jung describes his psychological concepts of the 
transcendent function, complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum with the tools he 
has learnt from his training as a medical doctor. Consequently, Jung does not explain 
these ideas using the lived experience of phenomenology to prove their validity. For 
example, when Jung (Jung, 1971, p.289) describes the transcendent function he 
states: “Fantasy must be allowed the freest possible play, yet not in such a manner 
that it leaves the orbit of its object, namely the affect, by setting off a kind of ‘chain- 
reaction’ association process”. The problem here is that Jung does not validate his 
concepts such as fantasy, affect and chain-reaction association process from a 
description of the direct (first person) experience. Jung also constructs his ideas on 
complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum from the natural scientific perspective. 
My thesis corrects these aspects of Jung’s writing and by doing this contributes to 
Daseinsanalysis theory and Erik Craig’s (Craig, 1988) call for all psychoanalytic 
theories to be re-interpreted with Heidegger‘s fundamental ontology. 
 
Craig explains that Boss has led the way in this task by explaining a variety of 
psychoanalytic concepts such as “‘transference,’ ‘countertransference,’ ‘resistance,’ 
‘repetition compulsion’ and ‘acting out,’” “in the philosophically ‘purified’ light of 
phenomenological reflection” (Craig, 1988, p.15). Knowles (Knowles, 2002) 
recognises that Medard Boss did criticise Jung’s work in an interview in 1968 where 
Boss says: “He wanted to remain a natural scientist and at the same time to become 
a phenomenologist. That's like trying to be both wood and iron” (Knowles, 2002, p.39). 
However, this is as far as Boss’s critique extends. Therefore, my thesis has importantly 
filled this ‘knowledge gap’ left by Boss and other Daseinsanalysts by explaining Jung’s 
writing in the ‘purified’ light of phenomenology. Thus, my dissertation continues the 
work of Boss who aims to cure therapists “of what he refers to as "a new neurosis best 
called 'psychoanalytis'” (Craig, 1988, p.15), which means to explain the findings in 
psychoanalysis through the experientially validated method of phenomenology. 
 
7.4 Jung and Practical Daseinsanalysis 
 
Boss argues for an ontological grounding of psychoanalysis with Heidegger’s 
philosophy. This has led him to discover that the treatment of psychopathology should 
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focus on helping a person to be open to all of the possibilities available to them for 
existing (Boss, 1963, p.47). Boss argues that if a person inauthentically fails to fulfil 
their possibilities, they experience “guilt” (Boss, 1963, p.270). Thus, the objective of 
Daseinsanalysis is for the psychotherapist to assist the analysand to become aware 
of and acknowledge all of their life possibilities to enable them to discover their unique 
self through an authentic relationship to existence (Boss, 1963). My thesis is consistent 
with the goals of Daseinsanalysis and therefore my research develops the theory that 
guides Daseinsanalysis psychotherapy. This can be recognised since my thesis 
translates Jung’s writing into the language of Daseinsanalysis and provides a bridge 
between these two areas of therapeutic writing. More specifically, my work shows that 
Jung’s ideas on the transcendent function, complexes, and the Rosarium 
Philosophorum can assist Daseinsanalysts to help a person avoid pathological guilt 
and be open to all of the possibilities available to them. 
 
My work can also combine with a variety of other Daseinsanalytic findings. Hicklin 
(Hicklin, 1988) explains that Daseinsanalytic therapists are attentive to a person’s 
immediate ways of relating with the therapist to identify some historical ways they have 
obstructed their openness and freedom. Hicklin argues that this is important to identify, 
as a narrowing of a person’s being-in-the-world “leads to incomplete or inaccurate 
perception of one's world and one's self” (Hicklin, 1988, p.135). Hicklin refers to this 
inaccurate prejudicial perception of the world "paranoid experiencing" (Hicklin, 1988, 
p.135) and this can be observed as a defensive and closed off relationship to the 
psychotherapist. Hicklin explains that this "rigor mortis" (Hicklin, 1988, p.135) toward 
others and the world involves a strong resistance to change because it defends a 
person from experiencing pain and suffering. Hicklin suggests that a Daseinsanalytic 
therapist must appreciate and be empathetic to this resistance to assist a person to let 
go of closing off to their world. My thesis contributes to Hicklin’s work by explaining how 
the transcendent function can help a person open up to being-in-the-world. The 
transcendent function removes the obstructiveness of a complex, opens and frees a 
person to form a more accurate perception of the world. Hicklin’s work can also 
contribute to my thesis, by pointing out that a psychotherapist should be empathetic 
towards the analysand’s complex64. This allows the analysand to retrieve the meaning 
of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand so the 
                                               
64 This is supported by (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.229) “Empathy and sympathy in listening”. 
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transcendent function can remove the analysand’s “paranoid experiencing” and “rigor 
mortis”. 
Boss (Boss, 1988) acknowledges that helping a person to achieve complete openness 
to the world is not easy and that the difficulty of this task depends on the length of the 
closed relationship a person has had toward the world. Consequently, this assists the 
therapist to understand that the success of the transcendent function can depend on 
the length of the closed relationship to the world. Thus, the task of retrieving the 
meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand may be 
more challenging as the length of the closed relationship to the world increases. 
 
In “The self understanding of the psychotherapist” (Brenner, 1988), Brenner explains 
the importance of the self understanding of the psychotherapist who should reflect on 
their “own unique manner of erecting obstacles to free and open relationships” 
(Brenner, 1988, p.149). Brenner recommends this not only for the psychotherapists 
own mental health but also for the benefit of the patients who come to psychotherapy. 
This helps a psychotherapist understand how to help a person form the awareness of 
his or her own “life-denying patterns and conflicts” (Brenner, 1988, p.150). As a result, 
Brenner’s work suggests that it is also important that a psychotherapist applies the 
transcendent function to their own complexes or “life-denying patterns and conflicts”65 
to help their patients achieve an openness to the world. 
 
My findings also contribute to Petr Kouba’s work in his book The Phenomenon of 
Mental Disorder: Perspectives of Heidegger‘s Thought in Psychopathology (Kouba, 
2014). Kouba also recognises that the aim of Daseinsanalysis is “to help the patient to 
achieve an open and steady being-in-the-world” (Kouba, 2014, p.3) and that 
psychopathology can be explained as a deprivation (lack) of possibilities for being-in- 
the-world. Kouba is consistent with Daseinsanalysis where he argues that health 
involves being intimately involved with the world and therefore the aim of the therapy 
“proves to be both adaptation and liberation” (Kouba, 2014, p.100). Consequently, I 
combine Kouba’s work with my thesis on the transcendent function, as well as 
Daseinsanalysis, as all these perspectives involve helping a person to achieve 
adaptation, liberation and an open and steady being-in-the-world. 
                                               
65 Also supported by (Holzhey-Kunz, 2014, p.229) 
213  
Kouba explains that the goal of psychotherapy should be to remove all constraints, 
obstructions, and blocks from being-in-the-world in order to allow the person to achieve 
a cheerful and relaxed calmness that Heidegger refers to as Gelassenheit (see 
Gildersleeve, 2017 to see how this extends to Lacan)66. Consequently, Kouba claims 
that anxiety signals a “pathologically narrowed relation to the world” (Kouba, 2014, 
p.110). This is consistent with the arguments from my thesis since I explain that an 
encounter with a complex involves an experience of anxiety, guilt and the call of 
conscience. Thus, Kouba’s work supports my thesis that the experience of anxiety, 
guilt and the call of conscience is evidence of a “pathologically narrowed relation to 
the world” grounded in the complex. Furthermore, Kouba argues that anxiety is a proof 
of un-free and dependent existence and that a person can gain health when 
Gelassenheit replaces anxiety. Gelassenheit is evidence of the removal of 
pathological obstructions to “attain a truly free relation to the world” (Kouba, 2014, 
p.111). In other words, Jung’s transcendent function can be understood to allow a 
person to achieve Gelassenheit which brings the openness and unconcealment of the 
“significative and referential relations between beings” (Kouba, 2014, p.173) from 
authentically being-in-the-world. Kouba says the openness and freedom of 
Gelassenheit brings “consummate happiness” (Kouba, 2014) because this happiness 
is a “feeling that appears when the realization of all essential possibilities of behavior 
has been opened for individual existence” (Kouba, 2014, p.104). Consequently, the 
transcendent function brings happiness and health by guiding a person to discover 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to “encounter the significative 
richness of beings” (Kouba, 2014, p.104). This also removes guilt that is a 
consequence of not discovering possibilities available for being-in-the-world. 
Achieving health means, therefore, to discover and be open to possibilities available 
and to stand “open to the challenges and claims of what is announced in the 
significative and referential context of its world” (Kouba, 2014, p.104). Consequently, 
psychopathology is an experience of obstructiveness from complexes that prevent 
maximum openness to the world of possibilities. For Kouba, mental illness occurs 
because an individual cannot “adequately respond to the challenges and requirements 
of their surrounding” (Kouba, 2014, p.107). This occurs because a person has not 
discovered possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand. In other words, a complex 
is the “lack of the possibility available to the healthy person to assemble his responses 
                                               
66 This is also consistent with Binswanger (1963, p.142, p.252). 
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and behavior to be self-reliant, free, open and enduring in the face of whatever may 
be encountered” (Kouba, 2014, p.109). 
 
Kouba also claims that health should be understood as a person’s “ability to open itself 
to chaos as to that dimension in which all sense and order perish. Health proves itself 
in the ability to bear chaos and to come to terms with the disintegration of a firmly given 
order; its essence is the readiness to face situations in which the appearing reality 
makes no sense” (Kouba, 2014, p.160). My thesis reflects and supports this where I 
explain that the transcendent function allows a person to unify the ego with the chaos 
of the unconscious complex. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the transcendent 
function is the Will to Power. This has led me to explain that Jung’s transcendent 
function can preserve and enhance life because it allows Dasein to resolutely 
schematise “regularity and as many forms as our practical needs require” on the chaos 
of the obstructiveness of a complex. Dasein encounters the obstructiveness of chaos 
of a complex when Dasein is inauthentic and has not retrieved the meaning of a guilty 
mood or possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand. When Dasein resolutely 
retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness- 
to-hand, Dasein has understood and uncovered the order and law of the chaos to 
remove the obstructiveness of a complex from being-in-the-world. 
 
With this work combined, the definition of health is a person’s ability to be open to 
chaos. This allows Dasein to schematise “regularity and as many forms as our 
practical needs require” on the chaos of the obstructiveness of a complex so Dasein 
can respond to the challenges of being-in-the-world. Furthermore, Jung’s 
transcendent function assists a person in achieving health. Kouba says existing in a 
habitual understanding of being-in-the-world demands less health than exposure to 
the uncertainty of what is not understood (chaos). He argues that healthy development 
involves the disruption of the established order of understanding being-in-the-world 
followed by a new understanding of being-in-the-world. In contrast, illness does not 
achieve a new understanding and order from exposure to chaos. Consequently, my 
thesis contributes to Kouba’s work by highlighting that it is important for Dasein to 
expose itself to the chaos of a complex to remove its obstructiveness from being-in- 
the-world with the transcendent function. This produces healthy development as it 
allows a person to “adequately respond to the challenges and requirements of their 
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surrounding”. 
 
Finally, the transcendent function can also be explained to allow individuation to take 
place through a “disintegration and the subsequent reintegration of individual being” 
(Kouba, 2014, p.180). This occurs by bringing order to the obstructive chaos of a 
complex by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the 
readiness-to-hand. Dasein stands between order (readiness-to-hand) and chaos 
(unreadiness-to-hand) and the difference between health and illness “depends on the 
mode in which order and chaos relate to one another” (Kouba, 2014, p.194). Jung’s 
transcendent function promotes health by bringing order to the chaos of an obstructive 
complex by discovering possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand. Alternatively, 
illness involves being closed to bringing order to the chaos of a complex and therefore 
does not allow the transcendent function to discover possibilities missing from the 
readiness-to-hand. As a result, bringing my work together with Kouba’s is important to 
guard against the tendency to categorize health as a lack of suffering. As an 
alternative, it is important to recognise that suffering from the experience of the chaos 
of the obstructiveness of a complex allows a new form of openness to being-in-the- 
world. This openness to being-in-the-world occurs through the discovery of 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and therefore “suffering is the price 
we pay for our freedom” (Kouba, 2014, p.196). 
 
7.5 Roger Brooke 
 
I now combine the findings from my thesis with the work of Roger Brooke who has 
used Heidegger’s philosophy to explain a number of Jung’s ideas. My research 
combined with Brooke’s work allows the transcendent function to be understood to 
enable individuation because individuation is “the calling for a deepened and 
awakened consciousness…from the world itself” (Brooke, 2000, p.19). The 
transcendent function provides a deepened and awakened consciousness by enabling 
a person to unconceal possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand, which 
removes the obstructiveness of a complex from the world. The transcendent function 
is “a response to the appeal from the things of the world to be brought into the 
affirmative light of human consciousness” (Brooke, 2000, p.22). The experience of the 
appeal from the world involves angst, guilt and the call of conscience from the 
obstructiveness of a complex. This appeal from the call of conscience is calling Dasein 
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to discover the meaning of the guilt and angst experienced from the obstructiveness 
of the unreadiness-to-hand. Discovering the possibilities missing from the readiness- 
to-hand brings the world into the light of consciousness. 
 
Furthermore, the transcendent function removes the obstructiveness of a complex 
from the world to achieve a wholeness. This is explained in Brooke’s writing as “a 
quality of undefensive openness in situations, and thus to a sense of being 
appropriately at home in the world” (Brooke, 2015, p.122). Additionally, the 
convergence between the work in my thesis and Brooke’s work is recognisable when 
he says, on the one hand, “the call to realise the potentialities of the self is a call to 
disclose the world in its various possibilities” and, on the other, that “Individuation is 
the development of consciousness. This involves the increasing differentiation of self- 
world possibilities” (Brooke, 2015, p.121). My dissertation clarifies this by showing that 
the transcendent function enables individuation by disclosing possibilities to remove 
the obstructiveness of a complex. Jung’s transcendent function aims to retrieve the 
meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and this 
is consistent with Brooke’s explanation of self-realisation which “is a movement 
towards wholeness, the wholeness is a relative term which points to a capacity to 
remain flexible and responsive in a variety of contexts” (Brooke, 2015, p.122). The 
transcendent function removes the obstructiveness of a complex by discovering “the 
world in its various possibilities” and this enables a person to be flexible and 
responsible in a variety of contexts. 
 
As a result, the transcendent function increases an openness to being-in-the-world by 
removing the obstruction of the chaos of a complex. This is achieved by discovering 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand and Brooke explains this by saying 
“paradoxically, the move to increasing openness and freedom is a process that 
deepens one’s sense of oneself and one’s experience of those beings with which one 
is engaged” (Brooke, 2015, p.122). The transcendent function unconceals the Self 
archetype which “is the embracing totality out of which individuality and identity 
emerge; it is realised at all levels of psychological development as a world with which 
one is engaged; as a gathering of the world it brings the world into being in the light of 
human consciousness” (Brooke, 2015, p.109). 
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The transcendent function retrieves the meaning of a guilty mood and discovers 
possibilities missing from the readiness-to-hand to enable the Self to emerge. A guilty 
mood arises as a call from the Self, which calls the ego to retrieve possibilities missing 
from the readiness-to-hand so the Self and world, can emerge. This is supported by 
Brooke who says “the self condemns one through guilt feelings (usually lived as 
neurosis) if one ignores the call” (Brooke, 1985, p.169). Dasein experiences guilt when 
the obstructiveness of a complex is encountered because this experience indicates 
that “one has failed, in a deep sense, in one’s responsiveness to the world” (Brooke, 
1985, p.169). My thesis adds to this by showing that the experience of the 
obstructiveness of a complex allows individuation to take place. Dasein achieves this 
by retrieving the meaning of a guilty mood and possibilities missing from the readiness- 
to-hand and this is a “gathering of relations and potentials that is often lived blindly, 
without conscious affirmation.” Thus, the transcendent function allows “the ego’s 
appropriation of the self” (Brooke, 2009, p. 605). In other words, the transcendent 
function allows the ego to expand its understanding of the Self and world and therefore 
“Self-realisation is also the realisation of the world” (Brooke, 1985, p.169). 
 
7.6 Jung and Nietzsche 
 
My thesis helps to explain Patricia Dixon’s statement that “Jung formalizes and gives 
a name (‘transcendent function’) to a process that is implicit throughout Nietzsche's 
work and basic to his philosophy”. I have shown that “Jung's notion of transcendent 
function plays a fundamental role in Nietzsche's philosophy; as a methodological 
procedure, it finds almost endless variety of expression in his writings” (Dixon, 1988, 
p.3). By demonstrating the compatibility of Jung’s and Nietzsche’s writing throughout 
my thesis, my work also supports Dixon when she says “It is held that the basic tenets 
of Jungian psychology illustrate and verify Nietzsche's message” (Dixon, 1988, p.3). 
 
As a result, by reading Jung alongside Nietzsche through Heidegger, my research 
gains “a deeper understanding of Nietzsche, and possibly to revise thinking on areas 
of his thought that are most frequently unappreciated or misunderstood” (Dixon, 1988, 
p.3). My work adds to Dixon’s argument “that the quest for wholeness, a prominent 
theme in C. G. Jung’s psychology, is the dominating theme in the life and work of 
Friedrich Nietzsche” (Dixon, 1988, p.ii) and highlights this with Heidegger’s philosophy 
in a new way. 
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Dixon argues that this “striving for wholeness is designated by Jung as the ‘process of 
individuation’. Like Nietzsche's ‘revaluation of values,’ it is a psychological process of 
self-integration: by recognizing and affirming the opposing aspects of his nature” 
(Dixon, 1988, p.ii). My work supports Dixon’s arguments and her work supports mine, 
particularly chapters 4, 5 & 6. This can be seen when Dixon argues that for both Jung 
and Nietzsche “a new equilibrium is established where the center of the personality no 
longer coincides with the conscious ego but with a point midway between the 
conscious and unconscious. The new center of the personality Jung calls the ‘self’ 
(Nietzsche the ‘higher self’) - the center and the totality of the personality which 
integrates all of its opposing aspects into one harmonious whole” (Dixon, 1988, p.iii). 
 
Dixon’s work also supports the arguments I have made in my thesis, particularly in 
chapter 6. This can be found when she claims that Jung’s transcendent function is 
articulated as “The ‘Primordial Unity’ of Nietzsche's first book - later expressed as ‘Life’ 
and ultimately as the ‘Will to Power’ - is a unifying principle that brings opposites 
together in an energy-enhancing tension that provides the power for transformation” 
(Dixon, 1988, p.7). Dixon further highlights the similarity between these two thinkers 
when she says, “For Nietzsche, as for Jung, the word ‘sickness’ connotes 
fragmentation and disunity, whereas ‘health’ is synonymous with ‘wholeness’ and 
always involves a union of opposites”. Nietzsche’s implicit understanding of Jung’s 
transcendent function is evident since “Nietzsche advocates a new ‘great health’ which 
corresponds to an all-embracing whole whereby ‘all opposites are blended into a new 
unity’” (Dixon, 1988, p.134). Dixon finds a number of other convergent themes in the 
work of both Jung and Nietzsche. These include: The collective unconscious, both 
experienced a ‘breakdown’ (Jung - Freud, Nietzsche - Wagner) that inspired their work, 
the idea of a ‘persona,’ or ‘mask’, the anima & animus, dreams, ‘the whole man’ or 
‘overman’. She claims both Nietzsche and Jung advocate, “Opposition breeds struggle 
that leads to wholeness” and “that there was a ‘rightful path’ - a predestined ‘task’ - for 
each individual, discoverable ‘in the deepest and most sacred part of his being’” 
(Dixon, 1988, p.194). Finally, Dixon also argues, “neurosis might actually be a warning 
signal which indicated when a person, perhaps through adherence to a false set of 
values or evasion of responsibilities, was straying too far from his own true path” (Dixon, 
1988, p.277). It is important to take from my thesis that the transcendent function puts 
a person on what we can arguably call their ‘true path’. 
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Dixon further supports the argument presented in my thesis that Jung’s transcendent 
function is Nietzsche’s Will to Power when she suggests that the “tension of opposites 
is seen as the condition of human advancement” (Dixon, 1988, p.262) for both Jung 
and Nietzsche. Nietzsche writes about the unification of opposites when he says "Man 
in contrast to the animal, has trained up an abundance of opposite urges and impulses 
in himself: by reason of this synthesis he is lord of the earth" and “the greatest men 
are those who unite the most antagonistic traits”. Jung’s work also illustrates this: 
"Every creative person is a duality or a synthesis of contradictory qualities" and "the 
greater the tension, the greater is the potential. Great energy springs from a 
correspondingly great tension between opposites" (Dixon, 1988, p.263). 
 
Dixon supports my arguments once again when she states that the transcendent 
function “is adumbrated in the opening section of Nietzsche's first book, The Birth of 
Tragedy, and serves as a model which progressively develops through his works, 
reaching its fullest expression in the Noontide vision of Eternal Recurrence in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra” (Dixon, 1988, p.317). The transcendent function and Will to Power 
aim to achieve the same thing where a person “gathers all that is scattered and 
multifarious and raises it to the original form of the One” or, in the words of Nietzsche, 
the “great style demands one strong fundamental will and abhors incoherence most” 
(Dixon, 1988, p.320). The transcendent function and Will to Power takes a person to 
the “living center” in “the deepest and most sacred part of his being," he finds himself 
"in the bosom of the Primordial One" (Nietzsche) and discovers “the One who dwells 
within" (Jung) (Dixon, 1988, p.320). In other words, the transcendent function and Will 
to Power occur as “The Self provides the missing piece, the shard as it were, of the 
broken wholeness of our psyche” (Dixon, 1988, p.321). 
 
7.7 Jung’s Resistance Toward Nietzsche 
 
The previous section, as well as the contents of my thesis, makes a strong argument 
that in certain respects Jung and Nietzsche are saying the same thing differently. 
Huskinson also supports the validity of my arguments and the importance of their 
contribution to the literature when she claims, “Nietzsche’s influence on Jung is 
significant” (Huskinson, 2004, p.87) and that “Nietzsche’s influence on Jungian 
analytical psychology has received little attention, and even less by way of thorough 
evaluation. This is surprising, almost embarrassing, as the similarities between the 
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thought of Nietzsche and Jung are obvious” (Huskinson, 2004, p.1). Huskinson 
highlights a number of similarities in the work of Jung and Nietzsche. Her arguments 
can be seen to support the arguments in my thesis and the work of Dixon when she 
says, “When the opposites fail to synthesize, or when only one opposite in the pair is 
present, Nietzsche and Jung warn of impending psychological damage” (Huskinson, 
2004, p.3). 
 
Huskinson sees that “For both Nietzsche and Jung the union of opposites represents 
the whole self – the Übermensch and Self respectively” and argues that Nietzsche 
anticipates “the fundamental tenets of Jung’s individuation process and of analytical 
psychology in general” (Huskinson, 2004, p.88). Huskinson also cites Roderick Peters 
in order to highlight the similarity between Jung’s Self and Nietzsche’s Superman 
(overman): “The Superman . . . is to be understood as the Self, [and] the doctrine 
preached by Zarathustra is none other than the doctrine of individuation” (Huskinson, 
2004, p.98). Huskinson confirms the work in my thesis on The Gay Science and 
Rosarium Philosophorum. For example, she writes, “the Übermensch and Self are in 
a continual dynamic state of creation; they are defined by reformulation – by birth, 
death and rebirth” and “The Übermensch and Self are expressions of this continuous 
Dionysian cycle of destruction and creativity” (Huskinson, 2004, p.93). 
 
Huskinson’s opinion on Jung’s relationship to Nietzsche can be summarised as 
follows. She states “I shall argue that, although Jung does not fully acknowledge it, 
Nietzsche anticipates the principal aspects of the Self’s realization: its psychic 
foundation, the ‘collective unconscious’; the process of ‘individuation’; the typological 
arrangement of the Self; and the particular archetypes encountered in the individuation 
process (the shadow, the anima/animus and the Self)” (Huskinson, 2004, p.98). She 
goes on to explain that it is peculiar that of the “seven affinities between Nietzsche and 
Jung only one is explicitly acknowledged by Jung, and then only in part” (Huskinson, 
2004, p.105). Huskinson delves deeper into this lack of referencing by Jung by 
analysing “in detail Jung’s ambivalent relationship with Nietzsche’s work and 
personality”; her work attempts “to explain the reasons that lie behind the ambivalence” 
(Huskinson, 2004, p.3). Huskinson argues that Jung does not reference Nietzsche for 
many of his ideas because he “has tried to distance himself from Nietzsche” 
(Huskinson, 2004, p.106). This becomes clearer when she suggests that “Jung 
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overlooks obvious passages in Nietzsche’s work” and that “One has an overwhelming 
sense that Jung is purposely selective in his reading of Nietzsche” (Huskinson, 2004, 
p.2). 
 
Huskinson argues that Jung tries to hide “his own personal unease with some of the 
material presented in Nietzsche – material that Jung often skates over at an alarming 
rate” and this also explains why Jung was motivated to mock “Nietzsche’s personality 
and … his personal life” (Huskinson, 2004, p.3). Huskinson also points out that Jung 
tries to distance himself from Nietzsche by arguing that Nietzsche’s philosophy is “one- 
sided, and that this failure is the cause of Nietzsche’s eventual mental collapse” 
(Huskinson, 2004, p.109). However, she dismisses this claim by Jung and instead 
suggests, “Nietzsche’s insanity was not, as Jung claims, the result of a onesided ego- 
inflation” (Huskinson, 2004, p.122). She argues Jung only says this to “dissociate 
himself from Nietzsche in his work” (Ibid) and as a defence against identifying with the 
similarity between Nietzsche and himself. 
 
Huskinson goes further to state that “Jung is strangely reluctant to acknowledge what 
I believe are great affinities between his and Nietzsche’s models of the union of 
opposites”. She also claims that “Jung’s criticisms, and his reasons for separating his 
model from that of Nietzsche, are suspect, and can be dismissed with relative ease” 
(Huskinson, 2004, p.131). She recognises that Jung omits numerous passages in his 
seminar on Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and she believes this occurs “to cover 
up the fact that the theories and personalities of Nietzsche and Jung are similar” 
(Huskinson, 2004, p.133). With this, Huskinson lays out the crux of her argument, that 
“Jung would unconsciously accept those affinities between his model and Nietzsche’s 
that I argue for, but he consciously rejects them out of a fear of the implications. An 
explicit identification with Nietzsche’s model would be nothing less than identification 
with (the insanity of) Nietzsche himself” (Ibid). 
 
This is also supported by a strange detail noted by Bishop where “the seminar notes 
were for the exclusive use of ‘members of the Seminar with the understanding that 
[they were] not to be loaned and that no part of [them was] to be copied or quoted for 
publication without Professor Jung’s written permission’” (Huskinson, 2004, p.134). 
Huskinson suggests this exclusiveness occurred because “Jung did not want these 
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notes to fall into the hands of those who would interpret them in a non-Jungian way – 
that is, those that were not in awe of the ‘great man’, and who might see his faults or 
anything he might wish to hide” (Huskinson, 2004, p.134). Bishop, who highlights the 
strangely obsessive and paranoid behaviour of Jung, also supports this claim: “Jung 
directed the literary material down the interpretative paths he wished to follow, and 
one has the distinct sense that Jung never lost control over the discussion” (Bishop, 
1995, p.269). Peters who writes “there are times when it feels as if he has to be the 
one who knows” (Huskinson, 2004, p.134) also emphasizes this. With this, Huskinson 
is even more convinced that Jung was trying to “hide or divert the seminars away from 
what he did not want to talk about: his own psychological disposition” (Ibid). 
 
Jung’s autobiography gives some indication as to why he was reluctant to be explicit 
about the similarities between himself and Nietzsche. For example, Jung says he 
“‘hesitated’ to read Nietzsche” because of his reputation: “At that time [Nietzsche] was 
much discussed, mostly in adverse terms” and “there were some persons at the 
university who had known Nietzsche personally and were able to retail all sorts of 
unflattering tidbits about him” (Huskinson, 2004, p.135). Jung says that he hesitated 
reading Nietzsche because he “was held back by a secret fear that I might perhaps be 
like him”. Jung also said “I feared I might be forced to recognize that I too was another 
such strange bird . . . [Nietzsche] could well afford to be something of an eccentric, but 
I must not let myself find out how far I might be like him” (Ibid). Huskinson concludes 
that Jung’s resistance to recognising the compatibility of his ideas with Nietzsche’s 
was due to “Jung’s ‘secret fear’ of being like Nietzsche – of being ‘forced to recognize’ 
that he too was ‘an eccentric’” (Ibid). 
 
With this, Huskinson clarifies Jung’s peculiar relationship to Nietzsche to suggest that 
Jung misrepresents Nietzsche’s philosophy as one-sided and “In accordance with their 
common model for the diagnosis of mental illness, Nietzsche is not a mentally ill 
personality per se, but Jung is. Jung is mentally ill according to his own insights” 
(Huskinson, 2004, p.150). My thesis supports Huskinson and the other writers outlined 
above, that Jung’s and Nietzsche’s work “said the same thing differently” and any 
denial of this by Jung can now be comprehended as Jung’s “one-sided interpretation 
of Nietzsche” (Ibid) due to Jung trying to distance himself from his “‘secret fear’ of 
being like Nietzsche” (Huskinson, 2004, p.135). 
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It is also important to highlight what Huskinson says about Jung’s understanding of 
Nietzsche’s Will to Power. Huskinson claims that Jung misunderstood Nietzsche’s Will 
to Power and that he “rejects the Will to Power, because he believes it is a one-sided 
doctrine” he thinks it is a “theory of power as domination” (Huskinson, 2004, p.154). In 
contrast to Jung’s misinterpretation due to his need to distance himself from Nietzsche, 
Huskinson insists, “this is certainly not the case, if by ‘power as domination’, Jung 
means physical power over others. The Will to Power is the unifying force of creativity 
and, according to Nietzsche, it is this discipline necessary for self-integration that 
evinces greater power than undisciplined brute strength” (Ibid). This is important for 
my thesis since both chapter 7 and my conclusion insist that Jung’s transcendent 
function is the same as Nietzsche’s Will to Power. Huskinson’s work supports my 
conclusion that Jung’s transcendent function is Nietzsche’s Will to Power since she 
also recognises that “Nietzsche’s Will to Power is the energy that unites the opposites. 
It can be understood as a process of compensation” (Huskinson, 2004, p.155). As a 
result, Jung’s rejection of Nietzsche’s Will to Power is “not the one-sided doctrine that 
Jung maintains” (Ibid) and Jung’s misrepresented comments about the Will to Power 
can be understood as having occurred due to his need to distance himself from the 
‘strange bird’ Nietzsche. 
 
Finally, Paul Bishop’s work also supports the conclusions from my thesis. Bishop 
argues, “Jung’s intellectual development can be read in detail as a reception of 
Nietzsche’s thinking” (Bishop, 1995, p.20). Jung’s autobiography corroborates this: “I 
was twenty-four when I read Zarathustra. I could not understand it, but it made a 
profound impression upon me” (Bishop, 1995, p.248). Bishop suggests that Jung’s 
breakdown in 1916 led him to “to understand Nietzsche in terms of his system of 
Analytical Psychology” (Ibid). 
 
Bishop’s work is directly supportive and informative to my conclusions on Jung’s 
transcendent function. For example, Bishop reports that Nietzsche’s Superman 
“represented nothing other than his own doctrine of individuation, which, defined by 
Jung as the gathering of the world to one’s self, accomplishes a meaningful (because 
structured) union of consciousness and the Unconscious (and all other opposites)” 
(Bishop, 1995, p.293). He also highlights a very clear connection between Jung’s 
transcendent function and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. This can be recognised when in 
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Ecce Homo Nietzsche says, “all opposites are in Zarathustra bound together into a 
new unity” (Bishop, 1995, p.351). Lastly, Bishop connects Jung and Nietzsche again 
when he says “The task of Jungian psychology is thus to mediate this opposition by 
means of the transcendent function, and Jung casts this idea in the Nietzschean terms 
of ‘value’” (Bishop, 1995, p.122). This work by Bishop can also be seen to be 
instructive to the application of the findings from my thesis when he concludes these 
“values must be revalued not just once, but ceaselessly; the opposites must be 
overcome over and over again; and the dialectic between consciousness and the 
Unconscious is a life’s work” (Bishop, 1995, p.123). 
 
7.8 The Transcendent Function 
 
Another key contribution my thesis provides is that it develops the theoretical and 
practical understanding of the primary and secondary research on the transcendent 
function. Specifically, my thesis not only enhances Jung’s writing but also contributes 
to Miller’s work (Miller, 2004) in his book The Transcendent Function. Miller’s book is 
entirely devoted to explaining and understanding the meaning of the transcendent 
function. This book is very important to my thesis (and arguably vice versa) as these 
two works are the only book-length investigations to explain the transcendent function. 
 
Miller’s book demonstrates that the transcendent function “is the wellspring from 
whence flows other key Jungian structures such as the archetypes and the Self, and 
is the core of the individuation process” (Miller, 2004, p.142). His book supports the 
arguments that I have made in this conclusion concerning the relationship between 
the transcendent function, individuation, wholeness and the Self. This can be 
appreciated when Miller says the transcendent function “has a central role in the self- 
regulating nature of the psyche, individuation, and the Self’s drive toward wholeness” 
(Miller, 2004, p.5). 
 
My research demonstrates that the transcendent function is a “unifying element” in 
Jung’s work and provides some consistency to the variety of concepts he presents. 
Miller comes to the same conclusion I do as he shows “that the transcendent function 
is linked with virtually all the concepts that are at the core of Jung’s psychology” (Miller, 
2004, p.77). It is important to understand the transcendent function in this way because 
“Up to now, we have been viewing the transcendent function as one of a number of 
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distinct pieces of Jung’s paradigm” (Miller, 2004, p.77); this understanding can 
enhance future research. Miller also adds that “the transcendent function is implicated 
by and inextricably intertwined with most, if not all, of Jung’s other seminal ideas” 
(Miller, 2004, p.77). I draw attention to this in my thesis as complexes and the 
Rosarium Philosophorum both contribute to explaining the meaning of the 
transcendent function. 
 
Miller’s examples of the central organising position of the transcendent function are 
different to the arguments I present in my thesis. For example, Miller focuses on 
showing that the Self “grows out of the idea of the transcendent function” (Miller, 2004, 
p.77). He also says, “Individuation, Jung’s seminal idea about a purposive psyche 
pulling us forward in a teleological way, cannot occur without the constant and 
repeated operation of the transcendent function” (Miller, 2004, p.77). Miller also notes, 
“opposites, fantasy, symbol” all are dependent on the transcendent function. This 
results in him stating, “If the Jungian paradigm is pictured as a web of intertwined 
concepts, each of which somehow implicates the others, it would be no exaggeration 
to say that the transcendent function lies at or near the center of that web” (Miller, 
2004, p.77). Horne who says the transcendent function is “the heart of [Jung’s] 
paradigm” (Miller, 2004, p.78) also supports this. This leads Miller to suggest that 
“Given this centrality, it is mystifying that there has not been more written about the 
transcendent function. Though frequently mentioned in writings on Jung’s psychology, 
it is rarely identified as a core concept” (Miller, 2004, p.78). My thesis has addressed 
some of this gap by demonstrating that the transcendent function is the core concept 
for complexes and the Rosarium Philosophorum. 
 
Miller also claims, “everything else that Jung proposed represented merely a 
refinement or differentiation of that phenomenon” (Miller, 2004, p.78). He argues “it 
may have been the working of the transcendent function for Jung personally that 
allowed him to access the unconscious in a way that led to the formulation of the other 
aspects of his psychology” (Miller, 2004, p.79). My investigation supports these 
statements by showing that the transcendent function has various facets and ways to 
be described and is a unifying element of Jung’s writing. This insight reveals that 
different aspects of the transcendent function can be discovered and a deeper 
understanding of the transcendent function can be found when Jung’s other works are 
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examined as a facet of the transcendent function. With this, new pathways are open 
to future research to discover hermeneutically the transcendent function in more 
clarity, complexity, and detail. 
 
Miller argues that by recognising the importance of the transcendent function for all of 
Jung’s writing an abyss of new understanding is opened. As a result of this new 
understanding, Miller identifies the concept of the transcendent function written 
implicitly “in other areas of psychology” (Miller, 2004, p.80). This provides an avenue 
to a deeper understanding of the meaning of the transcendent function by seeing the 
same concept presented in different ways. Miller suggests that the writing of others 
can “enunciate ideas and structures that reflect aspects of the transcendent function” 
(Miller, 2004, p.85) and that by examining similarities in explanations, differences can 
be identified which allow a deeper meaning of the transcendent function to emerge. 
He also points out that the transcendent function is understandable in relation to other 
theories to “broaden the landscape of the transcendent function” (Miller, 2004, p.97). 
 
Miller highlights this task by showing the similarities and differences of the concept of 
the transcendent function in “Winnicott’s transitional object/phenomena, Freud’s ego, 
Kohut’s selfobject, Klein’s depressive position, Fordham’s deintegration-reintegration 
cycle, Hillman’s soul, and the other non-depth analogies” (Miller, 2004, p.98). He 
claims this demonstrates “how fundamental to all of psychology the idea of a dialogue 
with unconscious, unacknowledged, unaccepted, and/or unknown material is” (Miller, 
2004, p.98). This suggests that the work I present in my thesis can also be developed 
and understood in ways that are more extensive by relating it to these other 
psychological theories (Gildersleeve, 2017). Miller states the transcendent function 
can explain all psychological growth and this idea of the psyche transforming from one 
state to another by mediating between different psychic states is widespread in the 
psychological literature. As a result, the findings from my thesis are applicable to all 
areas of research involving psychological growth. 
 
Finally, my research can contribute to and combine with work by Powell that explains 
the importance of understanding transference in connection with the transcendent 
function. Powell argues that it is important to understand a psychoanalyst’s role in 
meditating the transcendent function. She suggests that the analyst can assist a 
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patient in this task by understanding the patient through transference as this can build 
a bridge to unifying the ego and the unconscious. Powell explains that the 
psychoanalyst’s ability to unify their ego with their unconscious as a result of 
transference from the patient is essential to support the patient until they are able to 
“tolerate the tensions of psychic suffering when the opposites are encountered” 
(Powell, 1985, p.31). She points out that this understanding is equivalent to the 
theories of Klein, Winnicott, Bion and Kohut “where the analyst is seen to function as 
object/container, or self-object” (Powell, 1985, p.31). As a result, extending the 
findings from my thesis can also take place by combining it with the work of these 
psychoanalysts. 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
In this conclusion, I have highlighted a summary of contributions that my thesis 
provides to the Heideggerian and Jungian literature. In particular, I have demonstrated 
that my thesis has important implications for the theory and practice of Jungian 
psychology and Daseinsanalysis. My work extends the writings initiated by Boss and 
Heidegger in the Zollikon seminars by translating Carl Jung’s psychoanalytical findings 
into the "language of description of phenomena" and as “particular modes of being in 
the world, which make them possible”. Furthermore, my thesis has aimed to discover 
a “unifying element” which is “unthought” by Jung to provide Jung’s work with a 
consistent concept, which shows the interrelation of the transcendent function, 
complexes, and the Rosarium Philosophorum. I explained the interrelationship 
between these areas of Jungian psychology with Heidegger’s philosophy to provide 
consistency and an enhanced explanation of his psychology as exemplifying 
Nietzsche's Will to Power, as interpreted by Heidegger. In addition, my conclusion 
demonstrates that my work contributes to the small amount of research that 
investigates the relationship between Heidegger and Jung and between Jung and 
Nietzsche. Finally, my research develops the theoretical and practical understanding 
of primary and secondary research on Jung’s transcendent function. In summary, my 
thesis retrieves a variety of Jung’s and Heidegger’s writing as well as secondary 
research in these areas. This has led me to articulate a new understanding of the 
relationship between Jung and Heidegger as well as between philosophy and 
psychology. I have also extended the findings from my thesis to a book chapter on 
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Freud (Gildersleeve, 2016d67) and to a number of journal publications on Lacan and 
Zizek (Gildersleeve, 2016a; Gildersleeve, 2016b; Gildersleeve, 2016c; Gildersleeve, 
2017). My thesis and these publications provide a variety of new possibilities to be 
investigated in future research in philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis and 
Daseinsanalysis. 
                                               
67 Cf Holzhey-Kunz’s brief connection between Heidegger and Freud concerning the Oedipus complex 
(2014, p.150) 
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